This paper addresses the possibilities to introduce the stakeholder model in the firm, especially the possibility to give property or decision rights to stakeholders. This paper argues that it is not practical to give full property rights to more than one group of stakeholders. Decision rights to employees and creditors are already in place in some countries, but the possibility to introduce them more generally to other stakeholder groups depends very much on the governance and ownership structure of the firm (...) and the legal environment. The future of the stakeholder model in a globalised economy is also analysed. (shrink)

Since Ackerman in Corporate social responsiveness, the modern dilemma (1973), pleaded for the institutionalisation of corporate social performance (CSP) in business processes, researchers have focused on the role of strategy in CSP. This article demonstrates that CSP is institutionalised within the governance structure. We will attempt to make this clear by means of a description of the Dutch system of corporate governance. Under certain circumstances Dutch companies are already bound to CSP due to prevailing legislation. A governance perspective shows that (...) CSP is institutionalised within a company's governance structure. "Processes of responsiveness", since long regarded as a starting point of CSP-analysis, appear to be decision-making processes. Within these processes the expectations of the stakeholders can be institutionalised, trust can be built and interests can be incorporated. This makes CSP context-dependent. However, it is possible to analyse companies by comparing the companies' individual governance structures. The article concludes that CSP-analysis can fruitfully extend into analysing in the role of the stakeholders in the influence-pathways that are incorporated within the governance structure. (shrink)

By considering what we identify as a problem inherent in the ‘nature of the firm’—the risk of abuse of authority—we propound the conception of a social contract theory of the firm which is truly Rawlsian in its inspiration. Hence, we link the social contract theory of the firm with the general theory of justice. Through this path, we enter the debate about whether firms can be part of Rawlsian theory of justice showing that corporate governance principles enter the “basic structure.” (...) Finally, we concur with Sen’s aim to broaden the realm of social justice beyond what he calls the ‘transcendental institutional perfectionism’ of Rawls’ theory. We maintain the contractarian approach to justice but introduce Sen’s capability concept as an element of the constitutional and post-constitutional contract model of institutions with special reference to corporate governance. Accordingly, rights over primary goods and capabilities are granted by the basic institutions of society, but many capabilities have to be turned into the functionings of many stakeholders through the operation of firms understood as post-constitutional institutional domains. The constitutional contract on the distribution of primary goods and capabilities should then shape the principles of corporate governance so that at post-constitutional level anyone may achieve her/his functionings in the corporate domain by exercising such capabilities. In the absence of such a condition, post-constitutional contracts would distort the process that descends from constitutional rights and capabilities toward social outcomes. (shrink)

The analysis of narrative processes and metaphorical language are the topics generally focused on by business ethics researchers interested in the work of Paul Ricœur. Yet his work on political questions also applies to the ethical issues associated with organizations. Ricœur’s ethical enterprise can be expressed as a triad composed of teleological, deontological, and sapiential levels, associating ostensibly opposing positions of Aristotelian and Kantian origin. In this study, I examine politics, economics, and ethics in their dialectic relation as established by (...) Ricœur. Against a vertical, mechanistic, and axiologically neutral vision of management, he opposes the two conceptual pairs of conviction/imagination and ideology/utopia as well as a superior definition of justice associating reciprocal indebtedness and mutual disinterestedness. Through this analysis, it becomes clear that the vertical, hierarchical nature of politics tends to undermine the horizontal interactions necessary to procure just institutions in society. And any business ethic that does not acknowledge political tensions will be mute. What is needed instead is practical wisdom that is developed through interaction, and often through conflict, involving all the different players. (shrink)

Since Ackerman in Corporate social responsiveness, the modern dilemma (1973), pleaded for the institutionalisation of corporate social performance (CSP) in business processes, researchers have focused on the role of strategy in CSP. This article demonstrates that CSP is institutionalised within the governance structure. We will attempt to make this clear by means of a description of the Dutch system of corporate governance. Under certain circumstances Dutch companies are already bound to CSP due to prevailing legislation. A governance perspective shows that (...) CSP is institutionalised within a company’s governance structure. “Processes of responsiveness”, since long regarded as a starting point of CSP-analysis, appear to be decision-making processes. Within these processes the expectations of the stakeholders can be institutionalised, trust can be built and interests can be incorporated. This makes CSP context-dependent. However, it is possible to analyse companies by comparing the companies’ individual governance structures. The article concludes that CSP-analysis can fruitfully extend into analysing in the role of the stakeholders in the influence-pathways that are incorporated within the governance structure. (shrink)