Philosophia 48 (2):483-505 (2019)
AbstractMindreading capacity has been widely understood as the human ability to gain knowledge about the inner processes and states of others that bring about the behavior of these agents. This paper argues against this epistemic view of mindreading on the basis of different empirical studies in linguistics and social and developmental psychology: we are systematically biased in attributing mental states, and many everyday uses of mental ascription sentences do not reflect an epistemic function in our social interactions. We introduce an alternative view of mental ascriptions, the social cover view, which is consistent with the evidence. The social cover view holds that the main function of mental ascriptions is to cover the social status and reputation of an agent rather than to gain knowledge about her inner processes and states. Finally, we discuss two possible objections to our proposal.
Similar books and articles
Direct Social Perception and Dual Process Theories of Mindreading.Mitchell Herschbach - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:483-497.
The Complementarity of Mindshaping and Mindreading.Uwe Peters - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (3):533-549.
Signature Limits in Mindreading Systems.J. Robert Thompson - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (7):1432-1455.
A Notorious Example of Failed Mindreading: Dramatic Irony and the Moral and Epistemic Value of Art.W. Scott Clifton - 2016 - Journal of Aesthetic Education 50 (3):73-90.
Mirror Neurons Are Not Evidence for the Simulation Theory.Shannon Spaulding - 2012 - Synthese 189 (3):515-534.
Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich.Jennifer Nagel - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):179-199.
Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich.Jennifer Nagel - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):179-199.
A Critique of Embodied Simulation.Shannon Spaulding - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):579-599.
Action, Mindreading and Embodied Social Cognition.Joshua Shepherd - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):507-518.
How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition.Shannon Spaulding - 2018 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
Mindreading, Mindsharing, and the Origins of Self-Consciousness.James M. Dow - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):39-70.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Shaping Your Own Mind: The Self-Mindshaping View on Metacognition.Víctor Fernández-Castro & Fernando Martínez-Manrique - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (1):139-167.
References found in this work
The Enigma of Reason.Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.) - 2017 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature.Stephen C. Levinson - 2000 - MIT Press.
Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory.Dan Sperber - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):57.
Beliefs About Beliefs: Representation and Constraining Function of Wrong Beliefs in Young Children's Understanding of Deception.H. Wimmer - 1983 - Cognition 13 (1):103-128.