This article addresses the question of fundamental entities in set theory. It takes up J. Hamkins’ claim that models of set theory are such fundamental entities and investigates it using the methodology of P. Maddy’s naturalism, Second Philosophy. In accordance with this methodology, I investigate the historical case study of the use of models in the introduction of forcing, compare this case to contemporary practice and give a systematic account of how set-theoretic practice can be said to introduce models as (...) new entities. In conclusion, I argue for a view that takes both sets and models to be fundamental entities in set theory. (shrink)

We study the partition relation $X@>{\rm w}>>[Y]_{p}^{2}$ that is a weakening of the usual partition relation $X\rightarrow [Y]_{p}^{2}$ . Our main result asserts that if κ is an uncountable strongly compact cardinal and $\germ{d}_{\kappa}\leq \lambda ^{<\kappa}$ , then $I_{\kappa,\lambda}^{+}@>{\rm w}>>[I_{\kappa,\lambda}^{+}]_{\lambda <\kappa}^{2}$ does not hold.

We extend the construction of a global square sequence in extender models from Zeman [8] to a construction of coherent non-threadable sequences and give a characterization of stationary reflection at inaccessibles similar to Jensen’s characterization in L.

We present a construction of a global square sequence in extender models with λ-indexing.

Mauldin [15] proved that there is an analytic set, which cannot be represented by $B\cup X$ for some Borel set B and a subset X of a $\boldsymbol{\Sigma }^0_2$ -null set, answering a question by Johnson [10]. We reprove Mauldin’s answer by a recursion-theoretical method. We also give a characterization of the Borel generated $\sigma $ -ideals having approximation property under the assumption that every real is constructible, answering Mauldin’s question raised in [15].

In this paper we show that the Proper Forcing Axiom is preserved under forcing over any poset PP with the following property: In the generalized Banach–Mazur game over PP of length , Player II has a winning strategy which depends only on the current position and the ordinal indicating the number of moves made so far. By the current position we mean: The move just made by Player I for a successor stage, or the infimum of all the moves made (...) so far for a limit stage. As a consequence of this theorem, we introduce a weak form of the square principle and show that it is consistent with PFA. (shrink)

We show that for any infinite cardinal κ, every strongly $(\kappa + 1)-strategically$ closed poset is strongly $\kappa^+-strategically$ closed if and only if $AP_\kappa$ (the approachability property) holds, answering the question asked in [5]. We also give a complete classification of strengths of strategic closure properties and that of strong strategic closure properties respectively.

We introduce a property of forcing notions, called the anti-, which comes from Aronszajn trees. This property canonically defines a new chain condition stronger than the countable chain condition, which is called the property . In this paper, we investigate the property . For example, we show that a forcing notion with the property does not add random reals. We prove that it is consistent that every forcing notion with the property has precaliber 1 and for forcing notions with the (...) property fails. This negatively answers a part of one of the classical problems about implications between fragments of. (shrink)

The Axiom of Strong Condensation, first introduced by Woodin in [14], is an abstract version of the Condensation Lemma ofL. In this paper, we construct a set-sized forcing to obtain Strong Condensation forH. As an application, we show that “ZFC + Axiom of Strong Condensation +”is consistent, which answers a question in [14]. As another application, we give a partial answer to a question of Jech by proving that “ZFC + there is a supercompact cardinal + any ideal onω1which is (...) definable overH is not precipitous” is consistent under sufficient large cardinal assumptions. (shrink)

We give a fairly complete account which first shows that the solution to the inner model problem for one supercompact cardinal will yield an ultimate version ofLand then shows that the various current approaches to inner model theory must be fundamentally altered to provide that solution.

We define a weak iterability notion that is sufficient for a number of arguments concerning $\Sigma _{1}$ -definability at uncountable regular cardinals. In particular we give its exact consistency strength first in terms of the second uniform indiscernible for bounded subsets of $\kappa $ : $u_2$, and secondly to give the consistency strength of a property of Lücke’s.TheoremThe following are equiconsistent:There exists $\kappa $ which is stably measurable;for some cardinal $\kappa $, $u_2=\sigma $ ;The $\boldsymbol {\Sigma }_{1}$ -club property holds (...) at a cardinal $\kappa $.Here $\sigma $ is the height of the smallest $M \prec _{\Sigma _{1}} H $ containing $\kappa +1$ and all of $H $. Let $\Phi $ be the assertion: TheoremAssume $\kappa $ is stably measurable. Then $\Phi $.And a form of converse:TheoremSuppose there is no sharp for an inner model with a strong cardinal. Then in the core model K we have: $\mbox {``}\exists \kappa \Phi \mbox {''}$ is -generically absolute ${\,\longleftrightarrow \,}$ There are arbitrarily large stably measurable cardinals.When $u_2 < \sigma $ we give some results on inner model reflection. (shrink)

We show how in the hierarchies${F_\alpha }$of Fieldian truth sets, and Herzberger’s${H_\alpha }$revision sequence starting from any hypothesis for${F_0}$ that essentially each${H_\alpha }$ carries within it a history of the whole prior revision process.As applications we provide a precise representation for, and a calculation of the length of, possiblepath independent determinateness hierarchiesof Field’s construction with a binary conditional operator. We demonstrate the existence of generalized liar sentences, that can be considered as diagonalizing past the determinateness hierarchies definable in Field’s recent (...) models. The ‘defectiveness’ of such diagonal sentences necessarily cannot be classified by any of the determinateness predicates of the model. They are ‘ineffable liars’. We may consider them a response to the claim of Field that ‘the conditional can be used to show that the theory is not subject to “revenge problems”.’. (shrink)

This paper sets out a predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox of propositions within the framework of Church’s intensional logic. A predicative response places restrictions on the full comprehension schema, which asserts that every formula determines a higher-order entity. In addition to motivating the restriction on the comprehension schema from intuitions about the stability of reference, this paper contains a consistency proof for the predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox. The models used to establish this consistency also model other axioms (...) of Church’s intensional logic that have been criticized by Parsons and Klement: this, it turns out, is due to resources which also permit an interpretation of a fragment of Gallin’s intensional logic. Finally, the relation between the predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox of propositions and the Russell paradox of sets is discussed, and it is shown that the predicative conception of set induced by this predicative intensional logic allows one to respond to the Wehmeier problem of many non-extensions. (shrink)

Frege's Grundgesetze was one of the 19th century forerunners to contemporary set theory which was plagued by the Russell paradox. In recent years, it has been shown that subsystems of the Grundgesetze formed by restricting the comprehension schema are consistent. One aim of this paper is to ascertain how much set theory can be developed within these consistent fragments of the Grundgesetze, and our main theorem shows that there is a model of a fragment of the Grundgesetze which defines a (...) model of all the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the exception of the power set axiom. The proof of this result appeals to G\"odel's constructible universe of sets, which G\"odel famously used to show the relative consistency of the continuum hypothesis. More specifically, our proofs appeal to Kripke and Platek's idea of the projectum within the constructible universe as well as to a weak version of uniformization (which does not involve knowledge of Jensen's fine structure theory). The axioms of the Grundgesetze are examples of abstraction principles, and the other primary aim of this paper is to articulate a sufficient condition for the consistency of abstraction principles with limited amounts of comprehension. As an application, we resolve an analogue of the joint consistency problem in the predicative setting. (shrink)

Let ℒ be a first-order language of cardinality κ++ with a distinguished unary predicate symbol U. In this paper we prove, working on L, the two cardinal transfer theorem (κ⁺,κ) ⇒ (κ++,κ⁺) for this language. This problem was posed by Chang and Keisler more than twenty years ago.

We extend the gap 1 cardinal transfer theorem → to any language of cardinality ≤λ, where λ is a regular cardinal. This transfer theorem has been proved by Chang under GCH for countable languages and by Silver in some cases for bigger languages . We assume the existence of a coarse -morass instead of GCH.

From large cardinals we obtain the consistency of the existence of a singular cardinal κ of cofinality ω at which the Singular Cardinals Hypothesis fails, there is a bad scale at κ and κ ++ has the tree property. In particular this model has no special κ +-trees.

This is a continuation of our paper where we show that Rado's Conjecture can trivialize ‐sequences in some cases when ϑ is not necessarily a successor cardinal.

We show that both Rado's Conjecture and strong Chang's Conjecture imply that there are no special ℵ2-Aronszajn trees if the Continuum Hypothesis fails. We give similar result for trees of higher heights and we also investigate the influence of Rado's Conjecture on square sequences.

We show that both Rado's Conjecture and strong Chang's Conjecture imply that there are no special ℵ2-Aronszajn trees if the Continuum Hypothesis fails. We give similar result for trees of higher heights and we also investigate the influence of Rado's Conjecture on square sequences.

We give an overview of a research line concentrated on finding to which extent compactness fails at the level of first uncountable cardinal and to which extent it could be recovered on some other perhaps not so large cardinal. While this is of great interest to set theorists, one of the main motivations behind this line of research is in its applicability to other areas of mathematics. We give some details about this and we expose some possible directions for further (...) research. (shrink)

We investigate club guessing sequences and filters. We prove that assuming V=L, there exists a strong club guessing sequence on μ if and only if μ is not ineffable for every uncountable regular cardinal μ. We also prove that for every uncountable regular cardinal μ, relative to the existence of a Woodin cardinal above μ, it is consistent that every tail club guessing ideal on μ is precipitous.

Using the Friedman-Koepke Hyperfine Structure Theory of [2], we provide a short construction of a gap 1 morass in the constructible universe.

This paper will define a new cardinal called aStationary Cardinal. We will show that every weakly∏ 1 1 -indescribable cardinal is a stationary cardinal, every stationary cardinal is a greatly Mahlo cardinal and every stationary set of a stationary cardinal reflects. On the other hand, the existence of such a cardinal is independent of that of a∏ 1 1 -indescribable cardinal and the existence of a cardinal such that every stationary set reflects is also independent of that of a stationary (...) cardinal. As applications, we will show thatV=L implies ◊ κ 1 holds if κ is∏ 1 1 -indescribable and so forth. (shrink)

We show that MRP + MA implies that ITP(λ, ω 2 ) holds for all cardinal λ ≥ ω 2 . This generalizes a result by Weiß who showed that PFA implies that ITP(λ, ω 2 ) holds for all cardinal λ ≥ ω 2 . Consequently any of the known methods to prove MRP + MA consistent relative to some large cardinal hypothesis requires the existence of a strongly compact cardinal. Moreover if one wants to force MRP + MA (...) with a proper forcing, it requires at least a supercompact cardinal. We also study the relationship between MRP and some weak versions of square. We show that MRP implies the failure of □(λ, ω) for all λ ≥ ω 2 and we give a direct proof that MRP + MA implies the failure of □(λ, ω 1 ) for all λ ≥ ω 2. (shrink)

It is shown that if κ is an uncountable successor cardinal in L[ 0 ♯ ], then there is a normal tree T ∈ L [ 0 ♯ ] of height κ such that $0^\sharp \not\in L\lbrack\mathbf{T}\rbrack$ . Yet T is $ -distributive in L[ 0 ♯ ]. A proper class version of this theorem yields an analogous L[ 0 ♯ ]-definable tree such that distinct branches in the presence of 0 ♯ collapse the universe. A heretofore unutilized method for (...) constructing in L[ 0 ♯ ] generic objects for certain L-definable forcings and "exotic sequences", combinatorial principles introduced by C. Gray, are used in constructing these trees. (shrink)

We lay the combinatorial foundations for [5] by setting up and proving the essential properties of the coding apparatus for singular cardinals. We also prove another result concerning the coding apparatus for inaccessible cardinals.

We define the concept of a logic frame , which extends the concept of an abstract logic by adding the concept of a syntax and an axiom system. In a recursive logic frame the syntax and the set of axioms are recursively coded. A recursive logic frame is called complete , if every finite consistent theory has a model. We show that for logic frames built from the cardinality quantifiers “there exists at least λ ” completeness always implies .0-compactness. On (...) the other hand we show that a recursively compact logic frame need not be ℵ0-compact. (shrink)

Assume G.C.H. We prove that for singular λ, □ λ implies the diamonds hold for many $S \subseteq \lambda^+$ (including $S \subseteq \{\delta:\delta \in \lambda^+, \mathrm{cf}\delta = \mathrm{cf}\delta = \mathrm{cf}\lambda\}$ . We also have complementary consistency results.

Suppose that there is no transitive model of ZFC + there is a strong cardinal, and let K denote the core model. It is shown that if $\delta$ has the tree property then $\delta^{+K} = \delta^+$ and $\delta$ is weakly compact in K.

We introduce 0• as a sharp for an inner model with a proper class of strong cardinals. We prove the existence of the core model K in the theory “ does not exist”. Combined with work of Woodin, Steel, and earlier work of the author, this provides the last step for determining the exact consistency strength of the assumption in the statement of the 12th Delfino problem pp. 221–224)).

We prove that in all Mitchell-Steel core models, □ κ holds for all κ. (See Theorem 2.). From this we obtain new consistency strength lower bounds for the failure of □ κ if κ is either singular and countably closed, weakly compact, or measurable. (Corallaries 5, 8, and 9.) Jensen introduced a large cardinal property that we call subcompactness; it lies between superstrength and supercompactness in the large cardinal hierarchy. We prove that in all Jensen core models, □ κ holds (...) iff κ is not subcompact. (See Theorem 15; the only if direction is essentially due to Jensen.). (shrink)

We prove that in all Mitchell-Steel core models, □k holds for all k. From this we obtain new consistency strength lower bounds for the failure of □k if k is either singular and countably closed, weakly compact, or measurable. Jensen introduced a large cardinal property that we call subcompactness; it lies between superstrength and supercompactness in the large cardinal hierarchy. We prove that in all Jensen core models, □k holds iff k is not subcompact.