This study brings the thoughts of Derrida into conversation with François Laruelle’s non-philosophy or non-standard philosophy. Laruelle argued that Derrida is a philosopher of difference, thereby grouping Derrida together with Heidegger and Deleuze as philosophers of difference. The argument of this article is to explore Derrida’s work, bringing it into conversation with Laruelle’s non-philosophy and non-standard philosophy. This article is focussed specifically on Derrida’s democracy to come in line with Laruelle’s democracy of thought. The context of this discussion is the (...) end of philosophy or the closure of philosophy, and the opening of this closure for a democracy is yet to come – or whether the ideas of the end of philosophy or the closure of philosophy (metaphysics) are philosophical materials for Laruelle’s science of philosophy or non-philosophy. Laruelle does not seek a democracy to come, but understands these different thoughts as democracy of thought: all thoughts equal and unifacially turned not towards a democracy to come, but a future. (shrink)

Fossils and tombs in museums fascinate us and haunt us with their secrets. The discovery of the remains of Homo naledi, found, as argued by some, in an ancient burial chamber, promises to reveal secrets of an unremembered past, thus offering clues concerning our present-day humans and maybe influence our human future. The paper will not engage directly with what Homo naledi might contribute to the various science-religion and/or theology conversations but rather engage with the grammars of these conversations, by (...) asking the question, why do tombs and fossils haunt us? This article will bring into the conversation Derrida's interpretation on tombs and fossils, his hauntology, as well as the fascination with secrets. It will not offer an interpretation of Naledi, but rather ask the question why she inspires the belief that she has something to offer the science-religion conversation, or why she inspires the belief that such discoveries make no difference to the religious views on creation, for example. Whichever way, the dead, and specifically those dead to human memory, when 'recalled', haunt us and disturb us with their secrets. (shrink)

This article is part of a research project, Conversations after God. The focus of this article is to reflect on the theory and methodology of practical theology in a post-metaphysical context. It will be suggested that practical theology can redefine itself as public theology, but specifically as Christology by engaging the public texts within their contexts, but from a Christ-science hermeneutical approach. The proposed approach is a hermeneutical approach where the Christ-Ereignis guides the inner- and inter-textual reading of texts within (...) contexts. This Christ-Ereignis cannot be translated into a science or even a definable philosophy and therefore the logos is crossed out. Christology, as public theology is done from the margins of the dominant discourses and therefore it could be seen as a Christology from the margins of the market to create spaces of kingdom life: life in fullness. (shrink)

This paper examines a case where Amazon’s cloud-based AI assistant Alexa accidentally ordered a dollhouse for a 6-year-old girl. In the press, the case was defined as a technical recognition problem. Building on this idea, we argue that the dollhouse case helps us to analyze the limits of current AI applications. By drawing on the writings of Gilles Deleuze and François Laruelle, we argue that these limits are not merely technical but more deeply embedded in the structures where the thinking (...) of AI can potentially happen. We point out that AI research has been compromised by the concepts of what constitutes both ‘artificial’ and by what constitutes ‘intelligence’. First, we use the notion of artificial non-intelligence to explain how different modes of digital capitalism such as voice commerce establish limits for AI. Second, we use the notion of non-artificial intelligence to illustrate the limits of associating AI’s modes of thinking with human thought. (shrink)

Brandom's method of analyzing pragmatic relations among different practices and vocabularies through meaning-use diagrams is used to specify how Laruelle's nonphilosophical suspension of the Principle of Sufficient Philosophy may be distinguished from the philosophical auto-critiques of such thinkers as Badiou and Derrida. A superposition of diagrams modeling philosophical sufficiency on the one hand and supplementation through the Other on the other provides a schematic representation of the core duality of what Laruelle calls The-Philosophy. In contrast to this self-implicating and self-reproducing (...) structure, Laruelle's axiomatic method is shown to enable a unilateral usage of the practices and vocabularies of philosophy as mere material that is no longer subject to the presuppositions or ineluctable restitution of philosophy as such. (shrink)

The present article is a contribution to a particularly urgent issue that is unfolding in Buddhist circles in North America andEurope. Although this issue is framed in various ways, it revolves around a single question; namely, what form will contemporary reconfigurations of Buddhism take in the twenty-first century West? The most influential groups in this discussion to date are those that style themselves secular-, progressive-, atheist-, agnostic-, liberal-, and post-traditional Buddhist. As these groups gain adherents in the West, traditional organizations, (...) such as the various Zens, Tibetans, Vipassanas, etc., are stating their claim to “Buddhism” with increasingly vehement proprietorship. The present article, however, is not yet another attempt to reformulate or reform (in any sense of the term) “Buddhism.” Neither is it concerned with ameliorating traditional Buddhism's relationship with contemporary western secular values. In performing its first task, however, my emerging theory, called “speculative non-buddhism,” can contribute to the current debate in a decisive way by showing that all forms of Buddhism are identical. What makes them so is that they are all governed by what I call “buddhistic decision:” the syntactical structure that constitutes all things, discourse, and people, “Buddhist.” Decision thus constitutes both the ideological nature, and the ideological constant, of “Buddhism.”. (shrink)

Jesu li stvari ovog svijeta nešto što je dano samoj misli? Jesu li stvari tako mišljene da budu spoznatljive, da budu objektivne manifestacije transcendentalno uvjetovanih moći? Zapadna filozofska tradicija prema Francoisu Laruellu pretpostavlja tu transcendentalnu konstituciju realnog. To je pretpostavka koja uzdiže samu filozofiju kao označenu primateljicu transcendentalnog dara. U našem članku o Laruellovom projektu želimo pokazati kako ta pretpostavka kontrolira čak i prividno radikalne kritike filozofske tradicije koje su se umnožile kao posljedice Nietzscheovog i Heideggerovog mišljenja. Zato učinkovita kritika (...) filozofije mora biti ne-filozofska. Ona prema Laruellu mora dokinuti pretpostavke da je drugotnost dana da bi bila spoznata, kao što mora dokinuti pretpostavku kako sama misao ima fundamentalno drugačiju strukturu. Ne-filozofija počinje ne sa razlikom, ne sa subjektom i objektom, nego sa pozicioniranjem Jednog. Od te početne aksiomatske točke, ne-filozofija uzima kao vlastitu materijalnu filozofiju ponovno mišljenje u odnosu na Jedno. Ne-filozofski projekt ne započinje kao što to čini postmoderna filozofija s naviještanjem kraja filozofije. On uzima filozofiju kao prigodu da postavi pitanje drugačije vrste mišljenja – onog koji, umjesto da se diferencirajći odnosi prema svijetu koji pretpostavlja, potvrđuje kako je ultimativno u tijelu s Jednim kojeg nikad ne možemo znati. (shrink)

This essay argues that Laruelle’s ‘non-philosophical’ practice is connected to its performative language, such that to the question 'what is it to think?, non-philosophy responds that thinking is not “thought”, but performing, and that to perform is to clone the world. Non-philosophy is equally described by Laruelle as ‘transcendental practice’, an ‘immanent pragmatics’, or a ‘universal pragmatics’ that is ‘valid for ordinary language as well as for philosophy’. It is notable, however, that Laruelle objects to the focus on activity within (...) the concept of a speech act, and instead emphasizes the ‘descriptive passivity’ that an immanent pragmatics obliges. Laruelle calls this a ‘Performed-Without-Performation’ which would be an action of the Real: philosophical language seen as a performed, but without a ‘we’ – or any others – performing it. It is this notion of the performative, without either active human or philosophical adumbration, which is the topic of this essay. (shrink)