Abstract

Leibniz is recognized as having promoted a dispositional theory of innate metaphysical ideas. We get our concept of substance, for example, by thinking about what we are immediately aware of in ourselves. The same is true of other metaphysical concepts, such as being, unity, activity, etc. It is the purpose of this study to work out the details of his theory, so far as this is possible. ;Leibniz argues that we cannot be aware of ourselves, that is, reflect, without thinking of ourselves in certain ways, for in reflection we recognize immediately that certain things are true of us. He does not claim that what we come to know as the metaphysical concepts arise full-blown as soon as we are conscious, but rather that we arrive at them through a process of articulating what is implicit in every act of self-awareness. In this process we make use of whatever tools of analysis are available also from logic and the sciences. He argues that the process of articulating the metaphysical concepts demands their subjection to an empirical test: our concepts are valid only if we can find an object of experience to which they apply. For the metaphysical concepts this demand is answered mainly in reflection, for there is no reality known to us more intimately than ourselves. ;Chapters are organized as follows: An analysis of what I call Leibniz's transcendental argument, to the effect that we could not be aware of ourselves unless we were substances. This leads to a discussion of what he calls the primitive truths of fact , the originary objects of self-awareness. Leibniz's theory in historical perspective. I try to show that he wanted to reconcile the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions on self-awareness. I examine the lists of metaphysical concepts he claims are derived from reflection, and seek clues as to his position from the expressions he uses in the passages which contain them. The relation between reason and reflection: how they arise together in the human mind as it emerges into consciousness from its prior conditions. I discuss his concepts of expression, perception, sensation, and thought. I examine each of the basic metaphysical concepts: unity, identity, duration, being and existence, activity, and substance, to see what each owes to reflection. I also discuss his claim that all thought uses characters, his concept of similarity, and his use of analogy in metaphysics