Multilocation and Minimal Mereology do not mix well. It has been pointed out that Three-Dimensionalism, which can be construed as multilocation-friendly, runs into trouble with Weak Supplementation. But in fact, regardless of one’s theory of persistence, if someone posits the possibility of any one of several kinds of multilocation, he or she will not be able to maintain the necessity of any of the three axioms of Minimal Mereology: the Transitivity of Proper Parthood, the Asymmetry of Proper Parthood, and Weak (...) Supplementation. In fact, positing even the mere conceivability of cases involving multilocation will require the denial of the analyticity of Minimal Mereology. In response to this, some have claimed that we ought to relativise parthood, either to one region or to two. Unfortunately, if we replace the axioms of Minimal Mereology with region-relativised counterparts, we will not be able to capture the intuitions that supported the original axioms. The only adequate solution, I maintain, is to restrict multilocation to a domain outside the scope of the rules we intuitively take to govern the parthood relation. For those who take Minimal Mereology to be necessary and universal, that will mean relinquishing the possibility of multilocation. (shrink)

A team of leading philosophers presents original work on theories of parthood and location. Topics covered include how we ought to axiomatise our mereology; whether we can reduce mereological relations to identity or to locative relations; whether Mereological Essentialism is true; and what mereology and propositions can tell us about one another.

All of the current leading theories of location are parsimonious: they have at most one locative primitive, and the definitions of all of the other locative relations appeal to nothing beyond that primitive, mereological properties and relations, and basic logic. I argue that if we believe there can be extended, mereologically simple regions, we can construct cases that are incompatible with every possible parsimonious theory of location. In these cases, an object is contained within a simple region that is larger (...) than the object; that is, there is some region, r, and some object, x, are such that every subregion of r fails to be completely free of x, yet x fails to fill r. I argue that we ought to respond to this incompatibility by rejecting the analytic possibility of extended, simple regions. (shrink)

I examine the implications of positing stuff as a way to avoid colocation in the case of the statue and the bronze that constitutes it. When characterising stuff, it’s intuitive to say we often individuate stuff kinds by appealing to things and their relations. I argue that if this intuition is correct, there are important restrictions on how we can characterise stuff in order to avoid colocated portions of stuff.

Current formulations of Four-Dimensionalism may be objected to on grounds that they are too inflexible: the formulations do not seem to allow for enough variety in the views they are paired with. For instance, Kit Fine has noted that formulations of Four-Dimensionalism in terms of instantaneous parts may be too demanding for Four-Dimensionalists who believe nothing is instantaneous. And Trenton Merricks has argued that one can think something persists four-dimensionionally without taking it to have proper temporal parts, and claims that (...) our formulation of Four-Dimensionalism should be revised to allow for this. I will add my own worries to those of Fine and Merricks. I will note that current formulations of Four-Dimensionalism are not sufficiently neutral with respect to the structure of time, with respect to how liberally objects decompose into parts, and with respect to whether objects and the regions they fill match in mereological structure. I will show that we can formulate Four-Dimensionalism in a sufficiently neutral way, while still producing a view that can do the work we typically require of Four-Dimensionalism. (shrink)

Recently, we have been presented with an argument against the intrinsicality of shape that appeals to a plausible Humean principle. According to the argument, if shape is intrinsic and the location relation is fundamental, then we cannot explain the necessary correlation between an object’s shape and the shape of its location. And, it is claimed, the Humean principle tells us that an unexplained necessary correlation like this one is unacceptable. In this paper I respond to this argument by rejecting the (...) favoured interpretation of the Humean principle. I claim that sometimes there are truths about what it means to stand in a given relation, even when that relation has no analysis.. These truths sometimes entail that the relata of the relation have certain features. And it is not problematic for truths about what it means to stand in a relation to be unexplained. I argue that it is plausible to take is located at to be such a relation; an object’s having exactly the same shape as the region it is located at is part of what it means to be located at that region. I conclude with an amended formulation of the Humean claim that still captures the spirit of the principle without threatening the intrinsicality of shape. (shrink)

Logics of part/whole relations frequently take parthood or proper parthood as primitive, defining the remaining mereological properties and relations in terms of them. I argue from considerations involving Weak Supplementation for the conclusion that we should take fusion as our mereological primitive. I point out that the intuitions supporting Weak Supplementation also support a stronger principle, Weak Supplementation of Pluralities, and that the principle can only do the work demanded by our intuitions when formulated in terms of a notion of (...) fusion that cannot be defined merely in terms of mereological properties and relations, logic, and a membership relation. So, insofar as we think any definition of fusion must be so restricted, we have motivation to take fusion as primitive; further, we have greater insight into the motivation for our supplementation principle and which version of that principle we ought to endorse. (shrink)

The relation of being more fundamental than, as well as the Finean notion of partial grounding, are widely taken to be irreflexive, transitive, and asymmetric. However, certain time-travel cases that have been used to raise worries about the irreflexivity, transitivity, and asymmetry of proper part of can also be used to argue that more fundamental than and partially grounds do not have these formal properties. I present this worry and discuss several responses to it, with the aim of showing that (...) the problem is harder to address when applied to fundamentality and partial grounding than it was when merely applied to proper parthood. (shrink)

Trinitarians claim there are three Divine persons each of which is God, and yet there is only one God. It seems they want three to equal one. It just so happens, some metaphysicians claim exactly that. They accept Composition as Identity: each fusion is identical to the plurality of its parts. I evaluate Composition as Identity's application to the doctrine of the Trinity, and argue that it fails to give the Trinitairan any options he or she didn't already have. Further, (...) while Composition as Identity does give us a new way to assert polytheism, its help requires us to endorse a claim that undercuts any Trinitarian motivation for the view. (shrink)

We seem to talk about repeatable artworks, like symphonies, films, and novels, all the time. We say things like, "The Moonlight Sonata has three movements" and "Duck Soup makes me laugh". How are these sentences to be understood? We argue against the simple subject/predicate view, on which the subjects of the sentences refer to individuals and the sentences are true iff the referents of the subjects have the properties picked out by the predicates. We then consider two alternative responses that (...) involve reading these sentences as generics, similar to "The polar bear has four paws". The first response takes these sentences to be about kinds, and the second takes the relevant noun-phrases to act as predicates. We reject these accounts, but offer a third alternative which is informed by both, and which enables us to deny the existence of repeatable artworks while endorsing the truth of sentences seemingly about them. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue, contrary to common assumptions, that rational atheistic prayer is possible. I will formulate and respond to two powerful arguments against the possibility of atheistic prayer: first, an argument that the act of prayer involves an intention to communicate to God, precluding disbelief in God’s existence; second, an argument claiming that reaching out to God through prayer requires believing God might exist, precluding rational disbelief in God. In showing options for response to these arguments, I (...) will describe a model on which atheistic prayer is not only possible, but is on a par with theistic prayer in many more ways than one might expect. (shrink)

According to Principles of Sufficient Reason, every truth (in some relevant group) has an explanation. One of the most popular defenses of Principles of Sufficient Reason has been the presupposition of reason defense, which takes endorsement of the defended PSR to play a crucial role in our theory selection. According to recent presentations of this defense, our method of theory selection often depends on the assumption that, if a given proposition is true, then it has an explanation, and this will (...) only be justified if we think this holds for all propositions in the relevant group. I argue that this argument fails even when restricted to contingent propositions, and even if we grant that there is no non-arbitrary way to divide true propositions that have explanations from those that lack them. Further, we can give an alternate explanation of what justifies our selecting theories on the basis of explanatory features: the crucial role is not played by an endorsement of a PSR, but rather by our belief that, prima facie, we should prefer theories that exemplify explanatory power to greater degrees than their rivals. This guides our theory selection in a manner similar to ontological parsimony and theoretical simplicity. Unlike a PSR, our belief about explanatory power gives us a prima facie guiding principle, which provides justification in the cases where we think we have it, and not in the cases where we think we don't. (shrink)

Some Trinitarians, such as Thomas Aquinas, wish to claim that God is mereologically simple; that is, God has no parts distinct from Himself. In this paper, I present Simple Trinitarianism, a view that takes God to be simple but, diverging from Aquinas, does not identify the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit with anything in our ontology. Nonetheless, Simple Trinitarians would like Trinitarian sentences to be true; thus, they must give a non-standard semantics for those sentences. I will focus on one (...) possible semantics a Simple Trinitarian may give: taking Trinitarian claims to be translatable into feature-placing sentences, which posit property instantiation without requiring commitment to any objects that instantiate those properties. (shrink)

It is common to think that it’s possible for entities to spatially coincide in multiple ways: with overcrowding, and without overcrowding. Typically, we can distinguish between these by claiming that uncrowded spatial overlap involves a sharing of parts, and crowded spatial overlap does not. However, if we think that mereologically unusual entities, such as extended simples or some kinds of gunk, can also spatially overlap in crowded and uncrowded ways, we lose the ability to distinguish between those varieties of spatial (...) overlap via appeal to shared parts. Thus, we should either reject the possibilities that generated this difficulty, or we must look for an alternative explanation of these varieties of spatial overlap. (shrink)

The At-At Account of motion is the extremely popular view that, necessarily, something moves if and only if it’s at one place at one time, and at a distinct place at a distinct time. This, many believe, is all that motion consists in. However, I will present a case in which, intuitively, motion does not occur, though the At-At Account of motion entails that it does. I will then turn to the only tenable response that avoids revising the At-At Account: (...) denying the possibility of my case. I will argue that the response is both contentious and fails to defend the spirit of the At-At Account qua reduction of motion (rather than mere listing of necessary and sufficient conditions for motion’s occurring). (shrink)

Achille Varzi has shown that it is harder to deny Extensionality than we may have thought: he's argued that if we define proper parthood as parthood with distinctness, cases we take to violate Extensionality don’t really involve sharing of all proper parts. Aaron Cotnoir has responded by showing that, if we instead define proper parthood as asymmetric parthood, we can take Extensionality to be violated in these cases. I will offer a new response to this argument. Even granting Varzi's definition (...) of proper parthood, there are versions of Extensionality very similar to the one Varzi and Cotnoir discuss. One of these is motivated by the same intuitions as Varzi's Extensionality, and is violated in cases traditionally taken to be anti-Extensional. Thus, even granting Varzi's definition of proper parthood, anti-Extensionalists can capture a sense in which their cases violate Extensionality, without this merely amounting to a violation of Uniqueness of Composition. (shrink)

Sometimes people petition God for things through prayer. This is puzzling, because if God always does what is best, it is not clear how these prayers can make a difference to what God does. Difference-Making accounts of petitionary prayer attempt to explain how these prayers can nonetheless influence what God does. I argue that, insofar as one is motivated to endorse a Difference-Making Account because they want to respect widespread intuitions about this feature of petitionary prayer, they should also be (...) motivated to endorse an account of prayer that respects widespread intuitions about other central features of petitionary prayer. I describe three problematic cases and the intuitions we have about them, and show how these intuitions restrict any Difference-Making account of petitionary prayer. (shrink)

In a recent paper Shieva Kleinschmidt has argued that if certain scenarios involving extended simple regions are possible (so-called ‘Place Cases’), then no logic of location with only one primitive locative notion (i.e., no ‘parsimonious logic of location’) will suffice to describe all of the locative possibilities. Since almost all existing logics of location are parsimonious (and apparently for good reason) the argument is a considerable obstacle to the development of a satisfactory logic of location. Kleinschmidt suggests (...) that the best way out of the difficulty is to deny the possibility of Place Cases by denying that extended simple regions are possible. I argue that much the same problem arises even in cases not involving extended simple regions or indeed exotic regions of any kind. Thus, simply denying the possibility of extended simple regions will not save parsimonious logics of location. (shrink)

Social and linguistic perceptions are linked. On one hand, talker identity affects speech perception. On the other hand, speech itself provides information about a talker's identity. Here, we propose that the same probabilistic knowledge might underlie both socially conditioned linguistic inferences and linguistically conditioned social inferences. Our computational–level approach—the ideal adapter—starts from the idea that listeners use probabilistic knowledge of covariation between social, linguistic, and acoustic cues in order to infer the most likely explanation of the speech signals they hear. (...) As a first step toward understanding social inferences in this framework, we use a simple ideal observer model to show that it would be possible to infer aspects of a talker's identity using cue distributions based on actual speech production data. This suggests the possibility of a single formal framework for social and linguistic inferences and the interactions between them. (shrink)

In this article we examine the role of Entscheider (decision-makers) in the German asylum procedure, both legally and ethical. As the responsibility for deciding on asylum applications lies exclusively with them, their significance for the German asylum procedure can hardly be underestimated. However, over the last few decades the situation of Entscheider changed significantly: While the number and complexity of the cases they have to decide on has increased due to the growing immigration, the requirements for their education have been (...) lowered, owed to critical amendments to the relevant law. We analyze how the law currently defines the role of Entscheider, whether the legal framework is constitutional, and what modifications morality requires. Although the law defining their role seems to be constitutional, Entscheider’s education must be improved and they must be entrusted with the hearing of the applicants to meet what morality requires, we conclude. DOI: 10.17879/95189429199. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Frühmittelalterliche Studien Jahrgang: 48 Heft: 1 Seiten: 155-206.

(1996). Local politics and international relations: The case of the relations between Württemberg and Japan. The European Legacy: Vol. 1, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the study of European Ideas, pp. 778-781.

The early medieval exegesis of the Pentecost account in the Acts of the Apostles emphasised the divine origin of the light that some early medieval theologists, specifically Hrabanus Maurus, believed to have descended upon the Apostles and provided them with special powers. The following article links Hrabanus Maurus's exegetical work with early pictorial representations of Pentecost as well as medieval theories of action.

Study of the changing nature of the perception of an action and the action itself, and how thought-processes altered radically in the Middle Ages"--Provided by publisher.

ZusammenfassungDie Ökonomisierung bzw. die Kommerzialisierung des Sports ist ein langfristiger Prozess, der sich bereits seit der Wende zum 20. Jahrhundert vollzog und unterschiedliche Sportarten in unterschiedlichen Entwicklungsphasen und Geschwindigkeiten erfasste. Sportartikelunternehmen wie adidas beschleunigten diese Entwicklung nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, indem sie anlässlich sportlicher Großereignisse wie Olympischen Spielen oder Fußball-Weltmeisterschaften intensive Kontakte und Netzwerke zu Spitzensportlern und Funktionären aufbauten. Dabei ging es zunächst um die individuelle Ausrüstung der Sportler mit Schuhen und Kleidung, seit den 1960er Jahren dann auch um Promotionverträge (...) bei denen – in West- wie in Osteuropa – Geldzahlungen eine zunehmend wichtige Rolle spielten. Eine solche Vermarktlichung – also die Gestaltung von Prozessen, die bislang über den Staat oder bürokratische Strukturen und nun zunehmend über den Markt geregelt wurden (Ahrens et al. 2015: 395f.) Ökonomisierung, Kommerzialisierung und Vermarktlichung sind verwandte Begriffe, die z.T. auch synonym benutzt werden. Siehe dazu jüngst Graf (2019)., was im Vergleich zu anderen gesellschaftlichen Subsystemen durchaus eine Art „Normalisierung“ darstellte, erreichte spätestens in den 1980er Jahren und mit der massenmedialen Verbreitung des Sports neue Dimensionen, die wiederum mit Hilfe von adidas unter Horst Dassler in Kooperation mit dem IOC und der FIFA vorangetrieben wurden und die Grundlagen einer Kommerzialisierungsspirale legten, deren Auswirkungen bis in die Gegenwart reichen. (shrink)

Desire satisfaction has not received detailed philosophical examination. Yet intuitive judgments about the satisfaction of desires have been used as data points guiding theories of desire, desire content, and the semantics of ‘desire’. This paper examines desire satisfaction and the standard propositional view of desire. Firstly, I argue that there are several distinct concepts of satisfaction. Secondly, I argue that separating them defuses a difficulty for the standard view in accommodating desires that Derek Parfit described as ‘implicitly conditional on their (...) own persistence’, a problem posed by Shieva Kleinschmidt, Kris McDaniel, and Ben Bradley. The solution undercuts a key motivation for rejecting the standard view in favour of more radical accounts proposed in the literature. (shrink)

Kleinschmidt's definition of the “Weltformenkreis” as the smallest systematical unit of affinity removes any danger of obliterating the type and at the same time opens a way for judging the superior taxonomic groups on principle differently from the subspecies of a “Formenkreis”.It is demonstrated that the characters of geographical subspecies are characters of apparent shaping, those of the species however are characters of construction and qualitative and autonomic ones. It is the type differentiating in quality that justifies the definition (...) of species. As the characters of type do not necessarily appear gradual and quantitative, but are qualitative, the types cannot be derived from one another, unless they are conceived by the common superordinate idea of the superior systematical category next in order.The distinct division of species is opposed to the hypothetical continuity of the pedigree, which cannot be explained by a consanguinity nor by an affinity based on reproduction. The pedigree, however, is an expression of the spiritual order of nature, in which the types appear as units hierarchically graduated and determined by entelechy, not by dead matter.Within the systematical units there is a creative evolution, steadily pursuing its aim and leading from the primitive stage to the differentiated one, beginning with a juvenile phase, which is followed by orthogenetic maturity and, finally, by the aged stage with its “detypification”. The adaptation to the environment may be also proved for the primitive forms and is an organic part of the whole design of the world for them as well as for the specialized and differentiated forms. — The formation of new types cannot be explained in a merely mechanical way; everywhere, even in the gens and genoms, we state ingenious modifications, which do not only bring about a reaction of a single modification to the whole, but operate from the whole. Since the origin of man, since the tertiary formation, the creation of species has completely ceased. There are only alterations of subspecific character.After a digressive treatise on the fundamental difference of man and animal in order to explain the type the superior systematical categories are characterized as spiritual realities. It is especially for the “genus” that a revision is necessary. The reality of the common origin of certain species within the genus is not based on reproduction , but on the superior totality comprising the species. Individuals can be conceived by the character of the species, species by the character of genus only. This is an evidence for the methodicalness of creative nature. It excludes any evolution of the genus “from bottom to top”, which is irregular, accidental or immediately formed by environment. From this we derive the comprehensive right of a natural system which now is more than mere classification.Kleinschmidt qui donne une définition du „Weltformenkreis” comme la plus petite unité d'affinité systématique, déjoue le danger d'oblitérer le type et offre, en même temps, la possibilité de juger les groupes taxonomiques supérieurs par principe différemment de la souspèce d'un „Formenkreis”.Nous démontrons que les caractères des souspèces géographiques sont des caractères du façonnement extérieur, tandis que ceux de l'espèce sont des caractères de la construction d'une manière qualitative et autonome. Le type différent en qualité justifie seulement la définition de l'espèce. Comme les caractères du type n'apparaissent pas nécessairement graduels et quantitatifs, mais sont au contraire, qualitatifs, les types ne se dérivent pas l'un de l'autre, à moins qu'ils ne soient compris par la commune idée supérieure du plus sublime groupe systématique.La division distincte des espèces s'oppose à la continuité hypothétique de la généalogie, qui ne s'explique pas par une consanguinité ni par une affinité se fondant sur la reproduction, mais qui est plutôt une expression du régime spirituel de la nature, dans lequel les types se présentent comme des unités rangées hiérarchiquement et réglées par l'entéléchie et non par la matière.Dans les unités systématiques il y a une évolution créatrice qui tend continuellement à son but et mène de la phase primitive à la phase différentiée commençant par un état juvénile, qui est succédé par la maturité orthogénétique et enfin par l'âge avec sa „détypification”. L'adaptation au milieu est démontrée pour les formes primitives et représente un élément organique du grand projet mondial pour elles aussi bien que pour les formes spécialisées et différentiées. — La formation de types nouveaux ne s'explique pas seulement d'une manière mécanique; partout, même dans les „genes” et les „genomes”, nous observons des transformations ingénieuses, qui ne sont pas seulement une réaction d'une modification particulière à l'ensemble, mais un effet de l'ensemble. Depuis l'origine de l'homme, depuis la période tertiaire la formation d'espèces est complètement finie. À présent il n'y a plus que des variations d'un caractère souspécifique. Après un traité digressif sur la différence essentielle de l'homme et de l'animal pour expliquer le type les groupes systématiques supérieurs sont caractérisés comme des réalités spirituelles. C'est surtout pour le genre qu'une révision est nécessaire. La réalité de la racine commune de certaines espèces dans le genre ne se fonde pas sur la reproduction , mais sur la totalité supérieure qui implique toutes les espèces. Des individus sont compris par le caractère d'espèce, des espèces seulement par le caractère de genre. C'est une preuve de la méthode de la nature créatrice. Elle exclut une évolution de genre „du bas en haut”, qui est irrégulière, faite par hasard ou formée directement par le milieu. De là nous dérivons le droit compréhensible d'un système naturel, qui est désormais plus qu'une simple classification. (shrink)

The Eskimo language Kalaallisut (alias West Greenlandic) has traditionally been described as having a rich tense system, with three future tenses (Kleinschmidt 1851, Bergsland 1955, Fortescue 1984) and possibly four past tenses (Fortescue 1984). Recently however, Shaer (2003) has challenged these traditional claims, arguing that Kalaallisut is in fact tenseless.

This paper explores the treatment of intelligent agents as innovations. Past writings in the area of intelligent agents focus on the technical merits and internal workings of agent-based solutions. By adopting a perspective on agents from an innovations point of view, a new and novel description of agents is put forth in terms of their degrees of innovativeness, competitive implications, and perceived characteristics. To facilitate this description, a series of innovation-based theoretical models are utilized as a lens of analysis, namely (...) Kleinschmidt and Cooper’s (J Prod Innovation Manage 8:240–251, 1991) market and technological newness map, Abernathy and Clark’s (Res Policy 14:3–22, 1985) competitive implications framework, and Moore and Benbasat’s (Inf Syst Res 2:192–222, 1991) list of perceived innovating characteristics. Together, these models provide a theoretical foundation by which to describe intelligent agents, yielding new insights and perceptions on this relatively new form of software application. (shrink)