Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The archaelogy of spirit and the unique self: A Husserlian reading of Conrad-martius. [REVIEW]James G. Hart - 2008 - Axiomathes 18 (4):407-424.
    Although the connections of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ ontological phenomenology, what she called, “realontology,” to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology were constant concerns that usually remained in the background of her work, on occasion they became foreground. Similarly the problems surrounding the individuation of the person and spirit were persistent but rather marginal in her writings. In this paper I want first to review some of the issues as they are connected to ontological and transcendental phenomenology. Then I want to relate them to the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Th e Absolute Ought and the Unique Individual.James G. Hart - 2006 - Husserl Studies 22 (3):223-240.
    The referent of the transcendental and indexical “I” is present non-ascriptively and contrasts with “the personal I” which necessity is presenced as having properties. Each is unique but in different ways. The former is abstract and incomplete until taken as a personal I. The personal I is ontologically incomplete until it self-determines itself morally. The “absolute Ought” is the exemplary moral self-determination and it finds a special disclosure in “the truth of will.” Simmel's situation ethics is useful for making more (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The I: A dimensional account.Wolfgang Fasching - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (2):249-260.
    I have a clear idea of what it means that I have experiences in the past or future, and it does not seem to mean that experiences take place that possess certain content-characteristics, but simply and irreducibly thatIexperience them – i.e. that they are, at the time of their occurrence, experientially presentto me–, whatever their contents may be. So the central question regarding personal identity is: What is this “I”to whomthe experiences are present, and what is the nature of its (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The mineness of experience.Wolfgang Fasching - 2009 - Continental Philosophy Review 42 (2):131-148.
    In this paper I discuss the nature of the “I” (or “self”) and whether it is presupposed by the very existence of conscious experiences (as that which “has” them) or whether it is, instead, in some way constituted by them. I argue for the former view and try to show that the very nature of experience implies a non-constituted synchronic and diachronic transcendence of the experiencing “I” with regard to its experiences, an “I” which defies any objective characterization. Finally I (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations