This paper concerns virtue-based ethical principles that bear upon agricultural uses of technologies, such as GM crops and CRISPR crops. It does three things. First, it argues for a new type of virtue ethics approach to such cases. Typical virtue ethics principles are vague and unspecific. These are sometimes useful, but we show how to supplement them with more specific virtue ethics principles that are useful to people working in specific applied domains, where morally relevant domain-specific conditions recur. We do (...) this while still fulfilling the need for principles and associated practical reasoning to flexibly respect variation between cases. Second, with our more detailed approach we criticize and improve upon a commonly discussed principle about ecosystemic external goods that are crucial for human flourishing. We show this principle is far more conservative than appreciated, as it would prohibit many technology uses that are uncontroversially acceptable. We then replace this principle with two more specific ones. One identifies specific conditions in which ecosystem considerations are against a technology use, the other identifies favorable conditions. Third, we uncover a humility-based principle that operates within an influential “hubris argument” against uses of several biotechnologies in agriculture. These arguments lack a substantive theory of the nature of humility. We clarify such a theory, and then use it to replace the uncovered humility-based principle with our own more specific one that shifts focus from past moral failings, to current epistemic limits when deciding whether to support new technologies. (shrink)

We present a general relativistic model of a spherical shell of matter with a perfect fluid on its surface coupled to an internal oscillator, which generalizes a model recently introduced by the authors to construct a self-gravitating interferometer. The internal oscillator evolution is defined with respect to the local proper time of the shell, allowing the oscillator to serve as a local clock that ticks differently depending on the shell’s position and momentum. A Hamiltonian reduction is performed on the system, (...) and an approximate quantum description is given to the reduced phase space. If we focus only on the external dynamics, we must trace out the clock degree of freedom, and this results in a form of intrinsic decoherence that shares some features with a proposed “universal” decoherence mechanism attributed to gravitational time dilation. We note that the proposed decoherence remains present in the limit of flat spacetime, emphasizing that the effect can be attributed entirely to proper time differences, and thus is not necessarily related to gravity. Whereas the effect described in vanishes in the absence of an external gravitational field, our approach bootstraps the gravitational contribution to the time dilation decoherence by including self-interaction, yielding a fundamentally gravitational intrinsic decoherence effect. (shrink)

Ancient Greek philosophers generally accept the claim that εὐδαιμονία is within our power to achieve, regardless of circumstance. Conversely, external goods - physical health, education, social standing - are frequently present or absent due to circumstances beyond our control. Can eudaimonism explain how more than a privileged elite can attain εὐδαιμονία when so few enjoy the requisite external goods? <BR> A satisfactory account of the relation between external goods and well-being must accommodate both the (...) insight that there is an essential connection between prosperity and the flourishing life and that there is a real sense in which εὐδαιμονία is a self-sufficient concept. The -applied intellectualist- interpretation of eudaimonism defended here accommodates important insights of several ancient Greek traditions: Aristotle's account of human nature, specifically the role of external goods as necessary preconditions for leading a human life; Socratic and Stoic analysis that external goods are necessary constituents of moral action; and Plato's commitment to a criterion for judging the compatibility of external prosperity with a life of εὐδαιμονία. <BR> This text provides a comprehensive linguistic and ethical analysis of key terms and arguments across several centuries of ancient Greek ethical thought on this fascinating topic, making it an excellent foundation for an upper-division undergraduate seminar in ancient Greek ethics, virtue ethics, or applied ethics.". (shrink)

The Alternative Model of Personality Disorders integrates several theoretical models of personality functioning, including interpersonal theory. The interpersonal circumplex dimensions of warmth and dominance can be conceptualized as traits similar to those in AMPD Criterion B, but interpersonal theory also offers dynamic hypotheses about how these variables that change from moment to moment, which help to operationalize some of the processes alluded to in AMPD Criterion A. In the psychotherapy literature, dynamic interpersonal behaviors are thought to be critical (...) for identifying therapeutic alliance ruptures, yet few studies have examined moment-to-moment interpersonal behaviors that are associated with alliance ruptures at an idiographic level. The current study examined the concurrent and cross-lagged relationships between interpersonal behaviors and alliance ruptures within each session in the famous Gloria films. Interpersonal behaviors as well as alliance ruptures were calculated at half minute intervals for each dyad. We identified distinct interpersonal patterns associated with alliance ruptures for each session: Gloria ’s warmth was positively related with withdrawal ruptures concurrently in the session with Carl Rogers; Gloria’s dominance and coldness were related with increased confrontation ruptures in the session with Fritz Perls concurrently, while her coldness was also predicted by confrontation ruptures at previous moments; lastly, both Gloria’s dominance and Albert Ellis’s submissiveness were positively related with withdrawal ruptures. These interpersonal patterns demonstrated the promise of using AMPD dimensions to conceptualize momentary interpersonal processes related to therapy ruptures, as well as the clinical importance of attuning to repetitive, dyad-specific interpersonal cues of ruptures within each session. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, Aristotle seems to argue that certain external goods are needed for happiness because, in the first place, they are needed for virtuous activity. This has puzzled scholars. After all, it seems possible for a virtuous agent to exercise her virtuous character even under conditions of extreme hardship or deprivation. Indeed, it is natural to think these are precisely the conditions under which one's virtue shines through most clearly. Why then does Aristotle think that a (...) wide range of external goods is required for virtuous activity, and therefore, for happiness? -/- I argue that there is good sense to be made of Aristotle's stance on external goods. Specifically, I explain how, on this view, a range of external goods is required for the full exercise of virtue, and I show that it is only this full exercise that is constitutive of eudaimonia. Drawing on passages in Politics 7.13 and Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, I develop and defend a distinction between the "mere" exercise of virtue, and the full or complete exercise of virtue. I argue that, for Aristotle, the distinguishing feature of this distinction is the value of the virtuous action's ends. An action that fully expresses virtue aims at an end that is unqualifiedly good, while an action that merely exercises virtue does not. I argue that the external goods Aristotle mentions in NE 1.8 are necessary for performing actions with unqualifiedly good ends, and so necessary for the complete exercise of virtue. In addition to providing a more satisfactory account than existing proposals of the role of external goods in Aristotelian happiness, my interpretation has two additional upshots. First, it brings to light an under-appreciated and independently compelling feature of Aristotle's ethical thought: the value of virtuous actions depends in part on the value of the ends they aim to realize. Second, it finds in Aristotle a distinct and powerful way of thinking about the badness of certain kinds of misfortune and deprivation: they are bad in part because they prevent us from fully realizing our capacity for moral agency, from fully engaging with value in the world. (shrink)

이 글의 목표는 외적 좋음이 아리스토텔레스의 행복관에서 차지하는 위치와 수행하는 역할을 구명하는 것이다. 이를 위해서는 무엇보다도 탁월성을 따르는 영혼의 활동이라는 행복 규정과 외적 좋음의 관계가 무엇인지를 정확히 밝히는 것이 핵심적 과제가 된다. 외적 좋음의 지위 그리고 탁월성에 따르는 활동과의 관계에 관해서는 크게 두 방향의 해석이 존재한다. 이 중 한 해석에 따르면, 외적 좋음의 가치는 그것이 탁월한 활동의 실현을 위한 수단이나 여건을 제공한다는 사실에서 전적으로 유래한다. 외적 좋음은, 따라서, 그 자체가 행복의 구성요소는 아니며, 행복의 실현과 관련해 오직 수단적 가치만을 가진다. 반면 (...) 또 다른 한 해석에 따르면, 외적 좋음은 그 자체로 행복의 구성요소 중 하나이며, 탁월한 활동을 가능케 하는 역할과 구분되는 내재적인 가치를 가진다. 이 글에서는 일단 외적 좋음이 도구적 가치만을 갖는다는 해석은 아리스토텔레스의 생각을 지나치게 협소하게 파악하고 있는 것이며, 외적 좋음은 탁월한 활동을 가능케 하는 역할과 구분되는 가치 역시 가지고 있음을 보인다. 다음으로 이 글에서 다룰 것은 탁월성을 따르는 활동이 왜 단지 행복을 구성하는 여러 요소들 중 하나가 아니라 중심적인 요소인가 하는 것이다. 이 물음에 대한 답은 탁월성에 따르는 활동이 행복을 결정한다(kyrios)는 말의 의미를 정확히 파악하는 것으로부터 출발해야 한다. 이 글에서는 이 ‘결정함’의 의미를 탐구하면서, 외적 좋음에 관한 논의의 배후에서 그 진행을 이끌고 있는 아리스토텔레스의 근본적인 관심이 어떤 것인지를 드러낸다. (shrink)

If virtue ethics are to provide a legitimate alternative for reasoning about environmental issues, they must meet the same conditions of adequacy as any other environmental ethic. One such condition that most environmental ethicists insist upon is that an adequate environmental ethic provides a theoretical platform for consistent and justified critique of environmentally unsustainable practices and policies. The external goods approach seeks to establish that any genuinely virtuous agent will be disposed to promote ecosystem sustainability on the grounds (...) that ecosystem sustainability is a necessary external good for cultivating the virtues and/or human flourishing. At most the external goods approach is able to provide an environmental ethic that in most contexts will require that any genuinely virtuous agent will have the goal of promoting a weak environmental sustainability. A better approach may be the substantive approach, which incorporates environmental concern and practice into the substance of the virtues, rather than as a boundary condition for any prospective virtue. (shrink)

Aristotle tells us that contemplation is the most self-sufficient form of virtuous activity: we can contemplate alone, and with minimal resources, while moral virtues like courage require other individuals to be courageous towards, or courageous with. This is hard to square with the rest of his discussion of self-sufficiency in the Ethics: Aristotle doesn't generally seek to minimize the number of resources necessary for a flourishing human life, and seems happy to grant that such a life will be self-sufficient despite (...) requiring a lot of external goods. In this paper I develop an interpretation of self-sufficiency as a form of independence from external contributors to our activity, and argue that this interpretation accounts both for Aristotle's views on contemplation and for the role self-sufficiency plays in his broader account of human happiness. (shrink)

The paper explores the main competing interpretations of Aristotle's view of the relation between happiness and external goods in the Nicomachean Ethics. On the basis of a careful analysis of what Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics (and other works such as the Eudemian Ethics, Politics, Rhetoric, etc.) it is argued that it is likely that Aristotle takes at least some external goods to be actual constituents of happiness provided that (1) they are accompanied by virtuous (...) activity and (2) the agent enjoying and using those external goods does so in ways compatible with the continuous aim of acting virtuously. (shrink)

If virtue ethics are to provide a legitimate alternative for reasoning about environmental issues, they must meet the same conditions of adequacy as any other environmental ethic. One such condition that most environmental ethicists insist upon is that an adequate environmental ethic provides a theoretical platform for consistent and justified critique of environmentally unsustainable practices and policies. The external goods approach seeks to establish that any genuinely virtuous agent will be disposed to promote ecosystem sustainability on the grounds (...) that ecosystem sustainability is a necessary external good for cultivating the virtues and/or human flourishing. At most the external goods approach is able to provide an environmental ethic that in most contexts will require that any genuinely virtuous agent will have the goal of promoting a weak environmental sustainability. A better approach may be the substantive approach, which incorporates environmental concern and practice into the substance of the virtues, rather than as a boundary condition for any prospective virtue. (shrink)

Aristotle's account of external goods in Nicomachean Ethics I 8-12 is often thought to amend his narrow claim that happiness is virtuous activity. I argue, to the contrary, that on Aristotle's account, external goods are necessary for happiness only because they are necessary for virtuous activity. My case innovates in three main respects: I offer a new map of EN I 8-12; I identify two mechanisms to explain why virtuous activity requires external goods, including (...) a psychological need for external goods; and I show the relevance of Aristotle's distinction between wishing and choosing. On the view I attribute to Aristotle, our capacity to choose virtuously requires, first, that we wish for external goods (because virtue requires the right attitudes of evaluation) and, second, that these wishes are generally fulfilled (because the social consequences and psychological pain of unfulfilled wishes undermine our opportunity to act virtuously and to take pleasure in acting virtuously). I close with discussion of how Aristotelians should defend this approach. (shrink)

아리스토텔레스에게서 행복은 최고선으로서 ‘덕에 따른 영혼의 활동’으로 정의된다. 그런데 아리스토텔레스는 행복이 덕 이외에도 “외적으로 좋은 것들”(ta ektos agatha), 예를 들어 부나 명예 또는 좋은 태생이나 출중한 외모와 같은 것을 추가적으로 필요로 한다고 말한다. 행복에 대한 ‘덕의 충족성 원리’와 ‘외적인 좋음의 추가적 필요성 원리’는 행복의 구성원리가 무엇이 되어야 하는지에 대한 문제를 발생시킨다. 외적좋음의 자체적 가치를 인정하게 되면 덕의 충분성 원리가 훼손되고, 외적좋음의 가치가 인정되지 않으면 행복실현을 위한 추가필요성 원리가 부정될 수 있기 때문이다. 이 글은 아리스토텔레스의 행복론에 대한 보다 정확한 이해를 위해 (...) 그의 외적좋음에 대한 재평가를 시도한다. 이를 위해 ‘외적좋음이 없이는 덕에 따른 활동이 불가능하거나 쉽지 않다’는 아리스토텔레스의 언급에 주목하여, 이 말이 수단과 운적인 것으로 말해지는 외적좋음에 어떻게 적용되어야 할지를 규명한다. 특히 수단으로 말해지는 친구나 부와 같은 외적좋음과 덕활동의 상관관계는 아리스토텔레스의 질료와 형상 개념을 통해 이해를 시도한다. 이것은 수단으로 말해지는 외적좋음을 질료(hylē)에 상응하는 ‘가능태적 좋음’으로, 덕을 형상(eidos)적 원리로 보는 것이다. 결론적으로 외적좋음은 덕과 더불어 아리스토텔레스적인 행복을 실현하는 구성부분으로 이해될 수 있다. (shrink)

After distinguishing three conceptions of virtue and its impact on ordinary attachments to external goods such as social status, power, friends, and wealth, this paper argues that the Confucian Analects is most charitably interpreted as endorsing the wholehearted internalization conception, on which virtue reforms but does not completely extinguish ordinary attachments to external goods. I begin by building on Amy Olberding’s attack on the extinguishing attachments conception, but go on to criticize her alternative, resolute sacrifice conception, (...) on which the virtuous retain their ordinary attachments to external goods but are able to master them and willingly settle for virtue. I argue that we should reject this view because, unlike the wholehearted internalization conception, it cannot capture the facts that virtue silences or attenuates attachment to viciously obtained external goods and that virtue grounds positive emotional and cognitive self-assessments that are incompatible with some ordinary attachments to external goods. (shrink)

Consistent with the idea that business ethics is a form of applied ethics, many virtue ethicists make use of an extant (pure) moral philosophy framework, namely, one developed by Alasdair MacIntyre. In doing so, these authors have refined MacIntyre’s work, but have never really challenged it. In here questioning, and developing an alternative to, the MacIntyrean orthdoxy, I illustrate the merit of business ethicists adopting a broader philosophical perspective focused on constructing (new) theory. More specifically—and in referring to action sports (...) (e.g., mountain biking, snowboarding)—I propose that an external good motive is not only much more consistent with virtuous practical excellence than MacIntyreans acknowledge, but that such a motive is fundamental to identifying and explaining how practices can be deliberately created (by businesses). Consequently, and in stark contrast with MacIntyre’s deeply pessimistic outlook on modern business and society, I propose that those who value practices might celebrate our current era. (shrink)

This paper concerns virtue-based ethical principles that bear upon agricultural uses of technologies, such as GM crops and CRISPR crops. It does three things. First, it argues for a new type of virtue ethics approach to such cases. Typical virtue ethics principles are vague and unspecific. These are sometimes useful, but we show how to supplement them with more specific virtue ethics principles that are useful to people working in specific applied domains, where morally relevant domain-specific conditions recur. We do (...) this while still fulfilling the need for principles and associated practical reasoning to flexibly respect variation between cases. Second, with our more detailed approach we criticize and improve upon a commonly discussed principle about ecosystemic external goods that are crucial for human flourishing. We show this principle is far more conservative than appreciated, as it would prohibit many technology uses that are uncontroversially acceptable. We then replace this principle with two more specific ones. One identifies specific conditions in which ecosystem considerations are against a technology use, the other identifies favorable conditions. Third, we uncover a humility-based principle that operates within an influential “hubris argument” against uses of several biotechnologies in agriculture. These arguments lack a substantive theory of the nature of humility. We clarify such a theory, and then use it to replace the uncovered humility-based principle with our own more specific one that shifts focus from past moral failings, to current epistemic limits when deciding whether to support new technologies. (shrink)

In this volume, Sorin Sabou explores the dependency of happiness on external goods in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Sabou defends the following thesis: the dependency of happiness on external goods, in EN, is interpreted in the light of its political self-sufficiency, and in the light of our political humanity; this dependency is of three kinds: (1) enhancing-instrumental, (2) constitutive, and (3) subsistent.

It seems intuitive that human development and environmental protection should go hand in hand. But some have worried there is no framework within environmental ethics that suitably conjoins them. I...

This paper will try to test the plausibility of interweaving a conception of politics with the nature of the conflict which politics is supposed to regulate, by looking at a specific case in the history of Western political thought. I wish to consider the interpretation of modern social relations that sees conflict as arising from the unequal distribution of (relatively) scarce resources. It is my aim to analyse the origins of this conception. But first I would like to note the (...) success of this line of thought, which permeates both everyday conversations and theoretical works. When we argue that the unequal distribution of scarce resources is the main source of conflict, we use �resources� mainly to refer to all goods and commodities that are indispensable to the production of socially desirable items. The term �resources� carries a distinctive economic flavour; and as the main threat to social cohesion is seen to stem from disagreements over the allocation of those �resources�, the solution to the problem is mainly seen in terms of reaching an equilibrium, by relying on the devices of political economy. (shrink)

One of the most striking and controversial features of Aristotle's moral exemplar, the megalopsychos, is his tendency to be contemptuous. Not surprisingly, modern scholarship has found this attribute of the megalopsychos particularly unappealing. This article probes the question about the targets of the contempt of the Aristotelian megalopsychos and explores the forms that this contempt might take. I argue that the primary targets of the megalopsychos are people who claim superiority on the wrong grounds (their external prosperity and social (...) status). The megalopsychos, who prioritizes virtue over external goods as a criterion of individual worth ( axia), rejects the self-image these people claim for themselves and refuses to grant them the appraisal respect they are accustomed to receiving, and think they deserve. (shrink)

Human beings possess external stores in which they put all sorts of goods to use them at some later time. In this paper we investigate this typically human adaptation using agent-based simulations. We show that the use of external stores explains many aspects of human life, allowing the agents to reduce their dependence on both the environment and the current state of their body and to be more efficient in extracting the energy contained in the environment. We (...) analyse the spatial behaviour of agents with external stores located in specific positions of the environment and we find that these agents tend to develop a sedentary life. We discuss how stores can be at the origin of many human mental and social phenomena such as the acquisition of a more extended temporal perspective, specialisation in producing different types of goods, and exchange of goods. (shrink)

Human beings possess external stores in which they put all sorts of goods to use them at some later time. In this paper we investigate this typically human adaptation using agent-based simulations. We show that the use of external stores explains many aspects of human life, allowing the agents to reduce their dependence on both the environment and the current state of their body and to be more efficient in extracting the energy contained in the environment. We (...) analyse the spatial behaviour of agents with external stores located in specific positions of the environment and we find that these agents tend to develop a sedentary life. We discuss how stores can be at the origin of many human mental and social phenomena such as the acquisition of a more extended temporal perspective, specialisation in producing different types of goods, and exchange of goods. (shrink)

This book presents a theoretical treatment of externalities, public goods, and club goods. The new edition updates and expands the discussion of externalities and their implications, coverage of asymmetric information, underlying game-theoretic formulations, and intuitive and graphical presentations. Aimed at well-prepared undergraduates and graduate students making a serious foray into this branch of economics, the analysis should also interest professional economists wishing to survey recent advances in the field. No other single source for the range of materials explored (...) is currently available. Topics investigated include Nash equilibrium, Lindahl equilibria, club theory, preference-revelation mechanism, Pigouvian taxes, the commons, Coase Theorem, and static and repeated games. The authors use mathematical techniques only as much as necessary to pursue the economic argument. They develop key principles of public economics that are useful for subfields such as public choice, labor economics, economic growth, international economics, environmental and natural resource economics, and industrial organization. (shrink)

(1992). Cultural goods and their positive externalities. World Futures: Vol. 33, Culture and Development: European Experiences and Challenges A Special Research Report of the European Culture Impact Research Consortium (EUROCIRCON), pp. 181-187.

The importance of self-regulated learning has increased during the COVID-19 pandemic and measures for assessing students’ self-regulation skills and knowledge are greatly needed. We present the results of the first thorough adaptation of the Children’s Perceived use of Self-Regulated Learning Inventory. The inventory, consisting of 15 scales measuring nine components of SRL, was administered to a sample of 541 Slovenian ninth graders. Confirmatory factor analyses supported internal structure validity of most components, but two components required some structural modifications. Internal consistency (...) coefficients were acceptable for the majority of scale scores and were highly comparable to the original ones. While metric invariance across gender was confirmed, the scalar invariance of some scales needs further examination. Meaningful correlations with relevant externally assessed and self-reported self-regulation and school performance variables indicated good criterion validity of the inventory. The Slovenian version of the CP-SRLI thus proved to be a sufficiently valid and reliable instrument for assessing pupils’ learning self-regulation. (shrink)

The present paper proposes a new reading of one of the most obscure passages of De Architectura; in I, 1,3 Vitruvius claims that in architecture there is always a signifier and a signified, but his approach differs from Quintilian’s as presented in the latter’s Institutio Oratoria. Vitruvius’ is closer to Chrysippus approach, but he fails to mention the third constituent, the tynchanon. This omission is probably due to the fact that Vitruvius speaks of designs rather, than of existing buildings. What (...) can successfully signify a proposed building is, according to my reading, the design and erection of a building that is easily recognized by the public as realizing the intentions of the community to erect the proposed building. Such successful signification constitutes the ultimate criterion for good architecture. (shrink)

Ispoljavanje dobra u Hegelovim Osnovnim crtama filozofije prava nije postizanje srece ili malogradjanskog komfora, nego hrabro i odlucno, gotovo slucajno i spolja posmatrano neosnovano ispoljavanje partikularne volje. Ovakav pojam dobra je upravo suprotan pojmu dobra u smislu dobara i uzivanja koji sprecava stvaranje subjektivnosti kod onih koji su neprepoznati od datog drustvenog sistema, urusavajuci mogucnost partikularnog delanja kod ovih, i time ih podrzavajuci u mentalitetu rulje, to jest mase. Nadomestavanje nedostatka slobode komforom je pre karakteristika faze apstraktnog prava, koju faza (...) moralnosti tezi da prevazidje. U fazi apstraktnog prava, zbog slepog postovanja suvog legaliteta, ono sto je pravo u sebi i za sebe ne moze nikako biti ispoljeno u pravom smislu reci jer je izjednaceno sa ugovornom pravdom, cija je prava osnova nista drugo do pravo jaceg. (shrink)

Descartes's greatest glory was to be the first to articulate, and systematically to defend, the new scientific ideal of explanation in terms of lawfulness. For the realm of matter, lawful connections replaced anthropomorphic volitions as the model of rational explanation. Descartes's use of explanation in terms of lawfulness, inspired by Galileo's beginnings in this enterprise, was vindicated by Newton's subsequent achievement. Replacement of anthropomorphic agency, by causal mechanism, as the explanatory model, was undoubtedly the most profound of the many effects (...) of the new science on our culture. (shrink)

Platonists beginning in the Old Academy itself and up to and including Plotinus struggled to understand and articulate the relation between Plato’s Demiurge and the Living Animal which served as the model for creation. The central question is whether “contents” of the Living Animal, the Forms, are internal to the mind of the Demiurge or external and independent. For Plotinus, the solution depends heavily on how the Intellect that is the Demiurge and the Forms or intelligibles are to be (...) understood in relation to the first principle of all, the One or the Good. The treatise V.5 [32] sets out the case for the internality of Forms and argues for the necessary existence of an absolutely simple and transcendent first principle of all, the One or the Good. Not only Intellect and the Forms, but everything else depends on this principle for their being. (shrink)

"A translation of Plotinus' Enneads V.5: "That the Intelligibles are not External to the Intellect, and on the Good," with an introduction and philosophical commentary. Platonists beginning in the Old Academy itself and up to and including Plotinus struggled to understand and articulate the relation between Plato's Demiurge and the Living Animal which served as the model for creation. The treatise V.5 [32] sets out the case for the internality of Forms to the Intellect that the Demiurge is and (...) argues for the necessary existence of an absolutely simple and transcendent first principle of all, the One or the Good"--. (shrink)

Paper has three parts. Te first part gives the reasons for need of liberty external-social of science guaranteed by law. Speaks about it Declaration of human rights in 1948 and social teaching of Church – including documents of Vaticanum II and Jean Paul II, which indicate of subjectivity and dignity of man as person. The second part of this paper based on personalism demonstrates that science can harmoniously develop only in the climate of internal-moral freedom of scientist. The purpose (...) of science is revelation of truth, but effects of scientific investigations – in particular of biological-medical sciences – influence on the life of human individuals and societies. Conscious and free activity of man has ethical character, therefore liberty of science ought to be responsible liberty and then to be subordinated the ethical criterions. Science cannot ignore values and rules moral. The third part of paper stated that good of human person and common good of society demand juridical limitations of scientific inquiries’ liberty. Liberty is man’s right but also its obligation to respect of human person’s fundamental rights – including right to life, integrality and dignity. Therefore internal-ethical and external-juridical limitations are necessary of scientist’s liberty. (shrink)

Effects of globalization have amplified the magnitude and frequency of corporate abuses, particularly in developing economies where weak or absent rules undermine social norms and principles. Improving multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) ethical conduct is a factor of both the ability of firms to change behaviors in the direction of the moral good, and their willingness to do so. Constraints and enablers of a firm’s ability to act ethically emanate from the external environment, including the industry environment of which the firm (...) is a resident, and the host country environment in which it operates. A firm’s willingness to engage in ethical conduct is determined by the effective bundling of internal resources and the commitment of those resources to social ends. The interaction of external and internal conditions carves out categories of expected firm behaviors and suggests interventions that would push these behaviors in a more positive ethical direction. With reference to integrative social contracts theory (ISCT), these categories of firms are examined, and a conceptual model for analysis is developed to explain the drivers of corporate choices in the adoption and implementation of codes of conduct, and the relative power of relevant communities to the process. (shrink)

Effects of globalization have amplified the magnitude and frequency of corporate abuses, particularly in developing economies where weak or absent rules undermine social norms and principles. Improving multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) ethical conduct is a factor of both the ability of firms to change behaviors in the direction of the moral good, and their willingness to do so. Constraints and enablers of a firm’s ability to act ethically emanate from the external environment, including the industry environment of which the firm (...) is a resident, and the host country environment in which it operates. A firm’s willingness to engage in ethical conduct is determined by the effective bundling of internal resources and the commitment of those resources to social ends. The interaction of external and internal conditions carves out categories of expected firm behaviors and suggests interventions that would push these behaviors in a more positive ethical direction. With reference to integrative social contracts theory (ISCT), these categories of firms are examined, and a conceptual model for analysis is developed to explain the drivers of corporate choices in the adoption and implementation of codes of conduct, and the relative power of relevant communities to the process. (shrink)