There is growing interest in examining dark personality traits, to better explain malevolent and self-serving behaviour patterns commonly observed in clinical and non-clinical settings. Recently, taxonomies of dark personalities have been developed, along with psychometric tools to measure and delineate between traits including psychopathy, Machiavellianism and narcissism. The extent to which these constructs are distinct or overlapping remains controversial. Psychophysiological research can improve understanding of biological mechanisms contributing to personality that may help to evaluate taxonomies. This study investigated diurnal variations (...) in salivary cortisol (on waking, cortisol awakening response, and at bedtime, over two days) and their relationship to personality traits (Short Dark Triad Scale and IPIP Mini), psychopathology (Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale; DASS) and quality of life (WHOQOL-BREF) in a non-clinical sample (N=45, 26 females, 19 males, 18-59 years). Dark personality traits correlated with low bedtime cortisol, reduced sleep, depression and poorer quality of life. Hierarchical linear regressions analyses indicated that bedtime cortisol levels significantly accounted for variance in Psychopathy (F(1,39)=5.55, p=.02, R=.52, B=-1.81, 95% CI [-3.37-(-.26)], β=-.33, sr2=.10) and reduced sleep uniquely accounted for variance Machiavellianism (F(2,40)=5.99, p=.01, R=.48, B=1.01, 95% CI [.16-2.02], β=.34, sr2=.11). These data provide preliminary evidence that supports the cortisol hypoarousal hypothesis of Psychopathy and has identified a link between Machiavellianism, sleep-wake cycles, and chronotype. The hypoarousal hypothesis of Psychopathy contends that the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis is unresponsive to the stress of social engagement. Machiavellianism was predicted by longer days with evidence for an evening chronotype. These findings indicated that the Dark Triad traits have different underlying biological mechanisms that require further exploration. (shrink)

This article is a reply to Marsha Enright's essay “The Problem with Selfishness.” Enright argues that “selfishness” is not the correct designation for living according to the Objectivist ethics. This article defends Rand's use of “selfishness,” on three grounds. First, the self is central to Rand's ethics, because a person must value his self before he can value anything or anyone. Second, immoral people are selfless, because organisms that function at the perceptual level of awareness do not have (...) a self. Third, Rand has identified the exact meaning of “selfishness,” whether or not her definition accords with dictionary definitions. (shrink)

The fragility of the subject is a recurring issue in the work of Anne Enright, one of Ireland's most remarkable and innovative writers. It is this specific interest, together with her attempt to make women into subjects, that inevitably links her work to Bracha Lichtenberg-Ettinger's theory of the matrixial borderspace, a feminine sphere that coexists with the Lacanian symbolic order and that, even before our entrance into this linguistic system, informs our subjectivity. By turning to a point in time (...) before language—the encounter between “self” and “other” during pregnancy—both Enright and Ettinger test the boundaries of and the gaps within the linguistic system. It is the going before language that ultimately enables both to go beyond some of the most persistent dualisms present within the linguistic system and to create room for an alternative—a feminine—understanding of the ethical relationality between self and other. (shrink)

MARSHA F. ENRIGHT responds to Larry Sechrest's article "Rand, Anarchy, and Taxes" . She examines the social forces that logically lead to the development of government, and the reasons for geographical demarcations of governments.

(In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Psychology of Forgiveness, edited by Glen Pettigrove and Robert Enright) This chapter discusses forgiveness conceived as primarily a volitional commitment, rather than an emotional transformation. As a commitment, forgiveness is distal, involving moral agency over time, and can take the form of a speech act or a chosen attitude. The purpose can be a commitment to repair or restore relationships with wrongdoers for their sake or the sake of the relationship, usually by (...) forswearing one’s hostile attitudes toward a particular wrongdoing; the commitment may also be to oneself for one’s own sake, to be a person with a virtue of forgivingness. It can be incident-specific, that is, a response to a particular occasion of harm, or a forward-looking disposition, an aim to cultivate the habit of being a forgiving person in advance. The enabling conditions of forgivingness as a virtue may be more basic master virtues including integrity and humility, motivations that also underpin commitments to be unforgiving, so this chapter concludes with some careful consideration of the ethics of unforgivingness to others, and the commitment to be unforgiving of oneself. (shrink)

This volume considers challenges to forgiveness in the most difficult circumstances, such as in criminal justice contexts, when the victim is dead or when bystanders disagree, and when anger and resentment seem preferable and important. Contributing philosophers include Myisha Cherry, Jonathan Jacobs, Barrett Emerick, Alice MacLachlan, David McNaughton and Eve Garrard. Contributing psychologists include Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, Robert D. Enright and Mary Jacqueline Song, C. Ward Struthers, Joshua Guilfoyle, Careen Khoury, Elizabeth van Monsjou, Joni Sasaki, Curtis Phills, Rebecca Young, and (...) Zdravko Marjanovic. (shrink)