Intentionality without rationality

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):385-392 (2005)
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Abstract

It is often taken for granted in standard theories of interpretation that there cannot be intentionality without rationality. According to the background argument, a system can be interpreted as having irrational beliefs only against a general background of rationality. Starting from the widespread assumption that delusions can be reasonably described as irrational beliefs, I argue here that the background argument fails to account for their intentional description

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Lisa Bortolotti
University of Birmingham

Citations of this work

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Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.

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References found in this work

Pathologies of belief.Martin Davies & Max Coltheart - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):1-46.

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