Abstract

This paper offers a Kantian reading of Wittgenstein’s later conception of rules. Building on the continuity of Wittgenstein’s comparison between a sentence and a musical theme, the paper argues that central elements of the Kantianism one may find in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy carry over to his mature conception of grammar. Moreover, this Kantian reading offers a novel perspective on the puzzle about the normativity of Wittgenstein’s later notion of rules. It is argued that the normativity of an aesthetic judgement, understood in a specifically Kantian sense, offers a good model for construing the necessity of rule-following in his later philosophy. In analogy with the necessity of Kantian aesthetic judgements, the necessity of rule-following, while less than objective from a transcendental point of view, may be treated as objective for the members of the linguistic community under the assumption of a shared form of life