Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208 (2005)
AbstractI argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson (1985a) need to be met for the background of rationality to be in place
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Citations of this work
Delusions and Dispositionalism About Belief.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (5):596-628.
Capgras Delusion: An Interactionist Model.Garry Young - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):863-876.
A Davidsonian Perspective on Psychiatric Delusions.Marga Reimer - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):659 - 677.
The Phenomenological Role of Affect in the Capgras Delusion.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2008 - Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):195-216.
References found in this work
On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:5-20.