Acta Analytica 24 (4):237-248 (2009)

Sanford Goldberg
Northwestern University
Social (epistemic) virtues are the virtues bound up with those forms of inquiry involved in social routes to knowledge. A thoroughly individualistic account of the social virtues endorses two claims: (1) we can fully characterize the nature of the social virtues independent of the social factors that are typically in play when these virtues are exemplified, and (2) even when a subject’s route to knowledge is social, the only epistemic virtues that are relevant to her acquisition of knowledge are those she herself possesses. A social (or anti-individualistic) account of the social virtues, by contrast, denies one or both of these claims. I will offer some reasons for thinking that the individualistic account is not acceptable, and that one or the other social account provides a better understanding of the social virtues. The argument is not decisive, but it does suggest that the social dimension of social epistemic virtues is not fully characterizable in individualistic terms.
Keywords Testimony  Social epistemology  Virtue epistemology  Epistemological individualism
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-009-0059-z
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References found in this work BETA

What is Justified Belief?Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
A Virtue Epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):427-440.
Knowledge by Hearsay.John McDowell - 1993 - In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing From Words. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 195--224.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Division of Epistemic Labor.Sandy Goldberg - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):112-125.
Extending the Credit Theory of Knowledge.Adam Green - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):121 - 132.
Responsibility for Testimonial Belief.Benjamin McMyler - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):337-352.

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