On the fundamentals of Jaina philosophy and logic.

Treatise on Jaina logic with two commentaries.

Treatise on Jaina religious life and ethics with Bālāvabodha, auto-commentary, Gujarati translation and interpretation.

In accord with the theme of the present volume on , it is not so much the aim of this essay to provide a detailed account of particular lines of argument, as it is to suggest something of the manner in which so-called 'Buddhist idealism' unfolded as a tradition not just for Buddhists, but within Indian philosophy more generally. Seen from this perspective, Buddhist idealism remained a current within Indian philosophy long after the demise of Buddhism in India, in about (...) the twelfth century, and endured in some respects at least until the Mughal age, when the last thinker to be examined here, the Jain teacher Yaśovijaya, was active. (shrink)

The Jaina _saptabhaṅgī_ (seven angles of analysis or types of sentences) has drawn the attention of non-classical logicians due to its unique use of negation, contradiction, and _avaktavya_ (‘unutterable’). In its most basic structure, the _saptabhaṅgī_ appears as: (i) in a certain sense, _P_; (ii) in a certain sense, not _P_; (iii) in a certain sense, _P_ and not _P_; (iv) in a certain sense, inexpressibility of _P_; (v) in a certain sense, _P_ and inexpressibility of _P_; (vi) in a (...) certain sense, not _P_ and inexpressibility of _P_; (vii) in a certain sense, _P_, not _P_, and inexpressibility of _P_. This appearance has led many (e.g., Ganeri and Priest) to claim that the _saptabhaṅgī_ supports non-classical systems of logic, but such a reading is contested by Balcerowicz. Focusing on Vādidevasūri’s (12th c. CE) and Yaśovijaya’s (17th c. CE) accounts of the _saptabhaṅgī_, this paper puts forward a formalization of the _saptabhaṅgī_ that brings together the non-classical views and Balcerowicz’s view through relating the _saptabhaṅgī_ to the Buddhist unanswerable questions. (shrink)

In Jaina philosophy, pramāṇa is accepted as a definitive knowledge of an object and knowledge itself. There are many treatises on Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra which include epistemology and logic according to Jainism. Since Siddhasena’s Nyāyāvatra more than forty texts and commentaries are available on this subject. Five types of knowledge i.e. matijñāna (knowledge through sense organs and mind), śrutajñāna (scriptural of verbal knowledge), avadhijñāna (clairvoyance), manaḥparyayajñāna (knowing the modes of others’ minds) and kevaljñāna (knowledge of all substances and modes) as mentioned (...) in the canonical literature are the basis of the development of Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra. Contributions of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka (720–780), Vidyānanda (775–840), Ananatavirya (950–990), Vādiraj (1025), Abhayadevasuri (10th century), Prabhācandra (980–1065), Vādi devasśūri (1086–1169, Hemacandra (1088–1173), Dharmabushaṇa (15th century), Yaśovijaya (18th century) are very important in the development of Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra, the Tattvārthasūtra and its commentarial literature has also a significant role in developing the Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra. This development has three aspects-conceptual, analytical and logical. The Tattvārthasūtra is the first text which established the classification of knowledge as two types of pramāṇa – pratyakṣa (perception) and parokṣa (indirect pramāṇa). An intensive discussion on Jaina epistemology or pramāṇa-śāstra is seen in the commentarial literature of the Tattvārthasūtra. (shrink)