Why Christians Should Not Be Kaneans about Freedom

Philosophia Christi 19 (2):315 - 329 (2017)
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Abstract

Abstract: In this paper we argue that Robert Kane’s theory of free will cannot accommodate the possibility of a sinless individual who faces morally significant choices because a sinless agent cannot voluntarily accord value to an immoral desire, and we argue that Kane’s theory requires this. Since the Jesus of the historic Christian tradition is held to be sinless, we think Christians should reject Kane’s theory because it seems irreconcilable with historic Christian Christology. We consider two objections to our argument and argue that both fail.

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Michael Bertrand
Ohio State University

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References found in this work

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Are we free to break the laws?David Lewis - 1981 - Theoria 47 (3):113-21.
The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism.Peter Van Inwagen - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (3):185 - 199.
Responsibility, Luck, and Chance.Robert Kane - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-240.
Are We Free to Break the Laws?David Lewis - 1981 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.

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