Quasirealism as semantic dispensability

Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2313-2333 (2020)
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Abstract

I argue that standard explanationist solutions to the problem of creeping minimalism are largely on the right track, but they fail to correctly specify the kind of explanation that is relevant to distinguishing realism from quasirealism. Quasirealism should not be distinguished from realism in terms of the explanations it gives of why a normative judgment—a normative sentence or attitude—has the semantic content that it has. Rather, it should be distinguished in terms of the explanations it offers of what the semantic content of a normative judgment is.

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Derek Baker
Frankfurt School of Finance and Management

Citations of this work

.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2023 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
Handling rejection.Derek Baker & Jack Woods - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):159-190.

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References found in this work

Language, truth and logic.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1936 - London,: V. Gollancz.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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