Richard Stanley Peters was one of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy of education in the twentieth century. After reviewing Peters’ disentanglement of the ambiguities of liberal education, I reconstruct his view on the status and the existential foundations of the humanities. What emerges from my reconstruction is an original justificatory argument for the value of liberal education as general education in the sense of initiation into the heritage of the humanities. To close, I evaluate the scope and power of (...) this argument from the existential concern of the humanities. (shrink)

S B Brooke-Norris; Is School Enough? A Critique of Langford’s Idea of Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 227–.

S B Brooke-Norris; Is School Enough? A Critique of Langford’s Idea of Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 227–.

ABSTRACT“How should a person lead her life?” The purpose of this paper is to suggest some principles (not a complete list) which will serve us ‘intellectual instruments’ for assessing forms of life. These principles are utilitarian in nature, and, as I will argue, essential to a reasonably rich account of personal well-being. The principles suggested are not instrumental, that is, they determine the worthiness of a form of life led by an agent irrespective of whether it satisfies her existing desires (...) and meet her actual preferences. Hence, I will argue that a person can be deprived, that is, categorically deprived, even when most of her desires are satisfied. In the last section of the paper I will argue for the role of education in ‘initiating’ the agent into worthy forms of life, and hence evading the charge of categorical deprivation and that of irrationality. (shrink)

“How should a person lead her life?” The purpose of this paper is to suggest some principles (not a complete list) which will serve us ‘intellectual instruments’ for assessing forms of life. These principles are utilitarian in nature, and, as I will argue, essential to a reasonably rich account of personal well-being. The principles suggested are not instrumental, that is, they determine the worthiness of a form of life led by an agent irrespective of whether it satisfies her existing desires (...) and meet her actual preferences. Hence, I will argue that a person can be deprived, that is, categorically deprived, even when most of her desires are satisfied. In the last section of the paper I will argue for the role of education in ‘initiating’ the agent into worthy forms of life, and hence evading the charge of categorical deprivation and that of irrationality. (shrink)

Peters is best known for ‘Ethics and Education’, (1966) an attempt, using analytical methods, to provide a universal canonical account of the nature of education. This corresponded closely with the prevailing conception of liberal education of the time. Despite the acclaim with which this work was received, Peters became increasingly dissatisfied with his early views of education and in a series of papers written between 1973 and 1982, he retreated slowly from the view that one could construct a universal canonical (...) account of education and even from the view that this could be possible for liberal education. As his views changed, his philosophical methods developed as well, moving from the Moorean essentialist analysis of 1966, through a more Strawsonian connective analysis in the mid 1970s to a position based on W.B. Gallie's account of essentially contested concepts in the early 1980s. Parallel to and connected with this changing philosophical methodology came a distinction between an overarching concept of education and particular conceptions of education related to different societies and their values. (shrink)

In this article I argue that Outcomes-basedEducation is conceptually trapped in aninstrumentally justifiable view of education. Icontend that the notion of Outcomes-basedEducation is incommensurable with anon-instrumental justification of educationview as explained by RS Peters (1998). Theprocess of specifying outcomes in educationaldiscourse lends itself to manipulation andcontrol and thereby makes the idea ofOutcomes-based Education educationallyimpoverished. In this article an argument ismade for education through rational reflectionand imagination which can complement anOutcomes-based Education system for the reasonthat it finds expression in a non-instrumentaljustifiable (...) view of education. (shrink)

There is a move to centralise scattered documents; to archive all hardcopies of published journals in one place. PESA is moving to the institutionalisation of its history. We may ask, if philosophy of education in Australasia began at Bassar College, University of New South Wales on 20 May 1970, or if it emerged from the post-war focus on teacher education, teaching on the philosophy of education. Further to the injunction that we query who may be foregrounded; who assigned to possible (...) appendices of any PESA stories? By definition the non-members, the rejected scripts, the programme notations of those who failed to present at conferences will be the omissions. And the very fact that some have been rejected, for perhaps inadequate philosophising, for moving beyond the discourse of the liberal understanding of education means that there will always be gaps, omissions, a select record. In what ways may the archive order us? How do we ensure that archival history of PESA is not the work only of Great Wo/men. We will find that after ordering and collating disorderly archives, that what is collated will be incomplete. Our question may be as was Lorimer and Philo’s, ‘should we be “allowing more disorder into the archive”’? (shrink)

Curiosity, seen as a motive to do exploration within definite and generally accepted frames, is to be distinguished from wonder, where doubt about the frames themselves is the underlying factor. Granted this distinction, it will be argued that educational institutions need to build on both notions, i.e. wonder as well as curiosity.

Peters' account of the moral life and the conception of practical reason that informed it reflects a sophisticated moral universalism. However, attempts to extend a similarly sophisticated universalism into our understanding of education are not as well received. Yet, such a project is of clear contemporary relevance given the pressure put on educational institutions to achieve certain ends. If we can show that education entails standards that are not entirely contingent upon current interests, we would have a framework that all (...) institutions seriously claiming to be involved in the enterprise would have to acknowledge. In this paper I argue that a reconstruction of the relationship between Peters' work in philosophical ethics and his conceptual analysis may go some way in showing how one can speak of education in universalistic terms. Accordingly, although many of the criticisms laid at Peters' feet are of merit, they overshadow more potentially useful interpretive moves. Finally, I show how a change in the focus of Peters' account of education and practical reason more generally can provide important resources for engaging in a more plausible exploration of universalistic themes in education. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show that genuine dialogue is a refined human achievement and probably the most valid criterion on the basis of which we can evaluate educational or social policy and practice. The paper explores the prerequisites of dialogue in the language games, the common certainties, the rules of logic and the variety of common virtues; defends dialogue as a normative concept and interprets the principles of dialogue as extensions of its prerequisite virtues. Finally, it examines (...) the social conditions that are conducive to dialogue and those that frustrate it. (shrink)

This paper discusses R.S. Peters’ notion of ‘cognitive perspective’, which, through careful reading, can be interpreted as a wider perspective resulting from an awareness of the relationships of one’s knowledge and understanding to one’s own life. This interpretation makes cognitive perspective a holistic notion akin to that of worldview, and also points to the possibility for students to experience a change of outlook on the world, as a result of learning science. Given the ongoing debate regarding the notion scientific literacy (...) and the problems associated with it, the development of cognitive perspective can be considered the primary goal of school science education, as it provides an alternative way to think about what it means for a student to be educated in science. Such a goal, in turn, points to the importance of teaching for the significance of scientific facts and ideas, as awareness of such significance does not necessarily follow the acquisition of content knowledge and the application of the latter in everyday contexts. The paper also attempts to clarify the notion of utility of scientific knowledge, as an understanding of such notion is crucilal for understanding the implications of the development of cogintive perspective for school science education. (shrink)

This paper outlines the rationale underpinning the conception of science education as sociopolitical action, and then presents a critique of such a conception from the perspective of liberal education. More specifically, the paper discusses the importance of the conception of science education as sociopolitical action and then raises questions about the content of school science, about the place and value of scientific inquiry, and about the opportunities students have for self-directed inquiry. The central idea behind the critique is that a (...) conception of science education as sociopolitical action downplays the importance of knowledge for its own sake and totally neglects the personal/aesthetic dimension of science. (shrink)

This thesis investigates how children ought to be influenced with respect to religion. To answer this question, I develop a theory of cognitive curriculum content and apply it to the teaching of religious beliefs and beliefs about religions. By ‘a theory of cognitive curriculum content,’ I mean a theory that determines which truth-claims belong on the curriculum, and whether or not teachers ought to promote students’ belief of those claims. I extend this theory to help educators to decide which attitudes (...) address on the curriculum and whether or not to promote them. I then apply this to the case of religious attitudes and attitudes about religions. I argue that where having or failing to have a certain attitude makes a significant difference to students’ lives, it ought to be addressed by curricula. Where failing to have the attitude is irrational, this failure ought to be remedied; where having the attitude is irrational, that attitude ought to be discouraged; and where neither having nor failing to have the attitude is irrational, that attitude ought to be introduced and discussed without encouragement or discouragement. In so far as is practicable, educators should aim to acquaint students with arguments for and against having these attitudes and initiate them into the practice of assessing their soundness. The implications of this theory for extra-curricular influence, such as upbringing in the home, are also explored. (shrink)

Following recent developments in philosophy of education, this thesis attempts to relate work done in analytic philosophy of education to work done in normative philosophy of education. The first part of the thesis focuses on the analysis of the concept Curriculum. The aim of this analysis is to attempt to clarify Curriculum and show that it is an essentially normative concept. An examination of the nature of this concept raises serious moral issues, e.g. that of the justification of the content (...) of the Curriculum. This issue is dealt with in the second part of the thesis where I investigate two major philosophical attempts to justify the content of the Curriculum and show that the arguments adduced by Peters and Wilson do not satisfactorily resolve the issue, either in their own terms or in terms of the extent to which they speak to practical considerations. Mary Warnock attempts to merge the double rift, between Peters and Wilson, and between theoretical and practical considerations, by arguing that imagination and work are the criteria by which decisions as to the content of the Curriculum should be made. This moderate position, although more adequate, is not devoid of problems, especially with regard to the relationship between imagination and work. It is my belief that a fundamental change in the understanding of theory and practice in the field of education must occur before serious advances can be made with regard to the justificatory issue. (shrink)