This part of the philosophy of psychology I refer to as 'moral psychology'; and, therefore, this book is offered as a contribution to moral psychology. ...

In this superb introduction, Nicholas Dent covers the whole of Rousseau's thought. Beginning with a helpful overview of Rousseau's life and works, he introduces and assesses Rousseau's central ideas and arguments. These include the corruption of modern civilization, the state of nature, his famous theories of _amour de soi _and _amour propre_, education, and his famous work _Emile_. He gives particular attention to Rousseau's theories of democracy and freedom found in his most celebrated work, _The Social Contract_, and explains what (...) Rousseau meant by the 'general will'. (shrink)

The social, educational and political writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau have become enormously influential in the 200 years since his death. But the breadth as well as the depth of Rousseau's achievement - he was amongst other things a creative writer and musical composer as well as a philosopher - is not always appreciated. In around 100 articles, alphabetically arranged and fully cross-referenced, N. J. H. Dent explores all facets of Rousseau's work and thoughts, while his subject's remarkable life is summarized (...) in a biographical introduction. Details of works by and about Rousseau are listed in an extensive bibliography. For students or general readers seeking an introduction to Rousseau's work, and for those already familiar with the material who require a convenient reference source, this dictionary is essential reading. (shrink)

This paper considers the place of anger in human development and culture, as discussed by Rousseau inÉmile. It is argued that Rousseau presents anger as intimately associated with imperious self-assertion, and with a representation of others as malign and obstructive. If this pattern of thought and expectation is consolidated, the will to dominate these supposedly obstructive others becomes the central preoccupation. The madness lies in the idea contained in this that failure in having one's desires satisfied signals a wrong, an (...) abuse one has suffered. Regulation of anger is necessary to achieving a proper sense of our finitude, limitation and a reasoned sense of our dependence on others. (shrink)

According to familiar accounts, Rousseau held that humans are actuated by two distinct kinds of self love: amour de soi, a benign concern for one's self-preservation and well-being; and amour-propre, a malign concern to stand above other people, delighting in their despite. I argue that although amour-propre can (and often does) assume this malign form, this is not intrinsic to its character. The first and best rank among men that amour-propre directs us to claim for ourselves is that of occupying (...) 'man's estate'. This does not require, indeed it precludes, subjection of others. Amour-propre does not need suppression or circumscription if we are to live good lives; it rather requires direction to its proper end, not a delusive one. (shrink)

O'Hagan agrees with Dent that in Rousseau's idea of "amour-propre" we encounter a powerful, coherent model of human psychology, according to which individuals find their own identities by engaging in a network of relationships within a more or less reconstituted social order. He examines five ways in which people strive to attain that goal and five ways in which they characteristically fail. In the sixth section he discusses Rousseau's strategy of retreat from society, which is also a retreat from the (...) demands of "amour-propre". (shrink)

Nicholas Dent; The Basic Principle of Emile's Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 139–149, https://doi.org/10.

This paper considers the place of anger in human development and culture, as discussed by Rousseau inÉmile. It is argued that Rousseau presents anger as intimately associated with imperious self-assertion, and with a representation of others as malign and obstructive. If this pattern of thought and expectation is consolidated, the will to dominate these supposedly obstructive others becomes the central preoccupation. The madness lies in the idea contained in this that failure in having one's desires satisfied signals a wrong, an (...) abuse one has suffered. Regulation of anger is necessary to achieving a proper sense of our finitude, limitation and a reasoned sense of our dependence on others. (shrink)

According to familiar accounts, Rousseau held that humans are actuated by two distinct kinds of self love: amour de soi, a benign concern for one's self-preservation and well-being; and amour-propre, a malign concern to stand above other people, delighting in their despite. I argue that although amour-propre can assume this malign form, this is not intrinsic to its character. The first and best rank among men that amour-propre directs us to claim for ourselves is that of occupying 'man's estate'. This (...) does not require, indeed it precludes, subjection of others. Amour-propre does not need suppression or circumscription if we are to live good lives; it rather requires direction to its proper end, not a delusive one. (shrink)

Liberal critics of plato's republic criticise him for ignoring the moral autonomy of persons, their right to form and to express their own moral ideas. It is argued that this criticism is superficial. Neither plato, nor his liberal critics, wish all moral views to be held and acted on; they both wish to set limits to what is acceptable. The true source of disagreement is over the scope of reason in human affairs; plato understands that narrowly; his liberal critics in (...) a broad, permissive, way. (shrink)

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In this substantial and challenging book, O’Hagan gives central place to three of Rousseau’s works—the Discourse of Inequality, the Emile, and the Social Contract—which, he says, “constitute the axes of Rousseau’s idea of formation. The formation of the human race is the axis of the Second Discourse, the formation of the individual that of the Emile, and the formation of the citizen that of the Social Contract”. However, he also draws extensively on other material, particularly Julie, ou la Nouvelle Héloïse, (...) to extend and deepen some of Rousseau’s accounts, particularly of moral and psychological issues. Such selectivity enables O’Hagan to consider in some detail each of his chosen texts, which he does with persistent intensity and rigor, in chapters 2 to 6, devoting three of these chapters to his treatment of the Social Contract. Additionally, he selects certain topics for particular attention, with individual chapters on amour-propre, on Rousseau’s views about men and women, on Rousseau’s treatment of some issues concerning language, and he closes with an extended treatment of Rousseau’s religious ideas and views about the role of religion in society. It is pleasing to see this aspect of Rousseau’s thought, which is seldom considered at length these days, dealt with with such care. Another useful aspect of O’Hagan’s discussion is that he makes available and engages with some of the ideas of leading French critics of Rousseau, which helpfully broadens the horizons of the assessments he makes. (shrink)

In this substantial and challenging book, O’Hagan gives central place to three of Rousseau’s works—the Discourse of Inequality, the Emile, and the Social Contract—which, he says, “constitute the axes of Rousseau’s idea of formation. The formation of the human race is the axis of the Second Discourse, the formation of the individual that of the Emile, and the formation of the citizen that of the Social Contract”. However, he also draws extensively on other material, particularly Julie, ou la Nouvelle Héloïse, (...) to extend and deepen some of Rousseau’s accounts, particularly of moral and psychological issues. Such selectivity enables O’Hagan to consider in some detail each of his chosen texts, which he does with persistent intensity and rigor, in chapters 2 to 6, devoting three of these chapters to his treatment of the Social Contract. Additionally, he selects certain topics for particular attention, with individual chapters on amour-propre, on Rousseau’s views about men and women, on Rousseau’s treatment of some issues concerning language, and he closes with an extended treatment of Rousseau’s religious ideas and views about the role of religion in society. It is pleasing to see this aspect of Rousseau’s thought, which is seldom considered at length these days, dealt with with such care. Another useful aspect of O’Hagan’s discussion is that he makes available and engages with some of the ideas of leading French critics of Rousseau, which helpfully broadens the horizons of the assessments he makes. (shrink)

In this superb introduction, Nicholas Dent covers the whole of Rousseau's thought. Beginning with a helpful overview of Rousseau's life and works, he introduces and assesses Rousseau's central ideas and arguments. These include the corruption of modern civilization, the state of nature, his famous theories of amour de soi and amour propre , education, and his famous work Emile . He gives particular attention to Rousseau's theories of democracy and freedom found in his most celebrated work, The Social Contract , (...) and explains what Rousseau meant by the 'general will'. (shrink)

This note discusses critically a point in a d m walker's paper "the ideal of sincerity" ("mind", October 1978). Walker claims that desires are insincere if corrupted by incompatible desires. This view accounts for some cases, But not for all. It is argued, In the note, That superficial, Factitious, 'got up' desires are judged insincere as such because not 'natural' to a man. This is implied by the claim of andre gide's which walker misinterprets. The issue of natural desires in (...) contrast to artificial desires introduces the question of 'authenticity', Which is looked at in connection with lionel trilling's "sincerity and authenticity". (shrink)