Axiomathes 30 (4):391-421 (2020)

Abstract
This paper considers a problem for dynamic presentism that has received little attention: its apparent inability to accommodate the duration of events. After outlining the problem, I defend presentism from it. This defence proceeds in two stages. First, I argue the objection rests on a faulty assumption: that duration is temporal extension. The paper challenges that assumption on several different ways of conceiving of temporal extension. This is the negative case and forms the bulk of the paper. Second, after diagnosing the error leading to the identification of duration with temporal extension, I outline a new presentist-friendly account of duration that avoids the problem. In particular, a non-reductive account of duration is offered that treats it as a primitive quality which bestows its possessor with a certain modal quality: that the possessor potentially does not change whilst there are changes in its environs. This is the positive case. Together the positive and negative cases provide presentism with an interesting and novel way of overcoming the problem of duration.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10516-019-09464-9
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,066
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Unreality of Time.John Ellis McTaggart - 1908 - Mind 17 (68):457-474.
A World of States of Affairs.D. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
A Defense of Presentism.Ned Markosian - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:47-82.
The Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1903 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 11 (4):11-12.
Tense and Reality.Kit Fine - 2005 - In Modality and Tense. Oxford University Press. pp. 261--320.

View all 62 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Duration Enough for Presentism.Robert E. Pezet - 2020 - Axiomathes 30 (4):391-421.
Presentism and Consciousness.Neil McKinnon - 2003 - Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):305-323.
Presentism and Causation Revisited.Sam Baron - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (1):1-21.
Presentism and Grounding Past Truths.Matthew Davidson - 2013 - In Roberto Ciuni, Giuliano Torrengo & Kristie Miller (eds.), New Papers on the Present: Focus on Presentism. Verlag. pp. 153-172.
A Foundation for Presentism.Robert Pezet - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1809–1837.
Diachronic Unity and Temporal Transparency.Akiko M. Frischhut - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):34-55.
Experiences of Duration and Cognitive Penetrability.Carrie Figdor - 2020 - In B. Brogaard & D. Gatzia (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 188-212.
Perpetual Present: Henri Bergson and Atemporal Duration.Matyáš Moravec - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11 (3):197-224.
Presentism and the Triviality Objection.Takeshi Sakon - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1089-1109.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-12-21

Total views
11 ( #848,831 of 2,498,786 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #421,542 of 2,498,786 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes