Switch to: References

Citations of:

Evidence for animal metaminds

In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press (2012)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Epistemic Action, Extended Knowledge, and Metacognition.Joëlle Proust - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):364-392.
    How should one attribute epistemic credit to an agent, and hence, knowledge, when cognitive processes include an extensive use of human or mechanical enhancers, informational tools, and devices which allow one to complement or modify one's own cognitive system? The concept of integration of a cognitive system has been used to address this question. For true belief to be creditable to a person's ability, it is claimed, the relevant informational processes must be or become part of the cognitive character of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Replies to Langland‐Hassan, Nagel, and Smith.Joëlle Proust - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):736-755.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Shaping Your Own Mind: The Self-Mindshaping View on Metacognition.Víctor Fernández-Castro & Fernando Martínez-Manrique - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (1):139-167.
    Starting from Proust’s distinction between the self-attributive and self-evaluative views on metacognition, this paper presents a third view: self-mindshaping. Based on the notion of mindshaping as the core of social cognition, the self-mindshaping view contends that mindshaping abilities can be turned on one’s own mind. Against the self-attributive view, metacognition is not a matter of accessing representations to metarepresent them but of giving shape to those representations themselves. Against the self-evaluative view, metacognition is not blind to content but relies heavily (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Time and Action: Impulsivity, Habit, Strategy.Joëlle Proust - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):717-743.
    Granting that various mental events might form the antecedents of an action, what is the mental event that is the proximate cause of action? The present article reconsiders the methodology for addressing this question: Intention and its varieties cannot be properly analyzed if one ignores the evolutionary constraints that have shaped action itself, such as the trade-off between efficient timing and resources available, for a given stake. On the present proposal, three types of action, impulsive, routine and strategic, are designed (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations