Analysis 82 (2):386-396 (
2022)
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Abstract
It is not unusual in the philosophy of perception to use empirical research to build
arguments against or in favour of a certain philosophical view (see Phillips 2016 for a
scrutinizing discussion). This methodology is what Barwich uses in her book entitled
Smellosophy (2020) when criticizing an approach to olfaction according to which
‘truthful perception is an accurate mental representation of physical properties’
(Barwich 2020: 310). Furthermore, Barwich would like neuroscience to set the agenda
for philosophical questions about olfaction, so that empirical evidence is not just used
to adjudicate between existing philosophical theories but instead inspires new ones,
such as Barwich’s own. Thus, while her main focus is first-order theories of olfaction,
she also aims to exemplify a methodology for developing and assessing such theories
that ‘break[s] down the silos of institutionalized disciplinarity that are neatly dividing
philosophical from neuroscientific inquiry’ (Barwich 2020: 311). The ways in which Barwich arrives at and justifies claims about olfaction give rise to various questions about the relationship between philosophical discussion of perception and neuroscientific results concerning how the brain works. In part 1 of this critical notice, I look at the approach to olfaction that Barwich criticizes and raise a few of these questions. This leads to a query about exactly how the approach differs from Barwich’s own view of olfaction. Part 2 discusses selected aspects of her view. I examine how her claim that olfaction is both exteroceptive and interoceptive and the associated idea that the brain creates odours relate to the empirical research she presents. This leads to a query concerning her methodology, which uses empirical research about brain processing to arrive at conclusions concerning a subject’s experience.