Abstract

Finally, I place Heidegger in a dialogue with some of his primary "ontological" critics and competitors, and argue from a Heideggerean from a standpoint that certain key features of Sartre's "ontological" proposal presupposes Heidegger's analysis and is simply misguided. I also evaluate Sartre's critique of Heidegger's ontology and offer a Heideggerean rebuttal. I then consider Jaspers' ultimate challenge that any ontological grounding of psychoanalysis is impossible per se, and also his specific critique of Heidegger. I argue that Jaspers' critique is groundless. ;One it has been shown that Freud and Heidegger share a common understanding of man, and that this understanding finds its most appropriate and primordial grounding Heidegger's ontological analysis of human existence, the most genuine rapprochement between these two forms of psychoanalysis is firmly in hand. I then suggest that this rapproachment, if taken seriously could facilitate an advance in psychoanalytical knoweldge and therapeutic effectiveness without the concomitant loss of the concretely existing individual. ;Next I argue that an appropriate ontological foundation is essential for the establishment of the most genuine rapprochement between Freudian and existential psychoanalysis. I show that Freudian psychoanalysis lacks a proper ontological foundation, and contend Heidegger's analysis of human existence in Being and Time provides the most appropriate and primordial ontological foundation for psychoanalytic therapy. Since it was necessary to work concretely through Heidegger's actual analysis in its unity to substantiate my claim, I offer an elliptical version of it for purposes of clarification and later reference. I then argue that Heidegger's ontological analysis best satisfies certain crucial criteria for providing the most appropriate and primordial grounding for psychoanalytic therapy in the fruition of his analysis of Dasein via his phenomenological methodology. ;I first disclose and explicate the primary philosophical presuppositions underlying Freud's metapsychological theory and those underlying his therapeutic practice to show that Freud held two discrepant conceptions of man. I argue that the philosophical presuppositions of Freud's theory are incompatible with the existentialist concept of freedon, whereas those underlying Freudian practice harmonize quite closely with this conception . While doing so, I note several essential agreements between Freud, the practitioner, and Heidegger's analysis of human existence. In addition, I indicate several of the unresolved problems intrinsic to Freudian psychoanalysis when it is considered as a whole. ;Freudian and existential psychoanalysis have been traditionally understood as adhering to incompatible philosophical presuppositions concerning the nature of man and his relation to the world. This has resulted in the preclusion of any contemporary mutually fruitful dialogue between them, and a disregard of each other's important discoveries and insights in both their theory and practice. In this thesis, I show that the above opposition is far less recalcitrant than traditionally believed, and that the establishment of harmonious relations between these two forms of psychoanalysis is not only possible but necessary via philosophical analysis