Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment

Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1990)
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Abstract

This book examines some of the deepest questions in philosophy: What is involved in judging a belief, action, or feeling to be rational?

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Allan Gibbard
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Citations of this work

A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering.Carolina Flores & Elise Woodard - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2547-2571.
Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory.Dan Sperber - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):57.

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