Volume 52, Issue 11, October 2020, Page 1116-1119.

This article explores ways pre-service teachers learn to work upon their positive emotional conduct during an initial teacher education course. The article argues that education practice today promotes the acting out of positive emotions, creating conditions within which pre-service teachers ethically shape their emotional conduct. Utilising Foucault’s four-part ethical framework, the article draws on longitudinal research of pre-service teachers in Western Australia to analyse the crafting of emotional conduct through techniques of the self. The techniques the participants came to employ (...) during their course learning aligned with a telos of the resourceful, positive, and professional teacher. The article argues that this ethical enterprise relies on a certain model of teacher subjectivity which is inseparably linked with normalising governmental power. Such disciplining of emotions, however, is neither one-dimensional nor deterministic; rather, work at the intersection of the government of others and of oneself. We argue this allows pre-service teachers the freedom to care for the self as they seek to foster their own ethical practices as teachers. (shrink)

It has been claimed that ‘virtuous structures’ can foster moral agency in organisations. We investigate this in the context of employee involvement in corporate philanthropy, an activity whose moral status has been disputed. Employing Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of moral agency, we analyse the results of eight focus groups with employees engaged in corporate philanthropy in an employee-owned retailer, the John Lewis Partnership. Within this organisational context, Employee–Partners’ moral agency was evidenced in narrative accounts of their engagement in philanthropic activities and (...) in their disputes about the moral status of corporate philanthropy. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that although the Aristotelian ideal of leading a virtuous life for its own sake is admirable, conventional Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian accounts of how it might be realised are empirically inadequate: Habituation is unlikely to produce ‘a love of virtue’, practical experience cannot then produce practical judgement or phronesis, and Aristotle's conception of a virtuous life excludes all but an idealised elite. Instead, I argue that two conceptually distinct aspects of moral development can be identified: the (...) ‘Aristotelian’ and the ‘Humean’. In the former, the desire to lead a virtuous life for its own sake is produced through certain forms of challenging experience which, by disturbing and decentring the egoistic self, evoke a personal moral transformation. In the latter, the capacity to act well in specific social situations is the outcome of a process of socialisation, first in upbringing and later through initiation into the practices of adult life. Both aspects should be promoted in moral education for together they produce something akin to full virtue in the Aristotelian sense: Practical wisdom and practical judgement—or phronesis. Moreover, ‘the good life’ is best conceived as encompassing a variety of transcendent goods. To live a virtuous life for its own sake constitutes one good or form of human flourishing; but it is not the only one. (shrink)

This paper introduces ‘Virtue and Virtuousness: When will the twain ever meet?’ a special edition of Business Ethics: A European Review. The Call for Papers invited contributions that could inform the relationship between organisational virtuousness, as conceptualised by positive organisation studies, and the classical conception of virtues pertaining to individual women and men. While the resources of particular virtue traditions – Aristotelian, Catholic, Confucian, and the like – could inform their own debates as to whether virtue extends beyond individuals, the (...) debate between virtue traditions and positive organisation studies has a different dimension. The question is whether the claims of positive social sciences as such are compatible with those of any virtue tradition. We argue that positive social science and virtue traditions are indeed rivals such that adherence to the claims of the one precludes adherence to the other. Resolution to such conflicts requires that one tradition is able to resolve questions that exhaust the resources of the other. This paper suggests that at least one area of incoherence in the findings of positive social sciences can be resolved by virtue traditions, and introduces the remaining papers in the special edition. (shrink)

Ovaj tekst, kao nastavak našega promišljanja o dispozicijama za pedagogično djelovanje, kritička je refleksija vlastite profesionalne svakodnevice u kojoj detektiramo brojne dileme vezane za svrhu pedagoške profesije. Točke prijepora, poput – biti neutralna ili angažirana, graditi distanciran ili prisan pedagoški odnos, prioritizirati vlastitu ili tuđu dobrobit, odbijati ili prihvaćati sukob kao potencijalni agens promjene – izmještamo iz hodnika, predavaonica i učionica u kojima bivamo te, izlazeći time iz komforne zone nepromišljanja o njima, apostrofiramo ambivalentnu pojavnost dihotomije javno–privatno u skrivenome kurikulumu (...) tih prostora. Promatrajući dispozicije kao za autonomno pedagogično pedagoško djelovanje prediktivna uvjerenja i osobine razvijajućega karaktera, u radu zagovaramo napuštanje shvaćanja pedagoginja kao neutralnih profesionalki apstrahiranih od osobnih uvjerenja, kvaliteta i ograničenja te u fokus stavljamo etičnost, refleksivnost i autentičnost kao temeljne dispozicije za pedagogično djelovanje usmjereno k podupiranju mogućega i transformativnoga u pedagoškome odnosu. Rad zaključujemo promišljanjem odgovornosti studijā pedagogije i samih pedagoginja za kultiviranje opisanih dispozicija. This text, as a continuation of our reflections on dispositions for pedagogical practice, is a critical reflection on our everyday working life, in which we detect numerous dilemmas related to the goal of the pedagogical profession. We move points of contention – such as being neutral or engaged, building a distanced or close pedagogical relationship, prioritising one’s own benefit or that of others, rejecting or accepting conflict as a potential agent of change – out of the halls and classrooms in which we spend time and, breaching the comfort zone of not thinking about them, accent the apparently ambivalent dichotomy of public and private in the hidden curriculum of these spaces. By conceptualizing dispositions as evolving predictive beliefs and personal traits, the paper advocates abandoning the view of pedagogues as neutral professionals devoid of personal beliefs, qualities, and limitations, instead focusing on ethics, reflexivity, and authenticness as the basic dispositions for pedagogical practice directed towards supporting the possible and transformative in the pedagogical relationship. The paper concludes with a consideration of the responsibility of pedagogy programmes and pedagogues themselves in cultivating the aforementioned dispositions. (shrink)