Duration and the specious present

Philosophy of Science 27 (January):39-47 (1960)
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Abstract

The problem I shall discuss is specific, even minute. Yet, being philosophical, it arises and can be profitably discussed only in a context anything but minute, namely, that of a conception of philosophy and its proper method. I could not possibly unfold my conception once more for the sake of a minute problem. Nor do I believe that as things now stand this is necessary. I shall merely recall two propositions which are crucial in the context, and, in stating them, shall freely use its vocabulary. The undefined descriptive terms of the ideal language all refer to phenomenal things wholly presented. These things all are either individuals or characters, and, if characters, either relational or nonrelational. These are the two propositions. It may throw light on another crucial point not always well understood if I imagine someone to ask: Wholly presented to whom? The answer is: To the person to whose world the philosopher, who, himself always speaks commonsensically, fits the ideal language.

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Citations of this work

Duration Enough for Presentism.Robert E. Pezet - 2020 - Axiomathes 30 (4):391-421.
Duration Enough for Presentism.Robert E. Pezet - 2020 - Axiomathes 30 (4):391-421.

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