Delusions and the background of rationality

Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208 (2005)
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Abstract

I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson (1985a) need to be met for the background of rationality to be in place

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Lisa Bortolotti
University of Birmingham

Citations of this work

Delusional Evidence-Responsiveness.Carolina Flores - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6299-6330.
Delusion.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Delusions and Dispositionalism about Belief.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (5):596-628.
Capgras delusion: An interactionist model.Garry Young - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):863-876.

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References found in this work

Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:5-20.
Minimal Rationality.Christopher Cherniak - 1986 - MIT Press. Edited by Christopher Cherniak.
Intentional systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.

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