Thinking sadly: In favor of an adverbial theory of emotions

Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):799-812 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Introspective as well as empirical evidence indicates that emotions shape our thinking in numerous ways. Yet, this modificatory aspect of emotions has received relatively little interest in the philosophy of emotion. I give a detailed account of this aspect. Drawing both on the work of William James and adverbialist conceptions of perception, I sketch a theory of emotions that takes these aspects into consideration and suggest that we should understand emotions as manners of thinking.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,934

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-05-10

Downloads
128 (#172,621)

6 months
13 (#282,608)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Anja Berninger
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen

Citations of this work

Emotion and Attention.Jonathan Mitchell - 2022 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-27.

Add more citations

References found in this work

An argument for basic emotions.Paul Ekman - 1992 - Cognition and Emotion 6 (3):169-200.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1891 - International Journal of Ethics 1 (2):143-169.
The Rationality of Emotion.Ronald de Sousa, Jing-Song Ma & Vincent Shen - 1987 - Philosophy and Culture 32 (10):35-66.

View all 26 references / Add more references