René Descartes

Enlightenment philosopher, René Descartes, set out to establish what could be known with certainty, untainted by a deceiving demon. With his method of doubt, he rejected all previous beliefs, allowing only those that survived rigorous scrutiny. In this essay, Leslie Allan examines whether Descartes's program of skeptical enquiry was successful in laying a firm foundation for our manifold beliefs. He subjects Descartes's conclusions to Descartes's own uncompromising methodology to determine whether Descartes escaped from a self-imposed radical skepticism.

Argues that Descartes's commitment to mind-body causation leads to a commitment to body-body causation.

In Meditation I, Descartes dismisses the possibility that he might be insane as a ground for doubting that the senses are a source of knowledge of the external world. In this paper, I argue that Descartes was justified in so doing, and draw some general epistemological conclusions from this result.

Descartes argues that, apart from the existence of a veracious God, we can have no reason to believe that we possess reliable cognitive faculties, with the result that, if atheism is true, not even our seemingly most certain beliefs can count as knowledge for us. Since the atheist denies the existence of God, he or she will be precisely in this position. I argue that Descartes' argument is sound, and that atheism is therefore self-refuting.

Charles Larmore presents the central part of Descartes’ first meditation as a brief dialogue between a skeptic and a sensible empiricist. I point out a source of discontent about this innovative transformation.

I raise the question of whether there is a hidden source of doubt in Descartes’ first meditation, if one adopts the perspective of some people he describes as insane.

In this paper, I present the problem of the poor king, from combining Descartes and Rousseau.

This paper contests a standard interpretation of how Descartes comes to the conclusion that he is not his body in the second meditation. I propose an alternative interpretation in its place.

The purpose of this essay is to exhibit in detail the setting for the version of the Cogito Argument that appears in Descartes’s Meditations. I believe that a close reading of the text can shed new light on the nature and role of the “evil demon”, on the nature of God as he appears in the first few Meditations, and on the place of the Cogito Argument in Descartes’s overall scheme.

This article is to analize the doctrines of two great philosophers, Descarets and Ibn-Sina on the soul.As he himself said, Descartes, while doubting on anything, was sure that " cogito ergo sum".He found this an unquestionable fact, therefore he took it as the first principle.After Descartes, some objections have been posed against his doctrine; for example the objection, posed by Ibn-Sina. Ibn-Sina believed that thinking is among the soul's acts, and the soul cannot be affirmed through one of its own (...) acts; for, by the thinking, either the thinking in the universal sense of the term is meant or the thinking of a particular individual is meant; and in the latter case, it is absurd to go to find "the unknown". (shrink)

En este trabajo se analiza la tesis foucaultiana de la reducción de la filosofía a forma de conocimiento en Descartes y el consecuente abandono de la espiritualidad clásica, es decir, de la filosofía concebida como forma de vida basada en el cuidado de sí. A partir de aquí, además de observar que el propio Foucault matizará esta tesis, se demostrará que en Descartes la filosofía sigue esencialmente unida a la espiritualidad.

Cet article vise à souligner la centrante de Laf.308, Br.793 au sein des Pensées, tout en déterminant sa portée anti-cartésienne. Une confrontation avec d'autres fragments connexes permet de préciser ce que Pascal met sous le deuxième ordre : une science relayée par la pensée, non la métaphysique cartésienne. Il devient alors possible de discuter l'interprétation de Jean-Luc Marion et de montrer que, loin d'opérer une simple destitution de la métaphysique cartésienne au nom de la charité chrétienne, Laf.308, Br.793 résume bien (...) l'antagonisme de deux systèmes philosophiques. The object of this article is to point out the central place of Laf.308-Br.793 within the Pensées and to determine at the same time its anti-cartesian implications. By confronting it with connected fragments, we are allowed to state what exactly Pascal does include under the second order, that is, not the cartesian metaphysics, but a science whose relay is the thought. So it becomes possible to discuss Jean-Luc Marion's interpretation by showing that, far from simply producing a destitution of the cartesian metaphysics in the name of Christian charity, Laf.308-Br.793 concentrates well the antagonism between two philosophical systems. (shrink)

Descartes claims in the Discourse on Method (1637) to have devised a morale par provision in 1619-20, but, later, in the Conversation with Burman (1648), he divulged that he “does not like writing on ethics,” asserts that his morale was hastily written immediately before the publication of the Discourse, and, even more striking, adds that he was “compelled” to include this content due to “people like the Schoolmen.” These facts have led commentators to be skeptical whether Descartes created his morale (...) during his early philosophy as he claims in Part 3 of the Discourse. In response, I argue that he created a ‘lived morale’ during the early 1620s. Further, I argue that he endorsed it throughout his lifetime and conclude that he advocated it from the Rules for the Direction of the Mind (1620s) to the Passions of the Soul (1648). (shrink)

En este artículo examino la noción de amor a Dios (amour envers Dieu) en Descartes, conectándola con los principios metafísicos de su sistema y con los objetivos a los que da respuesta, y mostrando sus beneficios para la vida de todo hombre. Los desacuerdos de Spinoza en esta materia no constituyen una discrepancia menor, sino que adquieren relevancia sistémica desde el momento en que el amor Dei está conectado con nociones centrales de su filosofía, como la idea de Dios y (...) sus atributos, la relación del hombre con la sustancia infinita, la actividad mental-corporal, el conocimiento como expresión del deseo, la función liberadora de los afectos y la fruición del amor a Dios. Esta noción constituye una plataforma privilegiada para examinar las peculiaridades de los sistemas de Descartes y Spinoza, y deja ver notables diferencias en sus respectivos proyectos de naturalización de la realidad. (shrink)

El objetivo de este estudio es interpretar la relación entre el modelo anatómico de Descartes y el régimen disciplinario que M. Foucault propone en su tesis sobre el poder en la Modernidad. Se muestra cómo Foucault sitúa a Descartes como el iniciador de una medicina que convertiría el cuerpo humano en una máquina y al igual que esta, pasaría a concebirse como un sistema mecánico susceptible de ser explorable, controlable y manipulable.

_ Source: _Page Count 46 René Descartes is neither a Conceptualist nor a Platonist when it comes to the ontological status of the eternal truths and essences of mathematics but articulates a view derived from Proclus. There are several advantages to interpreting Descartes’ texts in light of Proclus’ view of universals and philosophy of mathematics. Key passages that, on standard readings, are in conflict are reconciled if we read Descartes as appropriating Proclus’ threefold distinction among universals. Specifically, passages that appear (...) to commit Descartes to a Platonist view of mathematical objects and the truths that follow from them are no longer in tension with the Conceptualist view of universals implied by his treatment of the eternal truths in the _Principles of Philosophy_. This interpretation also fits the historical evidence and explains why Descartes ends up with seemingly inconsistent commitments to divine simplicity and God’s efficient creation of truths that are not merely conceptually distinct from the divine essence. (shrink)

In the Letter to the Faculty of Theology of the Sorbonne, Descartes makes a reference to Leo's X's encyclical Apostolici Regiminis (1513), which supports the Aristotelian-Scholastic conception of the soul as anima corporis forma According to Descartes' doctrine of the eternal truths, God's power is absolutely unlimited. One of the consequences of this doctrine is that God could join a rational (human) soul to any body, which implies that the union of soul and the body in the Cartesian system is (...) not substantial in the Scholastic sense of the word. In bringing in Leo's X's encyclical to support his conception of the soul, Descartes used a papal document for purposes contrary to those for which it had been designed. Dans la Lettre à la Faculté de théologie de la Sorbonne, Descartes fait référence à l'encyclique Apostolici Regiminis (1513), qui soutient la conception aristotélico-scolastique de l'âme en tant qu'anima corporis forma Or, selon la doctrine de la création des vérités éternelles, le pouvoir de Dieu est sans limites : une de ses conséquences en est que Dieu eût pu unir l'âme rationnelle (humaine) à n'importe quel corps, ce qui implique que l'union de l'âme et du corps dans la philosophie cartésienne ne soit pas substantielle — du moins au sens scolastique du terme. En citant l'encyclique Apostolici Regiminis au commencement des Meditations, Descartes a en fait utilisé le document pontifical à l'opposé du but pour lequel il avait été conçu. (shrink)

La libertad en Descartes tiene dos momentos diferentes: antes de que se descubra la posibilidad de la verdad y después de su descubrimiento. La experiencia de la libertad previa al establecimiento de las condiciones de la verdad tiene lugar en la decisión de reconstruir el edificio del conocimiento. El descubrimiento de su fundamento teológico tiene como consecuencia la moralización del saber.

This article aims to contribute to counteracting the negative perception of Descartes’ philosophical legacy. The article addresses a specific aspect of the supposed human dominance over nature, that of the animal question. Against the accusation of “speciesism,” a hierarchy that considers humans superior and justifies their domination and cruelty towards animals, it is argued that Descartes did not regard animals as completely insensible, that his position was not as categorical as often presented, and that he can be interpreted not as (...) a speciesist but as an environmental advocate. (shrink)

Descartes consolida el paso de la ciencia de la verdad a la ciencia del hombre. En esta prima un cura sui, que acabará fortaleciendo al sujeto interiormente y desenfocando al otro. Todo hombre podría ser sabio; si bien, no desde la experiencia de la conciencia como ejercicio metódico y teórico del alma; pero sí como forma de vida que educa el fortalecimiento de la voluntad. La generosidad será la forma de la virtud, y si bien esta incluye las formas del (...) amor, el cogito cartesiano no logra salir de la auto-referencialidad. (shrink)

Los textos que se presentan a continuación aúnan a reconocidos estudiosos en el cartesianismo, junto a investigadores más nóveles. Son fruto además de un proyecto de investigación financiado por el Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, [Referencia PID2021-126133NB-100] que lleva por título: Éticas y metafísica de los afectos. Las génesis modernas del presente actual (EMAP). Se ofrecen, por tanto, los estudios que siguen como resultados de este proyecto, que inició su andadura en septiembre de 2022.

Los artículos de este segundo número monográfico dedicado a Descartes son un fruto más del proyecto de investigación -financiado por el Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, [Referencia PID2021-126133NB-I00]- que lleva por título: Éticas y metafísica de los afectos. Las génesis modernas del presente actual (EMAP). Se ofrecen a continuación relecturas cartesianas que ponen el acento en la revisión de ciertos tópicos atribuidos al pensamiento del padre de la modernidad, más mencionado que leído y estudiado.

Descartes claimed that the Cogito is ‘so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were incapable of shaking it’. This paper aims to demonstrate that this claim is false by presenting a sceptical scenario for the Cogito. It is argued that the story ‘The Circular Ruins’ by J. L. Borges illustrates that one can doubt one’s own existence and that pace Descartes (and many others) the claim ‘I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it (...) is put forward by me or conceived in my mind’ is false. (shrink)

This paper addresses the multiple readings that Foucault offers of Descartes’ Meditations during the whole span of his intellectual career. It thus rejects the (almost) exclusive focus of the literature on the few pages of the History of Madness dedicated to the Meditations and on the so-called Foucault/Derrida debate. First, it reconstructs Foucault’s interpretation of Descartes’ philosophy in a series of unpublished manuscripts written between 1966 and 1968, when Foucault was teaching at the University of Tunis. It then addresses the (...) important shifts that took place in Foucault’s thought at the beginning of the 1970s, which led him to elaborate a new approach to the Meditations in terms of ‘discursive events’. Finally, it argues that those shifts opened up to Foucault the possibility of developing an original reading of Descartes’ philosophy, surprisingly close to his own interest in ancient askēsis and the techniques of the self. (shrink)

La concepción dualista de Descartes expulsó lo incorpóreo de la materia y ha sido mal entendida durante siglos. Este artículo inicia reflexionando acerca de la importancia del materialismo para la ciencia. Enseguida, se examinan argumentos de la doctrina dualista relativos a la física, su materialismo y mecanicismo. Finalmente, se considera, desde la perspectiva de la unión, la biología humana, disciplina con características peculiares, dado que su objeto no es un ser meramente corpóreo, sino entremezclado.

This article has been invited by The European Legacy editors as a response to Ayumu Tamura’s “Did Descartes Read Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism?” which continues the promising lines of enquiry he...

An article of mine in The Heythrop Journal a decade ago discussed Descartes’ “Olympica” dream-sequence, the original of which is lost, but the details of which are preserved in a French version in...

En Montaigne, el yo es producto de la pluralidad y no existe separado de la naturaleza. En Descartes, por el contrario, la “voz de la razón” justifica una soledad que renuncia al cuerpo, a los sentidos y a la voz de los demás. Según Montaigne, el saber se busca en permanente relación con el mundo, sin la expectativa de una certeza absoluta que superaría nuestra pequeñez natural. Según Descartes, la investigación individual es más segura que aquella en la que varios (...) intervienen. Sin embargo, la diferencia entre ambos pensadores no se limita al plano del conocimiento. Tiene en realidad raíces biográficas y, sobre todo, responde a dosvisiones de la condición humana profundamente contrapuestas. (shrink)

In this work I intend to explore the textual and conceptual roots of the moral view in the Early Modern Rationalism of Cartesian spectrum as detected by Elisabeth of Bohemia. To this intent, I will drive my analysis, first, to the remark Descartes adds to his own provisional morality of the Discourse in the Letter of August 4th, 1645 to Elisabeth. Second, I will approach the two aspects of her reply to Descartes, both in her Letter of September 13th 1645, (...) which I call a) the contextual aspect – with which she excludes the hypotheses of an infinite science at the service of assessing the good and b) the self-related aspect, with which the philosopher of Bohemia address the moral objectiveness as an intrinsic practical value, obtained by the passions that may lead to reasonable actions. The upshot is a practical and affective moral view, in which the normative trait of some passions of the soul can be taken as the explanation of an intentional infrastructure of the mind, without, however, a theory of ideas as such playing an explicit role. Instead of a representational endeavor, Elisabeth of Bohemia claims a kind of self-awareness from the discovery of a passionate function as an expression of the adequate measure between happiness and morality of actions. That kind of awareness, I shall demonstrate, is what objectiveness consists in. (shrink)

In May 1643 Elisabeth of Bohemia addressed a question to Descartes which inaugurated a six-year Correspondence, until his death. He dedicates his mature metaphysical work to the Princess (Principles of First Philosophy, 1644) and writes Passions of the Soul (1649) as one of the results of the dialogue with the philosopher of Bohemia. The silencing of the last hundred years of historiography on Elisabeth of Bohemia's legacy in this epistolary exchange caused distortions and, in some cases, underpinned the bias as (...) a rule and as the history. One of the consequences of this distortion is the interpretation according to which her first question would consist of a critique of substantial dualism. In this study I suggest an interpretation of the nature of the first question, in order to clarify the philosopher's thinking and her role in dialogue, in a comprehensive way, without subscribing to the literary paradigm of the Cartesian soliloquy, and its bias. (shrink)

Aunque Descartes pretende hablar de cuestiones morales en general, y de las pasiones en particular, como si nadie hubiera escrito antes sobre ellas, lo cierto es que, en el caso de la admiración, es clara su referencia al mundo antiguo. En concreto, en este caso el pensador francés se sitúa críticamente en contra de la postura aristotélica, que entiende la admiración como el inicio de la filosofía. Frente a la propuesta clásica, que convierte dicha emoción en el motor permanente de (...) la investigación de las primeras causas, para Descartes la curiosidad excesiva y el estupor del asombro son rechazables. No obstante, algunos han señalado el carácter ambivalente de las declaraciones cartesianas. No en vano la admiración es no sólo la primera de las pasiones, sino también un componente fundamental de todas ellas. Y si bien en el campo del conocimiento debe superarse, en otros ámbitos, como el de la contemplación de la divinidad o en el goce de la libertad de la voluntad humana, tal desdén desaparece. En ese sentido, pretendemos explorar el modo en que Descartes separa admiración y conocimiento para luego reivindicar su importancia en el plano práctico. Palabras clave: Admiración, asombro, curiosidad, libre albedrío, pasión. (shrink)

Es tópica la interpretación de un Descartes desinteresado en temas morales. Así lo lee Foucault, para quien la Modernidad supuso la separación entre el nuevo tema central del conocimiento y el, ahora secundario, de la praxis. En este artículo defiendo que la obra de Descartes puede entenderse como una versión moderna del filosófico arte de vivir, en donde conocerse y cuidar de uno mismo siguen unidos por un eje central, el de la libre voluntad.

This paper will offer a systematic reconstruction of al-Ġazālī’s Sceptical Argument in his celebrated Deliverer/Delivered from Going Astray (al-Munqiḏ/al-Munqaḏ min al-Ḍalāl). Based on textual evidence, I will argue that the concept of certainty (yaqīn) in play in this argument is that of the philosophers—most notably Ibn Sīnā—and that it is firmly tied to demonstration (burhān) and hence to the materials of syllogism (mawwād al-qiyās). This will show that contrary to what many scholars believe, this Sceptical Argument is al-Ġazālī’s discovery of (...) a latent sceptical problem in Muslim philosophers’ epistemological theories based on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics that escaped even the agile mind of aš-šayḫ ar-raʾīs Ibn Sīnā. This reconstruction will also shed some light on the widespread assumption that al-Ġazālī anticipates Descartes’s sceptical considerations in the First Meditation. I will argue that not only do the two thinkers use incompatible strategies to reach their respective sceptical conclusions, but both their conclusions and their use of God in refuting them are also essentially non-identical. The conclusion is that the two sceptical arguments are essentially different. (shrink)

Cet article se propose de mettre au jour l'influence occamienne de la critique que Caterus adresse, dans les Premières objections, à la notion cartésienne de réalité objective de l'idée. This article intends to point out the ockhamist inspiration of the arguments of Caterus against the cartesian notion of idea's objective reality in the First objections.