Thinking sadly: In favor of an adverbial theory of emotions

Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):799-812 (2016)
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Introspective as well as empirical evidence indicates that emotions shape our thinking in numerous ways. Yet, this modificatory aspect of emotions has received relatively little interest in the philosophy of emotion. I give a detailed account of this aspect. Drawing both on the work of William James and adverbialist conceptions of perception, I sketch a theory of emotions that takes these aspects into consideration and suggest that we should understand emotions as manners of thinking.



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Anja Berninger
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen

Citations of this work

Emotion and Attention.Jonathan Mitchell - 2022 - Philosophical Studies:1-27.

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References found in this work

An Argument for Basic Emotions.Paul Ekman - 1992 - Cognition and Emotion 6 (3-4):169-200.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1891 - International Journal of Ethics 1 (2):143-169.
The Rationality of Emotion.Ronald de Sousa, Jing-Song Ma & Vincent Shen - 1987 - Philosophy and Culture 32 (10):35-66.

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