Plato: Ethics

La presente tesis doctoral se suma al proyecto general del grupo de investigación “Eidos: Hermenèutica, Platonisme i Modernitat”, ofreciendo una nueva lectura e interpretación del diálogo platónico Fedro. La tesis se divide en tres apartados. El primero, que sirve de introducción, establece los objetivos principales de la tesis y el método de trabajo que hemos seguido; además, ofrece toda una serie de consideraciones generales sobre el texto, como su autenticidad, su fecha de composición, una caracterización general de sus personajes y (...) su fecha de acción dramática. El segundo es con diferencia el más extenso de todos y constituye propiamente el núcleo de la tesis. A lo largo de sus once sub-apartados se ofrece una lectura pormenorizada del diálogo, en la que discutimos con algunas de las interpretaciones más relevantes y ofrecemos luz sobre los problemas más sustantivos del diálogo. Por una parte, se analizan las diferentes partes del diálogo, como la escena inicial, cada uno de los tres discursos eróticos, y la discusión posterior sobre la retórica tradicional, la dialéctica y la escritura; por otra, se trata de ofrecer una visión general de cómo se unen entre sí las distintas partes del diálogo y en qué sentido unas derivan de las otras. Esta manera de proceder nos ha permitido encontrar la controvertida unidad dramática y temática del diálogo: de un lado, la segunda parte del diálogo se muestra como una continuación necesaria de la primera; de otro, los temas del amor, el alma, la retórica tradicional y la dialéctica aparecen como diferentes aspectos a tratar para resolver el problema que Platón presenta en la escena inicial del diálogo a través de la figura de Fedro. Por último, el tercer apartado recoge de manera sintética las principales conclusiones del análisis llevado a cabo en desarrollo de la tesis. En él subrayamos el carácter unitario del diálogo y la relevancia capital que tiene la correcta comprensión de esta obra para la consideración de la naturaleza de las obras de Platón en general. (shrink)

In Plato’s Republic, Socrates argues that in the ideal city women and men in the guardian class should receive the same education (451e–52a, 456d–57a) and do the same work (453b–56b); indeed, Socrates emphasizes that the highest office in the ideal city, of philosopher-rulers, will include philosopher-queens and not just philosopher-kings (540c). Socrates’ conclusions might be thought to recognize equality as a value, but in this chapter, we argue that the basis for assigning men and women the same work is a (...) judgment of sameness in nature: with respect to civic contribution, women’s nature is the same as men’s, although on the whole inferior. Fundamentally, the judgment that women and men ought to do the same work irrespective of sex is a method of collecting and dividing kinds according to nature, so that the “ought” is scientific rather than moral. (shrink)

El presente artículo defiende que Platón bromea cuando su Sócrates afirma estar inspirado o bajo posesión divina en Fedro 238d y Crátilo 396d. Para ello, primero se sitúan en contexto ambos pasajes; a continuación, se muestra que a lo largo de todo el corpus Platón contrapone el conocimiento y el arte (τέχνη) al falso saber y a la inspiración (ἐνθουσιασμός); en tercer y cuarto lugar respectivamente, leemos los pasajes en cuestión en función de esta contraposición, para mostrar que hay que (...) desconfiar de cuanto dice Sócrates cuando burlonamente afirma estar inspirado. (shrink)

The critique of the poetry in Plato’s Ion unfolds in a clearly political context in which, in contrast to the old model of knowledge represented by poetry, Plato presents a new model, identified with philosophy, which questions the legitimacy of poets and rhapsodists as competent guides of the polis and citizens. In this critique, the characters and dramatic elements of dialogue are fundamental. Thus in Ion and Socrates the Athenian philosopher brings together all the characteristics that describe a real rhapsodist (...) of that time as well as the philosophical activity of the historical Socrates. (shrink)

Plato’s Phaedrus is a dialogue in which rhetoric is not only discussed, but also displayed. The first half of the plot depicts a rhetorical contest in which Socrates himself offers two opposite speeches on love, a kind of dissoi logoi. The current paper tries to explain that the second half of the dialogue offers the necessary keys to understand that for Plato true rhetoric is nothing but dialectic and that beyond the apparent antilogic exercise carried out by Socrates there can (...) be found philosopher’s dialectical practice itself. Last but not least, the article defends that dialectic does not necessarily deal with Forms. (shrink)

The current article offers a new reading of Socrates’ prayer to Pan in Plato’s Phaedrus. By means of a comprehensive approach, the paper shows that the prayer not only gathers together the most relevant topics dealt with during the conversation but it also exhorts us to engage in the way of life depicted by Socrates’ character, namely that of philosophy, which can be clearly distinguished from that of traditional rhetoric. To this extent, eros and logos, two elements closely related to (...) Pan, show themselves to be of primary relevance. Besides these issues, we discuss the puzzling nature of the prayer, defending the idea that it was authored with the same writing method as the full dialogue. Socrates’ psychagogic attempt with Phaedrus is analogous to Plato’s didactic effort to engage the reader in philosophy: instead of supplying a straight message which must be learnt by heart by Phaedrus or the reader, both Socrates and Plato offer friendly logoi intended to promote active research in the receivers. (shrink)

A growing number of scholars have seen that the Republic’s division of goods includes goods which possess value δι᾽ αὑτό in virtue of some of their causal effects. Building on this, I argue that goods, including justice, which are valuable διὰ τὰ γιγνόµενα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ (and whose effects can contribute to the value a good has δι᾽ αὑτό) are so in virtue of a limited class of beneficial effects: those that depend on the recognition of other agents. This way of (...) dividing goods explains why Socrates legitimately invokes some effects of justice in his demonstration that justice is valuable δι᾽ αὑτό. (shrink)

El presente artículo contiene una lectura cruzada del Fedro y el Crátilo en la que se aclaran algunos de sus ejes temáticos centrales con el fin de sacar a relucir las constantes del pensamiento platónico que ambos diálogos comparten. La descripción de la dialéctica presente en el Fedro encaja con una definición socrática del Crátilo que explicita que el nombre es un instrumento al servicio del dialéctico. Todo ello nos lleva a concluir que la técnica dialéctica, además de constituir el (...) principal mecanismo regulador de la oratoria, se postula en los diálogos platónicos como un procedimiento de corrección que permite validar cualquier tipo de proposición y aproximar a la verdad los más variados discursos y representaciones de la realidad. Abstract: The current paper contains a comparative reading of the Phaedrus and the Cratylus. Some of their central topics are here contrasted in order to highlight the characteristic traits of Platonic thought present in both dialogues. The description of dialectic in the Phaedrus fits well with a Socratic definition in the Cratylus which clearly specifies that names are tools at the service of the dialectician. This evidence leads us to the conclusion that -besides being the main mechanism to control and judge rhetoric- dialectical technic appears in the dialogues as the only correcting procedure that makes it possible to verify any sort of proposition and bring speeches and depictions of reality closer to the truth. (shrink)

In this article, I make the case for the continued relevance of Plato’s Timaeus. I begin by sketching Allan Bloom’s picture of the natural sciences today in The Closing of the American Mind, according to which the natural sciences are, objectionably, increasingly specialized and have ejected humans qua humans from their purview. I argue that Plato’s Timaeus, despite the falsity of virtually all of its scientific claims, provides a model for how we can pursue scientific questions in a comprehensive way (...) that stresses their connections to other disciplines, including the humanities, and that puts humanity qua humanity back in the picture. I then argue that being led by Plato’s philosophy to return humanity conceptually to the natural world can improve our thinking regarding climate change and other important environmental crises. (shrink)

This paper proposes a unified reading of pleasure's nature and value in Plato's _Philebus_. It also explains how the proposed reading illuminates certain claims about pleasure across the corpus that initially seem to be in some tension: (i) that pleasure is not the good; (ii) that pleasure is choiceworthy and an aspect of the best human life; and (iii) that pleasure is dangerous and tends to make us into bad people who live badly.

What makes a good leader? This paper takes Socrates in Plato’s early dialogues as the starting point for developing three leadership skills that are still relevant today: being on a mission, thinking in questions, and thinking like a beginner. I arrive at these Socratic leadership skills through an interdisciplinary approach to Plato’s early dialogues that puts Socrates in conversation with a diversity of thinkers: modern-day business leaders and leadership coaches, educators, Zen Buddhists, and art historians. I show that Socratic leadership (...) skills are valued in today’s business world, and I propose concrete exercises that can help anyone acquire these skills. In contrast to Platonic leadership—the leadership skills of the philosopher king—Socratic leadership skills have not been the focus of much investigation. This paper aims to advance a scholarly conversation about Socrates as a leadership model. (shrink)

This paper reevaluates the role of Adeimantus in Book 2 of Plato's Republic, arguing that his challenge to Socrates' view of justice—specifically, his interest in the influence of the outer world on our inner lives—serves a crucial yet underappreciated purpose in initiating the political project of the work. I suggest that it's due to Adeimantus' contribution in the Republic that Plato's wide-ranging inquiry into issues in ethics, politics, psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics hangs together as an integrated whole. A further benefit (...) of this reevaluation, I argue, is the way it illuminates Plato's assessment of poetry in the dialogue. This paper was delivered this past year as part of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy. Comments are welcome but please do not cite without permission. (shrink)

The Gorgias ends with Socrates telling an eschatological myth that he insists is a rational account and no mere tale. Using this story, Socrates reasserts the central lessons of the previous discussion. However, it isn’t clear how this story can persuade any of the characters in the dialogue. Those (such as Socrates) who already believe the underlying philosophical lessons don’t appear to require the myth, and those (such as Callicles) who reject these teachings are unlikely to be moved by this (...) far-fetched tale. This raises the question of who the myth is told for and what function it is meant to serve. This chapter argues that the myth is aimed, not at Callicles, but Socrates and those who aspire to follow him. There are uncertainties about the philosophical life that are due to the nature of embodiment, as well as reasons to doubt the connection between happiness and virtue. The myth assists with the former by presenting an image that draws a philosopher away from the goods of the body toward the goods of the soul. The story assists with the latter by presenting an image of cosmic justice, thereby securing happiness in proportion to virtue. (shrink)

Since antiquity, scholars have observed a structural tension within Plato’s Phaedrus. The dialogue demands order in every linguistic composition, yet it presents itself as a disordered composition. Accordingly, one of the key problems of the Phaedrus is determining which—if any—aspect of the dialogue can supply a unifying thread for the dialogue’s major themes (love, rhetoric, writing, myth, philosophy, etc.). My dissertation argues that “soul-leading” (psuchagōgia)—a rare and ambiguous term used to define the innate power of words—resolves the dialogue’s structural tension. (...) I clarify the conceptual and dramatic features of soul-leading by focusing on the dialogue’s uniquely prevalent use of the semantic network of “leading” and “following.” By continuing to foreground the language and drama of leading and following, I offer a new interpretation of the dialogue as a whole: the Phaedrus is Plato’s articulation of how the soul can be led into communion with reality. Chapter 1 discusses scholarly disputes about the unity of the Phaedrus and proposes that soul-leading adequately satisfies the criteria put forward for what would count as a unifying element. I argue that soul-leading unifies the dialogue both thematically and non-thematically; moreover, soul-leading is a theme capacious enough to account for the other principal contenders for unity put forward. Chapter 2 develops the ambiguous character of soul-leading by examining how the dialogue showcases dangerous forms thereof. Love and language are dangerous when they lead the soul toward goods which can never truly fulfill it. In order to clarify how love and language can mislead the soul, Socrates develops a set of accounts of how the soul is led, both internally and externally, in the three speeches on love. If the soul is to be led into communion with reality (the proper end of soul-leading), it must be led internally by the right part of the soul and externally by the right object of desire. Chapter 3 argues that all souls can, in principle, be harmonized and directed in the way that Chapter 2 requires. I show that Plato’s view of philosophy is neither elitist (i.e., some are intrinsically incapable of philosophy) nor naively essentialist. All can come into communion with reality because all are by nature equipped to do so. While Plato recognizes that there are forces which tend to prohibit one from exercising one’s capability of being rightly led, none of them are intrinsic to human nature. Chapter 4 argues that successful soul-leading require neither the leader nor the follower to be already well-disposed to what’s ultimate in order for the pair to come to a communion with what’s ultimate. Plato’s depiction of soul-leading love shows that love can itself promote the formation needed for both leader and follower to come into contact with reality. Love can do so because it is always already bound up reality in its responsiveness to beauty. Beauty itself calls the lover to itself by shining through the beautiful beloved, who acts as a reminder of transcendent Beauty. The lover mediates this same experience for the beloved. Each comes to desire the other as well as Beauty itself. Chapter 5 argues that the drama of the lovers’ formation mythically depicted in the Palinode (Chapter 4) is written into the drama of the dialogue as a whole. In the relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus, we see an enactment of love’s formative role. Likewise, in the relationship between Phaedrus and Lysias, we see an enactment of the dangerous soul-leading discussed in Chapter 2. My focus on leading and following also allows me to show the thematic significance of the drama’s setting. Chapter 6 articulates the metaphysical conditions under which one can be led into communion with reality. Transcendent Beauty invites us into communion with itself and makes possible our ascent by providing us with divine guides and images which can transport us from our ordinary experiences to the true beings. Beauty accomplishes its work—leading us in a “divine dance” where we follow the gods up to Beauty and back down to each other—through images. When we handle images of reality rightly, they lead our souls into communion with reality. Further, when we have come into communion, we’ll be inspired to be co-workers of Beauty’s soul-leading work. When we articulate reality in language, we create new images that can serve to lead others toward reality. (shrink)

In recent years, St. Augustine’s Press and Ignatius Press have been a fruitful hub for translating into English the works of German philosopher Josef Pieper (1904–1997). Pieper’s engagement with Plato is known in the English-speaking world through his short Divine Madness: Plato’s Case against Secular Humanism (Ignatius Press, 1995) and The Platonic Myths (St. Augustine’s Press, 2011). In 2018 St. Augustine’s Press published Dan Farrelly’s translation of Pieper’s Kümmert Euch nicht um Sokrates (1966), a German text initially composed as a (...) television play for Bavarian Radio between 1962 and 1967, and as radio plays for Studio Bern in 1966. Under the English title Don’t Worry about Socrates, Pieper’s text introduces a version, not translation, of Plato’s dialogues Gorgias, Symposium, and Phaedo. (shrink)

The relation of philosophy to democracy remains at the center of attention in Oda Tvedt’s essay, ”Philosophy, Democracy and Poverty: The philosopher as political agent in the Apology of Plato”. Tvedt argues that the role of the philosopher as Socrates presents it in this work is first and foremost to be an agent of subversive political activity, and she finds support for this view of the philosopher’s role in other works of Plato as well as within the Apology itself. She (...) holds that the poverty of Socrates is a vital clue to the understanding of the philosopher as a political figure in this dialogue. Taking a cue from Alain Badiou, and regarding justice as the political equivalent of truth, Tvedt investigates the relationship between democracy and philosophy in order to understand the connection between life and teachings for Plato’s Socrates. That Socrates chooses to abstain from the traditional political arenas points, Tvedt argues, toward a distinction in Plato’s political thought: the distinction between the private and the public realm, which in some ways corresponds to the distinction between the individual and the masses, and sheds light on what Plato’s criticism of the political realm really entails. (shrink)

Ignorance is commonly assumed to be a lack of knowledge in Plato’s Socratic dialogues. I challenge that assumption. In the Protagoras, ignorance is conceived to be a substantive, structural psychic flaw—the soul’s domination by inferior elements that are by nature fit to be ruled. Ignorant people are characterized by both false beliefs about evaluative matters in specific situations and an enduring deception about their own psychic conditions. On my interpretation, akrasia, moral vices, and epistemic vices are products or forms of (...) ignorance, and a person who lacks knowledge is not necessarily ignorant. (shrink)

The main idea of this allegory is the difference between people who simply experience their sensory experiences, and call that knowledge, and those who understand real knowledge by seeing the truth. The allegory actually digs into some deep philosophy, which is not surprising since it comes from Plato. Its main idea is the discussion of how humans perceive reality and if human existence has a higher truth. It explores the theme of belief versus knowledge. The Perception Plato theorizes that the (...) group of people tied up in the cave would assume that the shadows they see on the wall are reality. Plato's theory further states that the echoing sounds the prisoners hear are perceived as reality. This false reality is all that the people in the cave know. They have no true knowledge of the real world. However, they fully believe that what they see on the cave wall is reality, and even try to name the shadows they see passing by. Plato's cave allegory further proposes that one of the prisoners escapes or gains freedom from the cave. The freed prisoner moves toward the fire, which temporarily blinds him. As he gains his eyesight and moves into the real world, he gains a greater sense of reality. (shrink)

The just person controls his appetites by virtue of an alliance between his rational and spirited parts: while the first determines the object of the action, the second gives stability and strength to the prescription of reason. This essay aims to show that the spirited part can give strength to reason’s orders, only if it also receives value (i.e. the restoration of the individual’s damaged image). From this, I argue that the spirited part (i) always takes the side of reason (...) in the conflict with appetites (as enemies of the individual’s freedom) and, nevertheless, (ii) it can oppose [to] reason when the appetitive part is not at stake (and the claim of restoration, i.e. revenge, is repressed by reason). (shrink)

Seit Dodds’ Anwendung des Begriffs „Schamkultur“ auf die griechische Kultur genießt das Thema Scham die besondere Aufmerksamkeit der Gräzisten. Basierend auf einer detaillierten Analyse der relevanten Belegstellen im gesamten platonischen Corpus und einer kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit den vorherigen einschlägigen Forschungen, versucht die vorliegende Arbeit Platons Konzeption der Scham systematisch zu erläutern, und zwar thematisch unter den folgenden vier Perspektiven: dem sokratischen elenchos, der Wahrheitsliebe, dem Moralverständnis sowie der Moralerziehung im Staat. Die Studie zielt einerseits darauf ab, aufzuzeigen, dass Platons Verständnis (...) von Scham nicht so unreif ist, wie man bislang dachte; andererseits möchte sie vor Augen führen, dass Platon Scham nicht, wie traditionell angenommen, als nur negativ erachtet, sondern ihre positive Rolle in verschiedenen Gebieten durchaus anerkennt. Es wird gezeigt, dass Scham und die ihr verwandten Emotionen von Bedeutung sowohl für den platonischen Sokrates als auch für die platonische Philosophie im Ganzen sind, auch wenn der Begriff „Schamkultur“ wohl keine zutreffende Bezeichnung für seine Zeit darstellt. (shrink)

This paper concerns Plato’s characterization of the body as the soul’s tool. I take perception as an example of the body’s usefulness. I explore the Timaeus’ view that perception provides us with models of orderliness. Then, I argue that perception of confusing sensible objects is necessary for our cognitive development too. Lastly, I consider the instrumentality relationship more generally and its place in Plato’s teleological worldview.

The aim of this article is to explore Gadamer’s early reflections on Plato’s utopian thought and its potential topicality. In the following section, I will show how areté, understood as a hermeneutical and existential virtue, is dialectically related to ethics and politics in Gadamer’s phenomenological reception of Plato’s philosophy. I argue that, in Gadamer’s eyes, Socratic-Platonic self-understanding enables human beings to be aware of their political responsibilities, to recognize how they are existentially and mutually related to the other, and to (...) clarify dialectically their own existential possibilities in order to transcend their inherited world of values. In the third section, I aim to show how these are the grounds on which Gadamer’s initial thoughts on the utopian dimension of Platonic political philosophy developed, mainly through his further critical account of the works on the German “political Plato” published in Germany between 1927 and 1933, i.e., Kurt Singer’s Platon, der Gründer (1927), Julius Stenzel’s Platon. Der Erzieher (1928), and Kurt von Hildendrandt‘s Platon, Der Kampf des Geistes um die Macht (1933). Then, in the fourth section, I will express my own views on the relevance of reconsidering how the notions of areté, phrónesis, and andreía are already related in Plato’s dialogues, complementing the insights on Gadamer’s interpretation of areté in section two. My purpose is to go beyond Gadamer’s reading and provide us with a more solid ground to address his late reflections on political courage and its relations with his dialectical understanding of Platonic utopia as a myth. Therefore, I will explore the problem of civil disobedience, a topic that was actually not at the centre of Gadamer’s concerns, as a genuine mode of utopian political action which can enact a true deviation from the sophistic pólis and its understanding of power. Finally, in the conclusion, I will characterize Gadamer’s portrait of Platonic utopia as a dialectical myth which enables human beings to recognize when politics are being reduced to mere power abuse by the State and also suggest why Gadamer’s approach to utopias is still relevant today. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the moral psychology of the Phaedo and argue that the philosophical life in this dialogue is a temperate life, and that temperance consists in exercising epistemic discernment by actively withdrawing assent from incorrect evaluations the body inclines us to make. Philosophers deal with bodily affections by taking a correct epistemic stance. Exercising temperance thus understood is a necessary condition both for developing and strengthening rational capacities, and for fixing accurate beliefs about value. The purification philosophers (...) strive for, and the purifying role of philosophy, should then be understood as a clarificatory act consisting in making one’s thoughts clear and withdrawing assent from erroneous evaluative content in our desires and pleasures. Along the way, I argue that philosophers must neither avoid situations and activities that cause bodily affections as much as possible, nor ignore or care little about them. (shrink)

In Classical Greece, the philosophical consideration of human love reaches unimagined heights in the Platonic Dialogues. Eros is described both as the uniting force of Ancient Medicine and pre-Socratic Cosmology, and as the sacred impulse towards the Beautiful and the Good, towards the perfection of the Divine. The reflection of the Greek Patristic authors assimilates this concept of love and its Peripatetic, Stoic and Neoplatonic variations, but seriously rethinks some of their implications. The Judeo-Christian view of human and divine love, (...) expressed in the Song of Songs, the Johannine writings and the Pauline Epistles, leads the Fathers to question some of the aspects of Ancient Ethics: a certain theory of individualistic autonomy, the absolute predominance of the intellect and theory of Fate. By the end of the Fourth Century, Gregory of Nyssa coined the phrase ‘Ríza katà tèn agápen’ (root of love) to express the fullness of the virtuous and mystical life. This life is enhanced, according to Nyssen, not only by an endogenous and necessary movement towards perfection, but also and primarily by the interpersonal dynamics of love, of the gift and the free response. Augustine also uses the notion of radix dilectionis as an evolution of his own ethical theory in the early decades of the Fifth Century, in the midst of his disputes with Donatists and Pelagians. Written between 413 and 418, the Tractatus in epistolam Ioannis is one of the most celebrated treatises on love in the Latin Patristic tradition. Augustine redefines the concept of Moral Goodness in the context of a personal encounter of the human and the Divine, as a fruit that emerges from the inner root of love. (shrink)

Protagoras’ Grand Speech is traditionally considered to articulate a contractualist approach to political existence and morality. There is, however, a newly emerging line of interpretation among scholars, which explores a naturalist layer in Protagoras’ ethical and political thought. This article aims to make a contribution to this new way of reading Protagoras’ speech, by discussing one of its most elaborate versions.

In the present article, we attempt to elucidate the conceptual rela- tionship between censorship and emotional development. We employ a framework from emotion regulation studies in order to clarify how censorship works and to ex- plain why it cannot affect emotional development in the same way as the remaining types of emotional regulation. Nevertheless, we argue that, by focusing on Plato’s ac- count of censorship, and specifically of its sociocultural function, one can find that it is not a useless device (...) for emotional development. Censorship affects relevant variables in the dynamics of contraposed emotional processes that compete for dominance. (shrink)

Among the educative games of Plato’s Cretan city, choral performances have a prominent role. This paper examines the function of play (παιδιά) in the choral education in virtue in Plato’s Laws. I reconstruct the notion of play as it is elaborated throughout this dialogue, and then show how it contributes to solving the problem of virtue acquisition in the Athenian’s account of moral education through songs and dances. I argue that play in the Laws is best understood an imitative activity (...) that is intrinsically pleasurable, ordered by rules and patterns of repetition, and undertaken for its own sake by a player whose psychic condition is childish. Thus interpreted, we are in a better position to see why choruses must be engaged in playfully. Because the self-likening (ὁμοίωσις) process choral performances aim at requires pleasure and because pleasure normally obtains when there is a concordance between one’s character and the imitations, virtue acquisition is best secured if the imitations of virtue in choruses are performed playfully. (shrink)

O artigo busca apresentar as relações entre as exigências de cuidado-da-alma e a necessidade do conhecimento-de-si presentes no diálogo platônico Primeiro Alcibíades, indicando a forte ligação de tal aperfeiçoamento de si com o da pólis. Também as dimensões erótica, teológica, ética e política se encontram firmemente unidas no diálogo, visto que a formação do homem político exige o vínculo entre discípulo e mestre, sendo este o guia em direção ao reconhecimento da divindade, pois conhecer-se significa, ao final, conhecer a alma (...) e, na alma, o deus. A alma assim formada saberá conduzir-se como se deve, e será capaz de governar a si e à cidade. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to provide a philosophical conceptual framework to understand the theoretical roots and political implications of the interpretations of Plato’s work in Jaeger’s Third Humanism and Krieck’s völkisch-racist pedagogy and anthropology. This article will seek to characterize, as figures of localitas, their conceptions of the individual, community, corporeality, identity, and the State that both authors developed departing from Platonic political philosophy. My main hypothesis is that Jaeger’s and Krieck’s interpretations of Platonic paideía shared several core-elements (...) based on a modern conception of State sovereignty and human will, whose fundamental ground is the subjectivist-technical metaphysics. The “production” of a human type (spiritual and/or racial) and a unitary State political community appears in both authors mediated by a theory of political education, that I define as «State typohumanism», that sought its sustenance in Plato’s political philosophy, mainly by means of a distorted understanding of the notions of týpos and ē̂thos, and that, I argue, played a key role in the intellectual legitimization of völkisch-racism. This would be broadly translated into a programmatic and literal understanding of the Platonic Republic which assumes that the inherent function of any State is to produce subjectivities based on national identities grounded on homogeneous characteristics. In these varied characterizations similar appropriations of humanitas have been expressed both in Jaeger and in Krieck. (shrink)

A significant strand of the ethical psychology, aesthetics and politics of Plato's Republic revolves around the concept of poikilia, ‘fascinating variety’. Plato uses the concept to caution against harmful appetitive pleasures purveyed by democracy and such artistic or cultural practices as mimetic poetry. His aim, this article shows, is to contest a prominent conceptual connection between poikilia and beauty (kallos, to kalon). Exploiting tensions in the archaic and classical Greek concept, Plato associates poikilia with dangerous pleasures to redirect admiration toward (...) a distinctly philosophical pursuit of the nature of beauty. This is to displace a prominent and problematic cultural sensibility—the aesthetics of poikilia—not to deny that fascinating variety, even in mimetic poetry, may be beautiful. Rather, Plato's cultural critique lays bare an epistemological problem in the ethical psychology of beauty: since they cannot be distinguished from what seems beautiful, how should one respond to fascinating yet dangerous attractions? (shrink)

At the end of the Meno, Socrates suggests that genuine virtue is knowledge. This is surprising because he has recently concluded that virtue is true opinion. I show that Socrates’ new position is motivated by two commitments. First, that being virtuous requires being responsible for the correctness of one’s actions. Second, that only a knower has this kind of ownership of action. An implication of my argument is that, despite his emphasis on virtuous action in the Meno, Socrates endorses an (...) agent-centred ethics. He thinks the epistemic status of the agent is essential to the assessment of her goodness. (shrink)

The book "Theory of Forms: The Construction of Plato and Aristotle’s Criticism" focuses on two main aspects, construction and criticism. The constriction of Forms theory is the basis on which Plato built all of his philosophy and which influenced all forms of ideas philosophy that emerged after Plato. The research topic was completed by adding Aristotle's critique of the theory of Forms in order to put a clear picture in front of the reader, which was presented by Plato himself and (...) Aristotle's criticism of this theory. -/- Therefore, the book consists four chapters, the first chapter covers the following topics; The philosophical roots of Plato's theory of Forms, The numbers in the Pythagorean school, The Heraclitus' idea of change, Anaxagoras’ idea of Mind, Sophists. Chapter two, Plato's theory of Forms. Definitions of the Forms. The importance of the Forms, The existential and logical significance, Evidence of Forms, Evidence that knowledge is remembering. Chapter Three, Forms and Levels of Knowledge, Dialectic ,Inferential knowledge, Mental knowledge The fourth chapter, The nature of the Forms existence and its being Causes. Forms as numbers and their relationship to movement. The problem of Participation. The final Evaluation of Forms. (shrink)

This paper extracts and articulates the account of normativity in Plato’s Philebus. Central to this account is the concept of measure, which plays both an ontological and a normative role. With regard to the former, measure is what makes particular things to be the specific kind of thing they are; with regard to the latter, measure supplies the appropriate standard for determining whether or not those things are good or bad instances of their kind. As a result of measure playing (...) these two roles, normative evaluation is grounded in the ontological structure of the thing being evaluated. (shrink)

I argue that the arguments presented in Socrates’ dialogue with the personified Laws of the Crito are arguments Socrates endorses and relies upon when deciding to remain in prison. They do not, however, entail blind obedience to every court verdict, nor do they provide necessary and sufficient conditions for resolving every dilemma of civil disobedience. Indeed, lacking definitional knowledge of justice, we should not expect Socrates to be able to offer such conditions. Instead, the Laws present an argument that is (...) sufficient for resolving Socrates’ specific dilemma, showing us how Socrates can deliberate and act despite his lack of knowledge. (shrink)

The question of justice in Western philosophy finds its humble beginnings in the interplay of life and death. I am referring here to Plato’s Apology. The Apology is not only a text tracing the fate of the great philosopher Socrates by recounting his final speech before the judges of Athens, but it is also a text that, on a more subtle level, announces the advent of a promising justice that is birthed from death, or, to be more precise, from a (...) specific kind of death. Socrates, here, develops a justice that does not surge from the defence of one’s determination as a singular accused, or from the reconciliation of the criminal singularity into the ethical social body through pardon or punishment, but which rather derives from a negation, a radical annihilation of the category of pure singularity. Socrates does not defend himself as an accused who is determinately and definitively singular, but rather affirms the fact that, in some sense, there is no such singular to be defended, that he is not even one (οὐδείς), less than one, nothing. It is, precisely, in this affirmation of a negative, in this opening of a chasm, that a radically other conception of justice and its relation to the singular is subtly proposed. By pushing the singular to the margins of its possibility, by challenging, bending, pushing the question of the singular and its defence to its outmost limit, Socrates redeploys justice not as a remedying balance, but as the abysmal economy of the bottomless question, a fall into the void, in which life, death, the singular and justice co-incide to burst all definitive determination, substantial opposition and the possibility of establishing a firm ground for any such categories to hold as such. In gradually shedding off the substantial presuppositions of his singularity (knowledge, self-relation and relation to others), he unleashes a modality of the singular which deploys a kind of justice, a wholly other justice, which has shaken the tradition ever since, and, as this article will seek to show, reverberates again in what Jacques Derrida called deconstruction. (shrink)