Two dogmas of empiricism 1a

Abstract

Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact and truths which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as we shall see, a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science. Another effect is a shift toward pragmatism

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,322

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Two Dogmas of Analytical Philosophy.Greg Taylor - 2007 - Macalester Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):40-55.
Two dogmas of empiricism. Fifty years after.Herbert Schnädelbach - 2003 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):7-12.
The analytic-synthetic distinction.Stanley Munsat - 1971 - Belmont, Calif.,: Wadsworth Pub. Co..
Analyticity.James F. Harris - 1970 - Chicago,: Quadrangle Books. Edited by Richard H. Severens.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
96 (#175,688)

6 months
4 (#818,853)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Daniel Bonevac
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

F/actual knowing: Putting facts and values in place.Holmes Rolston - 2005 - Ethics and the Environment 10 (2):137-174.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references