Traditional Epistemology Reconsidered A Reply to Eflin

Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):69-77 (2003)
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Abstract

In this article, I reply to Juli Eflin's “Epistemic Presuppositions and Their Consequences.” I query Eflin's construal of the aims, scope and method of traditional epistemology, and go on to evaluate several of the central characteristics of Eflin's positive account – pluralistic virtue epistemology.

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Andrew McGonigal
Washington and Lee University

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References found in this work

Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Being known.Christopher Peacocke - 1999 - New York: Oxford University Press.
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.

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