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The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs
Oxford: Oxford University Press (2020)
Abstract
Lisa Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs are epistemically innocent and deliver significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. While the benefits of the irrational belief may not outweigh the costs, epistemic innocence helps to clarify the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency.Author's Profile
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Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs, by Lisa Bortolotti.Daniel Williams - 2021 - Mind 132 (526):549-558.
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Citations of this work
Agency-First Epistemology of Psychedelics.Lisa Bortolotti & Kathleen Murphy-Hollies - 2022 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 3.
Autonomy as an Ideal for Neuro-Atypical Agency: Lessons from Bipolar Disorder.Elliot Porter - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Kent
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