One major argument against prohibiting euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) is that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between killing and allowing to die: if we permit patients to die by forgoing life-sustaining treatments, then we also ought to permit euthanasia and PAS. In this paper, the author argues, contra this claim, that it is in fact coherent to differentiate between killing and allowing to die. To develop this argument, the author provides an analysis of Saint Augustine’s distinction between (...) martyrdom and suicide, highlighting the relevance of intention in the assessment of an agent’s actions. As a general matter of ethics, the intentions of agents, not just the outcomes of their actions, matter enormously for drawing distinctions between what is permissible and what is impermissible. Constructing an Augustinian account of this distinction between killing and allowing to die, the author argues that it is coherent to hold that assisted suicide is wrong, while also accepting that it is permissible to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatments. (shrink)

The paper deals with the way postmodernism has been discussed within philosophy of education and argued for by some authors within this context, and with what this kind of postmodernism can offer to education and to philosophy of education. Particular attention is paid to one of the basic presuppositions, namely the requirement to break with the cultural heritage and look for radical alternatives. A second paper will develop a different view of human action, following the later Wittgenstein, and draw on (...) Frankfurt's ideas on‘the importance of what we care about’ to revitalise the conception of the educational project. (shrink)

The paper deals with the way postmodernism has been discussed within philosophy of education and argued for by some authors within this context, and with what this kind of postmodernism can offer to education and to philosophy of education. Particular attention is paid to one of the basic presuppositions, namely the requirement to break with the cultural heritage and look for radical alternatives. A second paper will develop a different view of human action, following the later Wittgenstein, and draw on (...) Frankfurt's ideas on‘the importance of what we care about’ to revitalise the conception of the educational project. (shrink)

It is said that faith in a divine agent is partly an attitude of trust; believers typically find assurance in the conception of a divine being's will, and cherish confidence in its capacity to implement its intentions and plans. Yet, there would be little point in trusting in the will of any being without assuming its ability to both act and know, and perhaps it is only by assuming divine omniscience that one can retain the confidence in the efficacy and (...) direction of divine agency that has long been the lure of certain religious traditions. (shrink)