For Anselm, the attribute of omnipresence is not merely concerned with where God exists, but with where and when God exists. His account of this attribute thus precipitates a discourse on the nature of space and time: how they are related to God, to one another, and to the rest of the created order. In the course of this analysis Anselm articulates a number of positions which are generally thought to be the sole possession of modernity. In Part One of (...) what follows I argue, first, that Anselm provides us with an analysis of objects which have both spatial and temporal parts, and second, that he provides us with a clear distinction between those objects which persist by enduring through time in their entirety and those which persist by being temporally extended. In Part Two I argue that Anselm's analysis of omnipresence is consciously informed by a conception of spacetime, according to which space and time form a single, four-dimensional manifold in which objects both persist and move. (shrink)

In part one of this paper I argue that there are three possible accounts of human nature: we are either (i) purely material beings, (ii) purely spiritual beings (souls), or (iii) body/soul composites. In parts two and three I assess the relative merits of these positions both from a broadly secular perspective and also from the perspective of Christian orthodoxy. While both perspectives are mostly strongly opposed to the thesis that we are souls, and while a secular perspective is likely (...) to favor some form of materialism, I argue that Christian orthodoxy commits us to compositional substance dualism, since materialism is incompatible first, with the traditional understanding of Christ’s humanity, and second, with the thesis that we shall enjoy a conscious, sentient existence during the interim period between our death and the General Resurrection. (shrink)