In this article, we examine the ethical implications of human transgenesis by considering the phenomenon in its larger evolutionary context. After clarifying the concept of transgenesis, we show that rather than unprecedented or unnatural, transgenesis is a common aspect of the evolutionary process that has likely affected all extant living animals, humans included. Additionally, we demonstrate that human transgenesis is technically feasible and that the moral barriers to it are mostly based on irrational fears premised on distorted and unrealistic views (...) of “human nature”. Furthermore, we suggest that transgenically modifying persons might be morally preferable to relying blindly on the “natural lottery”, and that it is possible to do so in an ethical and responsible manner. (shrink)

The idea of homesteading can be extended to the realm of biological entities, to the ownership of information wherein organisms perform artifactual functions as a result of human development. Can the information of biological entities be ethically “homesteaded”: should humans (or businesses) have ownership rights over this information from the basis of mere development and possession, as in Locke’s theory of private property? I offer three non-consequentialist arguments against such homesteading: the information makeup of biological entities is not commonly owned, (...) and thus is not available for homesteading; the value of the individual biological entity extends to the information whereby it is constituted, and includes inalienable rights of an entity over itself and its information; and use of life as an information artifact makes an organism an unending means to an end rather than an end itself. I conclude that the information space of biological entities is not open for homesteading, not liable to private ownership, and should not be available for perpetual exploitation. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been renewed controversy about monuments to the Confederacy: these monuments, their detractors insist, are instruments of white supremacy—and, as such, ought to be lowered immediately. The dialectic is by now familiar: though some insist that these monuments are mere sites of memory, others note the relevant memory is that of the Confederacy—and that, because of this, the monuments are inevitably racist. Worse, the monuments were raised by racist individuals for racist ends; no surprise, then, that (...) so many experience them as racist—that is, as instruments of white supremacy. For all of these reasons, the monuments ought to be lowered. -/- And probably it is so. But what does one do when the instrument of white supremacy is a mountain? What does one do, moreover, when it is less than clear whether that mountain is an instrument of white supremacy? What does one do, in other words, when that mountain is a monument to a regime only ambiguously racist? What does one do when it was raised by a racist individual for a racist end—but has since that time come to be seen as a monument to precisely the opposite ideals? What does one do, in other words, when it is experienced by most not as a symbol of white supremacy but as a symbol—indeed, as the symbol—of freedom and equality? -/- What does one do, in short, with Mount Rushmore at this moment—that is, in the wake of the Charleston shooting and the Charlottesville rally? And can the experience of those who saw the mountain prior to its status as a monument—that is, the Lakota—illuminate this question? In this essay, I examine these monumental questions. I ask them—and try to answer them—first as a consequentialist, second as a deontologist, and third as a virtue ethicist. (shrink)

The development of genetically modified crops in Malaysia is now closer to the commercialization stage. This is in line with the Malaysian Biotechnology Policy in transforming science into business by 2011. However, the ethical aspects of modern biotechnology have not been taken into consideration while doing the research and development related to modern biotechnology. The objective of this paper is to study the ethical perception of the Malaysian stakeholders in the Klang Valley region towards modern biotechnology in general and GM (...) crops. A survey was carried out on 434 respondents from various stakeholder groups in the Klang Valley region. Results of the survey showed that the respondents were ambivalent and cautious about modern biotechnology and GM crops. Although they perceived modern biotechnology as not threatening the natural order of things and having high benefit, they felt that humans have no absolute right to modify living things, were moderately concerned about its possible risks and were highly concerned about the possibility of market monopoly by giant companies and developed countries. They also stressed the high need for labeling of modern biotechnology products and only had moderate confidence in modern biotechnology regulations. Perceptions towards the ethical aspects of GM crops were found to vary according to the type of gene transfers involved. GM crops that involve intra-species gene transfer, such as plant to plant gene transfer, were perceived as more beneficial, less risky and more ethically and religiously acceptable, as compared to those involving cross-species gene transfers. Crossspecies gene transfer that was developed for medicalrelated benefits was more acceptable, compared to those that offered only additional benefits, such as nutritional enhancement. (shrink)