Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):446-468 (2015)

Jacob Berger
Lycoming College
According to a traditional view, perceptual experiences are composites of distinct sensory and cognitive components. This dual-component theory has many benefits; in particular, it purports to offer a way forward in the debate over what kinds of properties perceptual experiences represent. On this kind of view, the issue reduces to the questions of what the sensory and cognitive components respectively represent. Here, I focus on the former topic. I propose a theory of the contents of the sensory aspects of perceptual experience that provides clear criteria for identifying what kinds of properties they represent
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12110
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References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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A Defense of Holistic Representationalism.Jacob Berger - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (2):161-176.
The Disunity of Perception: An Introduction.Indrek Reiland & Jack Lyons - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):443-445.

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