En la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar, Kant atribuye al principio mecanicista un carácter meramente regulativo. Esto podría dar lugar a pensar que, en esta obra, se opera una transformación del modo en que el autor concibe la causalidad general, ya que, en las primeras dos Críticas, existe una tendencia a identificar el principio mecanicista con el principio de la segunda analogía de la experiencia. En este trabajo, intentaré mostrar que la presentación del principio que Kant hace en la (...) tercera Crítica es totalmente coherente con las tesis que desarrolla en sus otras obras, y que no supone otra modificación de su teoría más que aquella que surge de dirigir la atención sobre el operar de la facultad de juzgar reflexionante y sobre los problemas con los que este operar se relaciona. (shrink)

En la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar, Kant llama la atención sobre ciertos productos de la naturaleza –los organismos- en los que tiene lugar un tipo de causalidad que nos es totalmente desconocida. Los organismos son causas y efectos de sí mismos. No sólo son seres organizados, sino que son capaces también de auto-organizarse. Estas características peculiares de los organismos no pueden ser explicadas por una causalidad mecánica. Mientras que las causas eficientes se dan bajo la forma temporal de (...) una serie descendente, los nexos causales en los organismos se dan bajo la forma temporal de una serie que es, a la vez, descendente y ascendente. En este trabajo, me propongo elucidar hasta qué punto la consideración de los organismos como fines de la naturaleza nos permite traducir la forma temporal de sus nexos causales a una forma temporal que sea conciliable con el principio de la segunda analogía de la experiencia. (shrink)

En este artículo, realizo una breve presentación de la interpretación de E. Watkins del modelo causal kantiano, y analizo algunos argumentos que el autor propone contra la posibilidad de entender la tercera analogía de la experiencia a partir del modelo causal “evento-evento”. Partiendo de una lectura alternativa de los textos kantianos, trato de demostrar, contra la opinión de Watkins, que la tercera analogía de la experiencia podría resultar inteligible a partir del modelo causal “evento-evento”, y que el modelo propuesto por (...) Watkins podría volver ininteligible, o al menos oscurecer, el signi cado de la segunda analogía de la experiencia. (shrink)

In §§62–82 of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment we find several references to the supersensible in the context of the solution of the antinomy of the power of teleological judgment. It is not, however, plainly clear how these references relate to each other or how they contribute to the proposed solution. Specially puzzling is the way in which the idea of an intelligent author of the world is related to the idea of an intuitive understanding. Some interpreters have (...) considered that the intelligent author of the world should possess an understanding capable of intuition. Kant, however, never expressly establishes this relationship. In this paper I intend to show that the idea of an intelligent author of the world cannot be enlarged with the idea of an intuitive understanding. Both of the references to the supersensible perform different functions. (shrink)

I The Kantian notion of ‘affection’ is indeed problematic and obscure. In so far as the subject is finite and does not create the object of knowledge, the latter must always be somehow given. The passive faculty of sensibility makes it possible for the object to appear. But this receptive character of the subject correlates to some affection. Something affects us, and our sensibility receives this affection under the pure forms of space and time. The question that immediately arises is (...) what performs the action of affecting. And any answer, in the theoretical framework of the transcendental idealism, is always troubling. If we say that the thing in itself affects us, we are speaking about something that is not cognoscible. If we say that the object performs the action of affecting, we are considering that the sensation that is involved in every experience is, at the same time, a result of an affection produced by the object of experience. (shrink)

Husserl frecuentemente critica la construcción kantiana de la subjetividad trascendental a través del método regresivo. Sin embargo reconoce que la Deducción de los conceptos puros del entendimiento (A) es tal vez el texto más fenomenológico de la Crítica de la razón pura, en la medida en que allí Kant intenta acceder directamente a las condiciones de posibilidad de la experiencia. Contra la opinión de Husserl, es nuestra intención mostrar en este artículo que la descripción de las operaciones sintéticas que Kant (...) lleva a cabo en la Deducción trascendental (A) no es el resultado de algo semejante a aquello que Husserl llama experiencia trascendental. Para sustentar esta postura proponemos una particular interpretación de la noción kantiana de autoafección, y de su relación con la de síntesis de la aprehensión. (shrink)

El principio de finalidad que Kant introduce en la Crítica del juicio expresa el supuesto de que la naturaleza opera con una uniformidad adecuada a nuestra facultad de juzgar. Sin embargo, en la medida en que el principio es sólo regulativo, él no puede asegurar que dicha uniformidad tenga lugar. La posibilidad de un caos empírico queda, pues, abierta.El principio de finalidad que Kant introduce en la Crítica del juicio expresa el supuesto de que la naturaleza opera con una uniformidad (...) adecuada a nuestra facultad de juzgar. Sin embargo, en la medida en que el principio es sólo regulativo, él no puede asegurar que dicha uniformidad tenga lugar. La posibilidad de un caos empírico queda, pues, abierta. En el artículo tratamos de demostrar que esto no es así. Las regularidades empíricas no son condiciones de la objetividad de la experiencia; pero ellas sin duda colaboran con el progreso del conocimiento y con la posibilidad de su organización sistemática. Pero la formación de los conceptos empíricos, la formulación de las leyes empíricas y la posibilidad del conocimiento empírico en general requieren la existencia de regularidades empíricas. Podría pensarse, en consecuencia, que éstas son una suerte de condición “material” de posibilidad de la experiencia, de la cual el idealismo trascendental no puede dar cuenta. En el artículo tratamos de demostrar que esto no es así. Las regularidades empíricas no son condiciones de la objetividad de la experiencia; pero ellas sin duda colaboran con el progreso del conocimiento y con la posibilidad de su organización sistemática. (shrink)

El principio de finalidad que Kant introduce en la Crítica del juicio expresa el supuesto de que la naturaleza opera con una uniformidad adecuada a nuestra facultad de juzgar. Sin embargo, en la medida en que el principio es sólo regulativo, él no puede asegurar que dicha uniformidad tenga lugar. La posibilidad de un caos empírico queda, pues, abierta.El principio de finalidad que Kant introduce en la Crítica del juicio expresa el supuesto de que la naturaleza opera con una uniformidad (...) adecuada a nuestra facultad de juzgar. Sin embargo, en la medida en que el principio es sólo regulativo, él no puede asegurar que dicha uniformidad tenga lugar. La posibilidad de un caos empírico queda, pues, abierta. En el artículo tratamos de demostrar que esto no es así. Las regularidades empíricas no son condiciones de la objetividad de la experiencia; pero ellas sin duda colaboran con el progreso del conocimiento y con la posibilidad de su organización sistemática. Pero la formación de los conceptos empíricos, la formulación de las leyes empíricas y la posibilidad del conocimiento empírico en general requieren la existencia de regularidades empíricas. Podría pensarse, en consecuencia, que éstas son una suerte de condición “material” de posibilidad de la experiencia, de la cual el idealismo trascendental no puede dar cuenta. En el artículo tratamos de demostrar que esto no es así. Las regularidades empíricas no son condiciones de la objetividad de la experiencia; pero ellas sin duda colaboran con el progreso del conocimiento y con la posibilidad de su organización sistemática. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se analiza si la versión de la justicia como equidad, presentada en El liberalismo político, es genuinamente una concepción política. Se examina el problema de la razonabilidad de las doctrinas comprehensivas, y se indaga luego si el argumento en dos etapas afecta la integridad estructural del liberalismo político. Se concluye que J. Rawls fracasa en su intento de justificar un liberalismo independiente de una doctrina comprehensiva de carácter liberal. ABSTRACT The article analyzes whether the conception of justice as fairness, (...) set forth by Rawls in Political Liberalism, is a genuine political conception. It first examines the issue of reasonableness of comprehensive doctrines and then goes on to inquire whether the two-step argument affects the structural integrity of political liberalism. The paper concludes that J. Rawls fails in his attempt to justify liberalism independently of a comprehensive liberal doctrine. (shrink)

Many recent discoveries have confirmed the importance of Orphism for ancient Greek religion, philosophy, and literature. However, its nature and role are still very controversial. The key problem of its relationship to Christianity has been discussed by ancient and modern authors from many different viewpoints, albeit too often tainted with apologetic interests and unconscious projections. This free and thorough study of the ancient sources sheds light on these questions and illuminates the complexity of the encounter between Classical culture and Jewish-Christian (...) tradition. New perspectives on the relationship between Classical and Jewish-Christian culture On the avowed subject of Orphism Author is specialist within the field. (shrink)

This essay argues that current advocacy of lesbian and gay rights to legal marriage and parenthood insufficiently criticizes both marriage and motherhood as they are currently practiced and structured by Northern legal institutions. Instead we would do better not to let the State define our intimate unions and parenting would be improved if the power presently concentrated in the hands of one or two guardians were diluted and distributed through an appropriately concerned community.

The opportunities to become a good person are not the same for everyone. Modern European ethical theory, especially Kantian ethics, assumes the same virtues are accessible to all who are capable of rational choice. Character development, however, is affected by circumstances, such as those of wealth and socially constructed categories of gender, race, and sexual orientation, which introduce factors beyond the control of individuals. Implications of these influences for morality have, since the work of Williams and Nagel in the seventies, (...) raised questions in philosophy about the concept of moral luck. In The Unnatural Lottery, Claudia Card examines how luck enters into moral character and considers how some of those who are oppressed can develop responsibility. Luck is often best appreciated by those who have known relatively bad luck and have been unable to escape steady comparison of their lot with those of others. The author takes as her paradigms the luck of middle and lower classes of women who face violence and exploitation, of lesbians who face continuing pressure to hide or self-destruct, of culturally Christian whites who have ethnic privilege, and of adult survivors of child abuse. How have such people been affected by luck in who they are and can become, the good lives available to them, the evils they may be liable to embody? Other philosophers have explored the luck of those who begin from privileged positions and then suffer reversals of fortune. Claudia Card focuses on the more common cases of those who begin from socially disadvantaged positions, and she considers some who find their good luck troubling when its source is the unnatural lottery of social injustice. (shrink)

What distinguishes evils from ordinary wrongs? Are some evils unforgivable? How should we respond to evils? Card offers a secular theory of evil--representing a compromise between classic utilitarian and stoic approaches--that responds to these and other questions.

The aim of this exploratory study was to examine client demographics and expectations, reasons for use, sensations during treatment, and perceived outcomes of Pranic Healing, an energy healing system lacking in scientific documentation but whose use in the general population is becoming more widespread internationally. This study consisted of a cross-sectional survey of adults (18+ years of age) receiving care from 12 Pranic Healing practices in four different states in the U.S. (N = 179) completing online questionnaires. Closed-ended response sets (...) were analyzed descriptively, while qualitative data were analyzed using content analysis. Reasons to use the therapy included physical, mental/emotional, and metaphysical issues, dissatisfaction with conventional care, and overall well-being. Expectations of care included enhanced abilities, cure or relief, or unsure. Respondents were more likely to cite a specific problem from which they needed alleviation than to cite overall health or wellness as their goal. Sensations experienced were reported to be of a relaxing nature and not, as was hypothesized, of an energizing nature. Results show that those who use Pranic Healing fit the sociodemographic profile of CAM (complementary and alternative medicine) users in the United States, that their reasons for use are not homogeneous, and that preliminary descriptive data from a selective subsample of respondents indicated that some respondents are experiencing positive outcomes attributed to this modality. (shrink)

In this contribution to philosophical ethics, Claudia Card revisits the theory of evil developed in her earlier book The Atrocity Paradigm, and expands it to consider collectively perpetrated and collectively suffered atrocities. Redefining evil as a secular concept and focusing on the inexcusability - rather than the culpability - of atrocities, Card examines the tension between responding to evils and preserving humanitarian values. This stimulating and often provocative book contends that understanding the evils in terrorism, torture and genocide enables (...) us to recognise similar evils in everyday life: daily life under oppressive regimes and in racist environments; violence against women, including in the home; violence and executions in prisons; hate crimes; and violence against animals. Card analyses torture, terrorism and genocide in the light of recent atrocities, considering whether there can be moral justifications for terrorism and torture, and providing conceptual tools to distinguish genocide from non-genocidal mass slaughter. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Truth-conditions are systematically determined when they are the output of an algorithmic procedure that takes as input a set of semantic and contextual features. Truth-conditional sceptics have cast doubts on the thesis that truth-conditions are systematic in this sense. Against this form of scepticism, Schoubye and Stokke : 759–793) and Dobler : 451–474.) have provided systematic analyses of utterance truth-conditions. My aim is to argue that these theories are not immune to the kind of objections raised by truth-conditional sceptics. (...) In particular, I argue that the use of Questions Under Discussion and ways of being is problematic. (shrink)

This paper presents a detailed analysis of a previous work that described the dynamic behavior of an antique stamp mill. The stamp mill application was for breaking ore stones as part of silver production. The dynamic analysis was established from a modern description of the kinematic chain. Since there is no technical data or archeological reports, the model was reconstructed using the dimensions described in original documents and assuming the operation conditions from different technical references. The model was validated using (...) the typical production rates from the pre-industrial revolution period (XVI to XVIII centuries). The results show a proper method for reconstructing the engineering data of antique mechanisms and provide the basis for reproducing these types of mechanisms with modern engineering concepts. The data can be extrapolated to other similar mills that were developed based on this functional principle. (shrink)

In this paper we propose a new approach to address the ramification problem in common-sense reasoning about action and change. We contrast the methods of McCain and Turner, Thielscher and Sandewall and, based on some of the limitations they encounter, we introduce a trajectory-based approach which keeps a history of the states through which a system evolves to characterise its dynamical state. We furnish an underlying state-transition semantics and a logic that admits an expressive, dynamical account of some typical scenarios (...) which encounter modelling difficulties in the other approaches mentioned. (shrink)