In theoretical matters, ecclesiastical claims to knowledge have lead to various conflicts with science. Claims in orientational matters, sometimes connected to attempts to establish them as a rule for legislation, have often been in conflict with the justified claims of non-believers. In addition they violate the Principle of Autonomy of the individual, which is at the very heart of European identity so decisively shaped by the Enlightenment. The Principle of Autonomy implies that state legislation should not interfere in the life (...) of individual citizens, as long as his or her actions do not violate the rights of others. This paper—using the example of the theory of evolution—rejects ecclesiastical claims to theoretical knowledge as completely unfounded and preposterous. In the case of orientational knowledge—using the example of euthanasia—ecclesiastical claims to (universalizable) knowledge are shown to be unfounded as well. The Church’s position with respect to euthanasia and a range of other bio-ethical topics, such as pre-marital sex, contraception, abortion, indissolubility of marriage, and homosexuality, rests on a very peculiar ethical position. This ethical position is the natural right theory, which—far from being universalizable—is shared by very few people. Among other things, this position presupposes the belief in God as the creator of nature, and the assumption that ethical norms can be derived from this premise. Thus ecclesiastical knowledge claims, cannot be justified in a way which could be reasonably supposed to be universally acceptable. Kant (see the quote) was the first to require this sort of justification. Claims that fail to implement Kant’s stipulations should be eliminated by what I would like to call “Kant’s razor”. (shrink)

(1988). Historical explanations in modern physics? The lesson of quantum mechanics. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 68-79.

(1988). Historical explanations in modern physics? The lesson of quantum mechanics. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 68-79.

In Descartes, the concept of a ‘universal science’ differs from that of a ‘mathesis universalis’, in that the latter is simply a general theory of quantities and proportions. Mathesis universalis is closely linked with mathematical analysis; the theorem to be proved is taken as given, and the analyst seeks to discover that from which the theorem follows. Though the analytic method is followed in the Meditations, Descartes is not concerned with a mathematisation of method; mathematics merely provides him with examples. (...) Leibniz, on the other hand, stressed the importance of a calculus as a way of representing and adding to what is known, and tried to construct a ‘universal calculus’ as part of his proposed universal symbolism, his ‘characteristica universalis’. The characteristica universalis was never completed—it proved impossible, for example, to list its basic terms, the ‘alphabet of human thoughts’—but parts of it did come to fruition, in the shape of Leibniz's infinitesimal calculus and his various logical calculi. By his construction of these calculi, Leibniz proved that it is possible to operate with concepts in a purely formal way. (shrink)

The main subject of the paper is to give an example of what could be called, in the history of philosophy and science, reinforcement of traditional topics or paradigms of explanation in order to give explanatory support to or to coooborate the defence of old or the solution of new problems. In the 17th century nearly all positions in the natural science are dependent from theological and philosophical (metaphysical) presuppositions, especially all positions which belong to types of the scientia universalis (...) (Yves de Paris, S. Izquierdo, A. Kircher). To defend the finiteness of the world and the geocentric position of the earth, the Jesuit A. Kircher (1602–1680) returns to an old topic of cosmological speculation, to the geometria speculativa, in order to demonstrate the absolute perfect and finite structure of the world as an analogon of the absolute perfect and finite structure of the cercle or, better, the sphere (globe). He shows this in his Iter exstaticum (Rome 1656) and in his Mundus subterraneus (Amsterdam 1665). The paper discusses only a central part of the Mundus subterraneus titled ‘Centrosophia’: here we find all typical arguments for the phenomenon of reinforcement of old topics and paradigms. God is the center or the non‐dimensional point (punctum) of the cosmic sphere (which is the sphere of all being) and he is in consequence the principle of all geometrical (ontological) parts of this figure. Kircher transmits the evidence of the perfect geometric relation between center and circumference modo analogico to the relation God (creator) and world. Together with this well known and often used analogy he develops a new theory: the theory of the dignity of the subterranean parts of the earth and the earth as earth, as the unic and ideologically exclusive place in all reality that gives mankind the fundament to develop its own implications. The high estimation of the earth sets free an unprejudiced view of what the subterranean area really is: Kircher thinks here in organologic categories — the subterranean world is an analogon of the world as such and this world is a great animal. Kircher develops in the limits of his traditional geocentric position an new non‐traditional theory of the inner side of the world. (shrink)

The ArgumentIn spite of Koyré's conclusions, there are sufficient reasons to claim that Galileo, and with him the beginnings of classical mechanics in early modern times, was closely related to practical mechanics. It is, however, not completely clear how, and to what extent, practitioners and engineers could have had a part in shaping the modern sciences. By comparing the beginnings of modern dynamics with the beginnings of statics in Antiquity, and in particular with Archimedes — whose rediscovery in the sixteenth (...) century was of great consequence — I will focus on the question of which devices played a comparable role in dynamics to that of the lever and balance in statics. I will also examine where these devices came from. In this way, I will show that the entire world of mechanics of that time — “high” and “low,” practical and theoretical — was of significance for shaping classical mechanics and that a specific relationship between art and science was and is constitutive for modern sciences. (shrink)

Leibniz's overall view of the relationship between reasoning and computation is discussed on the basis of two broad claims that one finds in his writings, concerning respectively the nature of human reasoning and the possibility of replacing human thinking by a mechanical procedure. A joint examination of these claims enables one to appreciate the wide scope of Leibniz's interests for mechanical procedures, concerning a variety of philosophical themes further developed both in later logical investigations and in methodological contributions to cognitive (...) psychology. (shrink)

What I am going to ask myself in this paper consists of two questions, which are interrelated: How should the discipline "Anglistik" be reconstructed from a theoretical point of view under consideration of intellectual and social history? In which way can this reconstruction have an effect on teaching English literature in universities? In answering the first question let me begin with a short outline concerning the ideological history of "Anglistik" from the 19th century to the present day. This short and (...) rough outline shall help to explain, why there is the obvious deficiency in theory, which nobody can deny who knows German Anglistik from within . Then I proceed in listing the necessary elements of a rational Anglistik, which have to be integrated into the discipline of the future. This description deals with the theoretical and teleological aspects of the reconstruction . In the last section I try to warrant my proposition to reconstruct Anglistik by an example, which has the task to demonstrate the interrelation of literary history, intellectual and social history within the discipline. (shrink)

What I am going to ask myself in this paper consists of two questions, which are interrelated: (1) How should the discipline “Anglistik” be reconstructed from a theoretical point of view under consideration of intellectual and social history? (2) In which way can this reconstruction have an effect on teaching English literature in universities? In answering the first question let me begin with a short outline concerning the ideological history of “Anglistik” from the 19th century to the present day. This (...) short and rough outline shall help to explain, why there is the obvious deficiency in theory, which nobody can deny who knows German Anglistik from within (I). Then I proceed in listing the necessary elements of a rational Anglistik, which have to be integrated into the discipline of the future. This description deals with the theoretical and teleological aspects of the reconstruction (II). In the last section I try to warrant my proposition to reconstruct Anglistik by an example, which has the task to demonstrate the interrelation of literary history, intellectual and social history within the discipline (III). (shrink)

We investigate the way physical laws objectively refer to the entities they are about. Laws of mathematical physics do not refer directly to the “real world” but to an ideal specific domain of objects, which we term “scope”. In order to find out which real objects physical laws deal with, reference to the scope is not sufficient. We need in addition the search for domains to which laws apply — i. e. “empirical domains”— in order to establish their reference to (...) the “real world”. It is just in such empirical domains that we are able to discover the real entities physical laws objectively refer to. “Physical reality” turns out to be not something “given” but rather something “to come out” of the very process of scientific inquiry. (shrink)