Rights

This paper builds on the work of several exceptional scholars from the disciplines of philosophy, law, and history. My central aim is to introduce and explicate an idea closely related to (and derivative of) the concept of rights talk, a concept I call ‘constitutional emotivism’. By drawing upon scholars including Mary Ann Glendon, Jamal Greene, A.J. Ayer, and Alasdair MacIntyre, I aim to gather the conceptual threads that I trace through their work which together form the idea of constitutional emotivism. (...) In a sentence, constitutional emotivism is the conflation of moral disagreements with constitutional rights grievances. When this conflation occurs, rights conflicts that never needed to occur in the first place reinforce rights talk and its uncompromising nature. (shrink)

Divergences and controversies are inevitable in the discussion of freedoms and rights, especially in the matter of reproduction. The Chinese first social egg freezing lawsuit raises the question: is the freedom to freeze eggs for social reasons justified because it is an instance of reproductive rights? This paper accepts social egg freezing as desirable reproductive freedom, but following Harel's approach and considering two theories of rights, the choice and interest theories of rights, we argue that social egg freezing is not (...) a reproductive right because one cannot justify a right or an instance of rights via merely describing the function of those instances that have been justified as right, that is, the choice theory lacks justifying normativity. Since reserving fertility and a suspension from reproduction do not serve reproductive ends per se, the sufficient reason for demanding social egg freezing as a right should be found in other ends rather than in right‐to‐reproduce, that is, the interest theory denies the demand as a right‐to‐reproduce. Permitting it on any grounds without guaranteeing adequate and accessible resources, especially in light of cross‐border reproductive care, raises serious questions about reproductive equality and violates the idea of reproductive rights. Therefore, any ground for social egg freezing should be weighed against whether more pressing reproductive needs, specifically those that are justified as rights, have been met. It would be social progress to shoulder these burdens for the vulnerable and then allow social egg freezing—if right‐to‐reproduce were not the only privilege of the few. (shrink)

Artificial intellgence and fundamental rights from a European perspective.

According to a rights forfeiture theory of punishment, liability to punishment hinges upon the notion that criminals forfeit their rights against hard treatment. In this paper, I assume the success of rights forfeiture theory in establishing the permissibility of punishment but aim to develop the view by considering how forfeited rights might be reclaimed. Built into the very notion of proportionate punishment is the idea that forfeited rights can be recovered. The interesting question is whether punishment is the sole means (...) for reclaiming forfeited rights. I argue for a pluralistic theory of rights reclamation, according to which, there are multiple ways by which a wrongdoer can recapture her forfeited rights. In particular, I argue that offering remorseful compensation is a valid means by which a wrongdoer might partially, or fully, reclaim her right against punishment. (shrink)

This paper sketches the emergence of, and shifts within, the social, legal, and political figurations of sex workers in Poland. By adopting a genealogical perspective, I investigate how sex workers have been (re)constituted as subjects of governance and unimaginable social justice claimants in legislation, political debates, and law enforcement strategies. With a broad temporal scope, this article traces continuities, transformations, and disruptions within modes of sex work governance in Poland from the adoption of the first laws relating to sex work (...) enacted during the early 19th century to the present day. Through analysis of policy documents, scholarly work on the history of sex work policies in Poland, and personal accounts by sex workers, I identify and examine two dominant discursive and legal figurations of a sex worker: as a threat, and as a victim in need of rescue and protection. While analysing the emergence of and interplay between these two figurations, this article demonstrates how these seemingly contradictory frames of recognition gradually conjoined within 20th-century Polish sex work governance strategies, rendering sex workers unimaginable subjects of rights and social justice claimants. (shrink)

Neurotechnologies are revolutionizing our ability to monitor and modify the brain. As these technologies gather more data, many seek to understand whether brain data raises novel privacy concerns a...

In their paper “Brain Data in Context: Are New Rights the Way to Mental and Brain Privacy?” Susser and Cabrera (2024) argue against the notion that specific rights may be necessary to protect “brai...

The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to “mental privacy.” In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are—at least for now—no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection (...) technologies, such as gene sequencing tools and online surveillance. To better understand the privacy stakes of brain data, we suggest the use of a conceptual framework from information ethics, Helen Nissenbaum’s “contextual integrity” theory. To illustrate the importance of context, we examine neurotechnologies and the information flows they produce in three familiar contexts—healthcare and medical research, criminal justice, and consumer marketing. We argue that by emphasizing what is distinct about brain privacy issues, rather than what they share with other data privacy concerns, risks weakening broader efforts to enact more robust privacy law and policy. (shrink)

Although this article uses Obergefell v Hodges (2015) as its frame, it aims to bring out some distinctive features of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence of dignity more broadly. There are two reasons why such an investigation is important. The first is important to those interested in the legal case. Indeed, in Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health (2022), the Court now argues that the relevant ‘test’ for determining whether a right is protected under the Due Process Clause is whether the right is (...) found to be ‘deeply rooted’ in the nation’s history and tradition. This article aims to critique this decision, as well as originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation more broadly, and seeks to resurrect and reconstruct Kennedy’s jurisprudence of dignity that has undergirded (sometimes quietly) the expansion of civil rights protections to the LGBTQ+ community. The second reason this investigation is important is of interest to philosophers and legal historians. Dignity is a notoriously elusive concept, and much ink has been spilt trying to sort out the precise nature of its content and its boundaries. This article brings together the many (seemingly disparate) uses of dignity found across cases involving gay rights, abortion, and foreign sovereign immunity, and argues Kennedy effectively weaves these uses together in ways that may sharpen our understanding of dignity in both the philosophical and legal literatures. (shrink)

Arguments against inflicting violence on people to defend animal rights have relied on the view that inflicting violence is always wrong. But these arguments end up prohibiting too much, as defensive violence should be permissible in certain extreme cases. We argue that considerations about the counterproductiveness of defensive violence are better at distinguishing permissible and impermissible instances of animal rights violence than a blanket rejection of violence. We respond to the objection that assuming violence to be counterproductive is ad hoc, (...) discussing real-world and fictional examples of animal rights violence. We argue that defensive violence on behalf of animals should almost always be assumed to be counterproductive because it threatens to trigger self-reinforcing reactions on the part of the socio-technical regimes that violate animal rights in the first place. (shrink)

Animal rights activists all around the world are working to end animal suffering. They campaign for laws to protect animal welfare. They work to stop the use of animals in tests for medicines and cosmetics, factory farming, and the use of fur. Many stop eating meat and using animal products. All agree that animals deserve to be treated with respect and dignity. Could you be one of them? Read this book to find out how to be an animal rights activist"--Provided (...) by publisher. (shrink)

This collection posits three questions. 1. What structures of violence and oppression are experienced and shared by human and nonhuman laborers working and dying in these necropolitical facilities? 2. If there is an intersection between class and species, which, in turn incorporates race, gender, abilities, and other categories of oppression, in which ways is the contemporary animal advocacy nonprofit sector reifying or disrupting these hierarchies in its mission towards animal liberation? 3. If there are classist and racist biases in Animal (...) Activist Nonprofit Sector (AANS), how can the AANS incorporate social class in dialogue with the liberation of nonhuman animals in order to build strategic alliances and coalitions between social movements and political subjects? This book not only envision a world without these hierarchies but offer tangible steps the AANS can take to achieve liberation for human and nonhuman animals. (shrink)

A collection of articles about the rights of children.

In its long history of rulings on the constitutional rights of children, the U.S. Supreme has struggled with a dilemma: either regard children as persons with fundamental rights that the state must respect, or regard them as human beings who are always in some form of custody. This paper describes and critically discusses three solutions to this dilemma. Only the third solution -- "the enjoyment or rights-in-trust theory" -- solves the problem.

Laurence Houlgate's critique of Shuman's "The Right to be Unhealthy" appearing at page 81 of the same issue of the Wayne Law Review.

Advances in assisted reproductive technologies can give rise to several ethical challenges. One of these challenges occurs when the reproductive desires of two individuals become incompatible and conflict. To address such conflicts, it is important to unbundle different aspects of (non)parenthood and to recognize the corresponding reproductive rights. This article starts on the premise that the six reproductive rights—the right (not) to be a gestational, genetic, and social parent—are negative rights that do not entail a right to assistance. Since terminating (...) or continuing a pregnancy is a form of assistance, the right (not) to be a gestational parent should enjoy primacy in conflicts. However, while refusing assistance may hinder the reproductive project of another person, “prior assistance” does not entitle someone to violate a reproductive right. Therefore, our analysis provides reasons to argue that someone has a right to unilaterally use cryopreserved embryos or continue the development of an entity in an extracorporeal gestative environment (i.e., ectogestation). Although this could lead to a violation of the right not to be a genetic parent, it does not necessarily entail a violation of the right not to be a social parent. (shrink)

In this chapter, I purpose to demonstrate that pre-colonial Africa had a concept of dignity grounded in moral practice and thinking that formed the foundations of social justice as an everyday lived experience. The chapter will highlight how various African Indigenous groups maintained law and order while upholding social justice of all the participants. Using examples from diverse cultures, the chapter will demonstrate how African Indigenous communities used customary law to control its members through encouraging good behaviors and sanctioning negative (...) behaviors. The chapter recognizes that Africa is not a homogeneous society or entity or even a series of isolated ethnic groups that are comparatively similar (Shorter, Concepts of social justice in traditional Africa. Pro Dialogo Bulletin, 12, 32–51, 1977; Onyeozili & Ebbe, 2012). On the contrary, Africa is/was socially and culturally fragmented with diverse human groups that have adapted to a myriad of physical, social, economic, and cultural environments. These adaptations have been made more intricate by lack of uniformity resulting from many different independent traditions and inventions from within and without and the impact of contact with other ethnic groups. This has led to a rich array of socio-cultural and political systems of languages, cultures, and religions. This attests to the extraordinary flexibility, absorbability, and civility of the Indigenous African societies who exchanged ideas and practices over wide areas with no need of great movements of peoples or conquests. The Indigenous cultures co-opted ideas on their own and integrated them to their own systems of thought and symbolism without coercion. Therefore, while there is no single concept of social justice that can be termed universally “African,” there are several different experiences that have a relatively wide currency. These experiences relate to different social levels—the family, community, and the political structure—and to the distinctive styles of life dictated by the various environments and cultural traditions. These are the experiences that we are going to collectively refer to as “African.”. (shrink)

Presents differing arguments on such topics as animal rights, what constitutes ethical treatment of animals, and using animals in scientific experimentation.

While postmodernists have claimed that the failure of the Enlightenment was a failure of philosophical courage, this plenary address explores how its greatest shortcoming actually was its hubris. Paying attention to how Western scholars have centered pride in their elitist purview was their ultimate worldview, this article examines ‘pride’ as the doctrinal dimension of the good life in contemporary Western society and culture. Furthermore, it implores postmodern Christian social ethicists to reform their stewardship to the telos of the field's highest (...) ideals and role, in order to confront the shortcomings of the Enlightenment and help realize its greater capacity for social transformation. Borrowing the Gandhian critique of ‘knowledge without character’, the author surveys how the existential crisis of higher education, the political manipulation of journalism, and the policy practices of politicians, public intellectuals, and pundits operate in addressing post-imperial/postmodern legacies have legitimated implicit biases and dehumanizing projects that pass off stereotypes as scholarship and hate as hermeneutics. (shrink)

Louis Brown discusses the mission of sharing the healing love of Christ, particularly in health care. He investigates how doing so requires that we respect the rights to life, conscience, and religious freedom as the foundations for human dignity in our health care system.

Are there virtues that constitutively involve using certain concepts? Does it make sense to speak of rights or duties to use certain concepts? And do consequentialist approaches to concepts necessarily have to reproduce the difficulties that plague utilitarianism? These are fundamental orientating questions for the emerging field of conceptual ethics, which invites us to reflect critically about which concepts to use. In this article, I map out and explore the ways in which conceptual ethics might take its cue from virtue-ethical, (...) deontological, and consequentialist traditions of ethical thought, flagging the main difficulties facing each approach. I end by sketching how the various dimensions of evaluation singled out by these three traditions might be combined in a single approach. (shrink)

This paper identifies an overlooked but widespread philosophical view in the animal rights movement, Animal Rights Vanguardism. This is the view that (1) the arc of history, by way of ever-increasing moral awareness, bends towards animal liberation,(2) animal rights activists are aware of the moral truth when it comes to human-animal relations thanks to a moral-epistemic privilege, and (3) the primary moral imperative for animal rights activists is to increase the moral awareness of the masses. The paper then makes four (...) points about Animal Rights Vanguardism: First, it can be found across a wide range of animal rights literature. Second, it is the target of many familiar objections against vegans and animal rights activists. Third, it presents an obstacle to the success of the animal rights movement. Fourth, consciously rejecting it leads to a more compelling philosophy of animal rights activism, termed Critical Animal Rights Collectivism, which is based on the principles that social change is contingent, that everyone has broadly equal access to moral truth, and that activists should focus on collective organization more than on individual persuasion. (shrink)

John Tillson argues, on grounds of children’s well-being, that it is impermissible to teach them religious views. I defend a practice of pluralistically advocating religious views to children. As long as there are no monopolies of influence over children, and as long as advocates do not use coercion, deceit, or manipulation, children can greatly benefit without having their rational abilities subverted, or incurring undue risk to form false beliefs. This solution should counter, to some extent, both perfectionist and antiperfectionist reasons (...) against initiating children into religions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Rights of Women: Reclaiming a Lost Vision by Erika BachiochiAngela KnobelThe Rights of Women: Reclaiming a Lost Vision by Erika Bachiochi (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2021), 422 pp.Erika Bachiochi's The Rights of Women is animated by a clear vision: a vision of men and women as possessors of the same nature and engaged in the same shared enterprise. Men and women possess the (...) same nature because they are rational animals and hence fulfilled by living a life that exhibits the fullness of their rational human nature, and they are engaged in the same enterprise because both naturally pursue the same good: the common good of their families and societies. Bachiochi argues that this Aristotelian and communitarian understanding of the relationship between the sexes was the original vision of feminism: it was the vision of the early feminist Mary [End Page 742] Wollenstonecraft, and likewise the vision that inspired and animated our nation's founding mothers. As feminism's most famous advocates began to adopt the language of the Enlightenment and its incoherent emphasis on "rights," however, Wollenstonecraft's robust and sensible understanding of the right relationship between the sexes was gradually left behind. Modern feminism, Bachiochi argues, needs to reclaim Wollenstonecraft's vision, and has indeed already begun to do so in the communitarian and dignitarian work of Mary Ann Glendon.As is evident from the preceding, there are three distinct claims advanced in Bachiochi's book. First—and this I take to be the overarching thesis of the book—there is a claim about how feminism ought to understand the relationship between the sexes (i.e., in terms of Aristotelian flourishing and natural law). Second, there is the claim that feminism originally did understand the relationship between the sexes in this way. Finally (this is the third thesis), there is the claim that modern feminists have lost this vision, and that the solution to our current woes is to reclaim it. It is important to notice that truth of the first thesis does not depend on the truth of the second or the third, or vice versa. Because the first thesis is to my mind the most interesting and important of the three, it will be the focus of my remarks here. But it is worth making a few brief remarks about the other two theses, if only because so much of the book's content is devoted them.Did early feminists have a clear vision of the right relationship between the sexes, a vision informed by Aristotle and natural law? Did later feminists discard that clear vision? Is Enlightenment philosophy to blame? This is a common narrative, particularly in pro-life circles, and I think there is certainly an element of truth to it. I think Bachiochi rightly recognizes an Aristotelian strain in Wollenstonecraft, and rightly applauds the early feminist advocacy of virtue. What I am not quite ready to accept, though, is the "clear" part of the clear vision. Early feminists subscribed to many admirable views. They also seem to have held some less admirable ones. However laudable her advocacy of virtue and chastity may have been, for instance, Wollenstonecraft seems to have had a very dim view of men (45). Similarly, I found the "voluntary motherhood" movement, which Bachiochi applauds, repellent. If disharmony between the sexes arose from men having too much control over women's sexual lives, harmony will hardly be restored by reversing the equation and instead giving women complete control over sex (109). My own instinct (which this book only reaffirmed) is to think that feminism as a movement has always been a bit confused, has always had some good goals and some that were less so. I think this, in [End Page 743] part, because I am not sure that a coherent "feminism" is possible. I shall say more about this below.Bachiochi's real claim, of course, is that there is a right way to understand men and women, and consequently a right way to be a feminist. But my genuine appreciation for and affirmation of her view of what the right relationship between the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Declaration of Independence:Inalienable Rights, the Creator, and the Political OrderChristopher KaczorPierre Manent puts his finger on numerous problems that arise from an emphasis on human rights that is detached from any consideration of human nature, the Creator, or the traditions that inform human practice. In his book Natural Law and Human Rights: Towards a Recovery of Practical Wisdom, Manent writes: "Let us dwell a moment on the proposition (...) in which so much passion is invested today: man is the being who possesses rights. It resonates as our self-definition and our perspective on humanity, one that we take to have fortunately replaced other definitions and perspectives, such as that man is God's creature or that man is a political animal."1 Contemporary political discourse has arrived, so he thinks, at an impasse of contradiction, incoherence, and self-defeating beliefs.Manent finds a vital help for thinking through these issues in Thomas Aquinas,2 but perhaps also a useful resource is the work of Thomas Jefferson. In Natural Law and Human Rights, Manent cites the first article of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen: "Human beings are born and remain free and equal in rights."3 But Manent does not cite the Declaration of Independence drafted by Jefferson. The 1776 Declaration provides a way of addressing many of Manent's concerns about human rights, human nature, and equality because it combines an appeal to the Creator [End Page 249] with the establishment of rights grounded in human nature and defended by limited government. In order to approach some of the important political, religious, and philosophical questions raised in Natural Law and Human Rights, we can reconsider the famous "American proposition": "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." What exactly does this famous American proposition mean? Can it help us to address some of the concerns about incoherent political discourse that Manent highlights?We Hold These Truths to Be Self-EvidentWhat does "we hold these truths to be self-evident" mean? The interpretation of this phrase has generated no small amount of speculation.4 As Manent notes, appeals to self-evidence arise also today in disputes about same-sex marriage.5 Even if we cannot perfectly trace the remote or proximate historical origins of the phrase in 1776, we might still examine some possible meanings.For John Locke, a self-evident truth is akin to what later philosophers called an analytically true proposition.6 Such propositions are true in virtue of the agreement of the ideas that make up the proposition. "A bachelor is an unmarried man of marriageable age" is self-evidently true, since the idea of "bachelor" agrees with the idea "an unmarried man of marriageable age." It does not seem plausible that the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence were meant in this sense. The assertions of the Declaration are not true simply by agreement of ideas or by definition in a way that is obvious to anyone who is a native speaker.Thomas Reid suggests a different sense of self-evidence. On his view, [End Page 250] self-evidence does not mean obviousness to everyone, but rather clear to those with the requisite education and maturity: "Moral truths... are self-evident to every man whose understanding and moral faculty are ripe."7 If a person is conscious of no moral obligation whatsoever, then reasoning with such a person will not bring the person to understand his or her obligations. Just as mathematical calculations cannot begin without acceptance of basic axioms of mathematics, so too ethical reflection presupposes but does not establish its first principles. As Reid says, "the man who does not by the light of his own mind, perceive some things in conduct to be right, and others to be wrong, is as incapable of reasoning about morals as a blind man is about colours."8 Just as there are people who cannot see colors, so too there are people lacking the requisite moral... (shrink)

This essay investigates the tensions between traditional music and its modern codification as intellectual property. It will begin by considering the myths concerning the divine source of music. In traditional music and in folk music, music is closely connected to religious ritual. In these rituals the source of the music is recognized and attributed to certain deities. For instance, in Thai traditional music, the Wai Khru ceremony venerates the Duriyathep or devatas drawn from Indian mythology: Phra Visawakarm, Phra Panjasinghkorn, and (...) Phra Parakhonthap (Narot). Much of modern and contemporary music has long been disengaged from ritual and its traditional forms of transmission. Especially since the nineteenth century with the growth of popularity of music printing, it has been subject to copyright law. With these restrictions in transmission, the more fluid routes of transmission have become broken and the ritualistic and religious identifications have been transferred to the cult of performers, to legal codification, to the control of corporations, and the construction of new mythologies through marketing. This essay will use Walter Benjamin’s reflections on the loss of “aura” in the reproduced work of art to try to understand the consequences of this transition in the function of music. And it will consider the situation in Thailand where traditional music and mythology stands side by side with marketed music, and traditional performance stands side by side with commercial performance. It will demonstrate that these conflicts cannot be resolved. But it is precisely in the appreciation and preservation of these conflicts, that traditional culture can itself be recognized and preserved. (shrink)

The COVID-19 period caused a lot of suffering globally, as millions lost their lives while others went through the pain of being infected. The introduction of vaccines to minimise chances of infection and death was a welcome development. However, it was also fraught with its own challenges in the area of sexual health and rights of both women and men. Scholarship on gender and religion noted the way women failed to access contraception in a period in which sexual activity had (...) increased as most couples were together for long periods of time. The introduction of vaccines was accompanied by a lot of misinformation. Lack of clarity on the effect of the vaccines on pregnant and lactating mothers caused a lot of anxiety. This was exacerbated by the information that was being circulated on social media platforms that the vaccines would interfere with individuals’ reproductive capacity. Yet African religio-cultural beliefs and practices place so much importance on both women and men’s ability to have children. In fact, one’s respectability in African indigenous societies is greatly linked to their ability to have children. This article seeks to examine the fears of some Zimbabweans to accept COVID-19 vaccines, establishing how these fears were tied to issues of sexual reproductive health and rights. The article focuses on showing how the terrain of sexual health and rights is a sensitive one which called for caution in a COVID-19 context in Zimbabwe. Data for the article were gathered through informal interviews and social media platforms. Contribution: The article makes a significant contribution to the way COVID-19 interfaced with issues to do with SRHR in Zimbabwe. (shrink)

Many believe the existence of a moral right to some good should lead to recognition of a corresponding legal right to that good. If, for instance, there is a moral right to healthcare, it is natural to believe countries should recognize a legal right to healthcare. This article demonstrates that justifying legal rights to healthcare is more difficult than many assume. The existence of a moral right is insufficient to justify recognition of a corresponding justiciable constitutional right. Further conditions on (...) when it is appropriate to recognize constitutional rights are rarely satisfied in the healthcare case. And focusing on aspirational or statutory rights presents costs for those seeking to justify legal rights on the basis of corresponding moral ones while maintaining empirical challenges for justifying constitutional rights. This suggests movement from a moral right to a corresponding legal one is far from straightforward and justifies examining alternative means of realizing moral socio‐economic rights such as the proposed moral right to healthcare. (shrink)

In this chapter, Eileen M. Hunt reveals new intellectual ties between Bentham and Benthamite thought and the political ideals of Wollstonecraft and Shelley, who theorized the relationship between women’s misery and women’s rights in British international thought from the end of the eighteenth century through the first few decades of the nineteenth century. Hunt argues that Wollstonecraft’s political ideas influenced her daughter Mary Shelley, leading her to develop a critique of Malthusian and Benthamite views on misery and population control that (...) inscribed new political and feminist arguments into the global reception of British international thought. (shrink)

Since 2022, the EU, US, and other nations have imposed medical sanctions on Russia to block the export of pharmaceuticals and medical devices and curtail clinical trials to degrade Russia’s military capabilities. While international law proscribes sanctions that cause a humanitarian crisis, an outcome averted in Russia, the military effects of medical sanctions have been lean. Strengthening medical sanctions risks violating noncombatant and combatant rights to healthcare. Each group’s claim is different. Noncombatants and severely injured soldiers who cannot return to (...) duty enjoy the right to adequate health care that sanctions cannot undermine. Combatants falling captive enjoy the same medical care that adversaries provide their own troops. Combatants yet to renounce hostilities, however, have no claim to medical attention and remain subject to sanctions. Nevertheless, medical sanctions prove unworkable in this complex environment of conflicting rights and command no place in a sustainable sanction regime. (shrink)

Rising temperatures, increased frequency and intensity of storms, and other extreme climate events clearly indicate that we are living in an era of dramatic climate change. The impacts of pollution...

The right to self‐defense has played a major role in objections to gun regulation. Many contend that gun regulations threaten this right. While much philosophical discussion has focused on the relation between guns and this right, less attention has been paid to the argument for the right of self‐defense itself. In this article, I examine this argument. Gunrights defenders contend that the right of self‐defense is needed to explain why interferences in self‐defense are wrong. I propose an alternative explanation for (...) such wrongs, one which does not posit the existence of a self‐defense right, and then show how it undermines their claim that there exists a strong presumption against gun regulation. I conclude by articulating the implications of this alternative explanatory account for other rights. (shrink)

This article examines the idea of mind-reading technology by focusing on an interesting case of applying a large language model (LLM) to brain data. On the face of it, experimental results appear to show that it is possible to reconstruct mental contents directly from brain data by processing via a chatGPT-like LLM. However, the author argues that this apparent conclusion is not warranted. Through examining how LLMs work, it is shown that they are importantly different from natural language. The former (...) operates on the basis of nonrational data transformations based on a large textual corpus. The latter has a rational dimension, being based on reasons. Using this as a basis, it is argued that brain data does not directly reveal mental content, but can be processed to ground predictions indirectly about mental content. The author concludes that this is impressive but different in principle from technology-mediated mind reading. The applications of LLM-based brain data processing are nevertheless promising for speech rehabilitation or novel communication methods. (shrink)

How should we think about public rioting for political ends? Might it ever be more than morally excusable behavior? In this essay, I show how political rioting can sometimes be positively morally justified as an intermediate defensive harm in between civilly disobedient protest and political revolution. I do so by reading political rioters as, at the same time, uncivil and ultimately conciliatory with their state. Unlike civilly disobedient protestors, political rioters express a lack of faith in the value or applicability (...) of civility in interacting with the state under the political status quo. But unlike political revolutionaries who aim at separation from the state, political rioters paradigmatically seek fuller inclusion within it. By rejecting even the appearance of compliance with the political status quo’s systems of justice, political rioters can create a unique venue for systemically marginalized citizens to express warranted disrespect for the state that maintains them in ongoing subjection, as well as their inviolable respect for themselves as persons with dignity beyond the boundaries of civility. (shrink)

Land is a constitutional issue in Ethiopia. Article 40 of the FDRE constitution enshrines governing provisions about rural and urban land. Legislation power is given to the federal government (Article 51(5) of the constitution) although this power can be delegated to regions (Article 50(9) of the same constitution). In contrast, administration power is allocated to regions (Article 52 (2(d)) of the constitution). The federal government has enacted the Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation 456/2005. Both federal and regional land laws (...) have Alternative Dispute Resolution clauses. However, the opportunities and challenges of these clauses from the access to justice perspective are not studied very well. The main objective of this paper is to assess the legal framework and practice of ADR mechanisms in the rural land administration system from the access to justice perspective and come up with a policy option. Doctrinal type of legal research is applied where it involves theory testing which deals with studying existing laws (both federal and regional laws). In addition, both primary and secondary sources have been used. Primary qualitative data was collected through semi-structured interviews. The study found that there are legal constraints. One significant legal constraint is the requirement for mandatory mediation in certain regional states before seeking recourse in a court of law. Mediation is not clearly and uniformly applied per the law and in practice (often the practice and legal framework confuse mediation with arbitration, inappropriately giving decision-making powers to mediators, and turning them into arbiters). Women and Vulnerable Groups are generally more negatively affected by the overreaching of mediators into decision-making, because the mediators are more easily influenced by the party opposing women and Vulnerable Groups, and/or the mediators are culturally biased. This study recommends that mediation should be made optional, where mediators are chosen by the parties and the legal framework is clear that the role of the mediators does not involve imposing decisions. For Oromia and SNNPR, the legal regime of mediation should be clarified to avoid confusion with the arbitration. It is necessary to train community-level mediators in the law and the protection of land rights of Vulnerable Groups against gender discrimination. (shrink)