Delusions and Dispositionalism about Belief

Mind and Language 26 (5):596-628 (2011)
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Abstract

The imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it tempting to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie argue that adopting a dispositional account of belief can secure the doxastic status of delusions. But dispositionalism can only secure genuinely doxastic status for mental states by giving folk-psychological norms a significant role in the individuation of attitudes. When such norms individuate belief, deluded subjects will not count as believing their delusions. In general, dispositionalism won't confer genuinely doxastic status more often than do competing accounts of belief.

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Maura Tumulty
Colgate University

Citations of this work

Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities.Matthew Parrott - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):271-296.
Can Dispositionalism About Belief Vindicate Doxasticism About Delusion?José Eduardo Porcher - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (3):379-404.

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The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
The Language of Morals.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1952 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
The language of morals.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1952 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press.

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