On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant?

Philosophic Exchange 29 (1) (1999)
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Abstract

On what basis should we make an epistemic assessment of another’s authority to impart knowledge? Is social identity a legitimate feature to take into account when assessing epistemic reliability? This paper argues that, in some cases, social identity is a relevant feature to take into account in assessing a person’s credibility.

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