Are emotions feelings?

Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):9-25 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The majority of emotion researchers reject the feeling theory of emotions; they deny that emotions are feelings. Some of these researchers admit that emotions have feelings as components, but they insist that emotions contain other components as well, such as cognitions. I argue for a qualified version of the feeling theory. I present evidence in support William James's conjecture that emotions are perceptions of patterned changes in the body. When such perceptions are conscious, they qualify as feelings. But the bodily perceptions constituting emotions can occur unconsciously. When that occurs, emotions are unfelt. Thus, emotions are feelings when conscious, and they are not feelings when unconscious. In the end of the paper, I briefly sketch a theory of how emotions and other perceptual states become conscious

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,283

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
457 (#43,062)

6 months
27 (#111,694)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jesse J. Prinz
CUNY Graduate Center

Citations of this work

The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed Emotions.Demian Whiting - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):281-303.
Against Emotions as Feelings: Towards an Attitudinal Profile of Emotion.Rodrigo Díaz - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (7):223-245.
Negative Feelings of Gratitude.Tony Manela - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (1):129-140.

View all 28 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references