Creeping Minimalism and Subject Matter

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):750-766 (2020)
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Abstract

The problem of creeping minimalism concerns how to tell the difference between metaethical expressivism and its rivals given contemporary expressivists’ acceptance of minimalism about truth and related concepts. Explanationism finds the difference in what expressivists use to explain why ethical language and thought has the content it does. I argue that two recent versions of explanationism are unsatisfactory and offer a third version, subject matter explanationism. This view, I argue, captures the advantages of previous views without their disadvantages and gives us a principled and general characterisation of non-representational views about all kinds of language and thought.

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Matthew Simpson
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2023 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
Superspreading the word.Bart Streumer - 2024 - Noûs 58 (4):927-947.
Should expressivists go global?Matthew Simpson - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (8):2275-2289.

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Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.
The question of realism.Kit Fine - 2001 - Philosophers' Imprint 1:1-30.

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