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  1. Farewell to arms? The all-or-nothing problem again.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    Joe Horton’s all-or-nothing problem concerns a situation in which it is morally permissible to do nothing and to save two people but not to save only one. This description seems to entail that we should do nothing rather than save only one. I object to Horton’s solution and challenge a principle he draws attention to, which is required to generate the problem but which Horton regards as beyond dispute.
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  2. Note: an adult version of the all-or-nothing problem.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    I present an example in which the all-or-nothing problem involves adults, rather than children in danger.
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  3. The flowchart solution to the all-or-nothing problem.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    This paper presents what I call “the flowchart solution” to Joe Horton’s all-or-nothing problem. Rather than three options – don’t save any child, save one, or save two – there is a flowchart with a choice of don’t save or save, and then within save, save one or save two.
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  4. A compensatory solution to the all-or-nothing problem.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    The all-or-nothing problem, formulated by Joe Horton, presents us with a situation in which you can do nothing or save one child or save two. It is dangerous to save any, making doing nothing morally permissible, but there is no extra danger in saving two, so it seems wrong to just save one. But then doing nothing is morally better than saving one. I present a solution in response to this problematic result, which is that doing nothing is not an (...)
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  5. A metaphysical solution to the all-or-nothing problem.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    In this paper, I present a metaphysical solution to the all-or-nothing problem, which rejects the description of the choices in favour of lower-level descriptions.
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  6. Graphomania and the all-or-nothing problem.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    When Milan Kundera introduces the concept of graphomania, he seems to register only two extremes: the person who writes for a few known people and the person who writes for a very large audience. Joe Horton’s all-or-nothing problem provides a way of making sense of this conceptualization of the situation, though in a way that breaks with Kundera’s emphasis on a writer’s craving for audience attention.
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  7. Does the Anthropocene Require Us to be Saints?Bennett Gilbert - manuscript
    The question of the moral demands that humans, posthumans, and nonhumans in the Anthropocene put up on persons now living generally takes the form of supererogatory demands—that is, moral obligations with a perfectionist structure leading to obligations “above and beyond the call of duty” and extreme individual and collective sacrifice. David Roden construes this by deontology; Toby Ord, following Derek Parfit, by consequentualism. Such obligations are akin to the martyrdom of saints: but must our expectations of the Anthropocene necessarily lead (...)
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  8. Finlay's Radical Altruism.Gerald Hull - manuscript
    The question “Why should I be moral?” has long haunted normative ethics. How one answers it depends critically upon one’s understanding of morality, self-interest, and the relation between them. Stephen Finlay, in “Too Much Morality”, challenges the conventional interpretation of morality in terms of mutual fellowship, offering instead the “radical” view that it demands complete altruistic self-abnegation: the abandonment of one’s own interests in favor of those of any “anonymous” other. He ameliorates this with the proviso that there is no (...)
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  9. All Reasons Are Moral.Daniel Muñoz - manuscript
    Morality doesn't always require our best. Prudent acts and heroic sacrifices are optional, not obligatory. To explain this, some philosophers claim that reasons of self-interest must have a special "non-moral" significance. A better explanation, I argue, is that we have prerogatives based in rights.
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  10. Chapter 5: Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
    This is Chapter 5 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I argue that those who wish to accommodate typical instances of supererogation and agent-centered options must deny that moral reasons are morally overriding and accept both that the reason that agents have to promote their own self-interest is a non-moral reason and that this reason can, and sometimes does, prevent the moral reason that they have to sacrifice their self-interest so as to do more to (...)
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  11. Exemplars and expertise: what we cannot learn from saints and heroes.Alfred Archer & Matthew Dennis - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    According to a popular line of thought, moral exemplars have a key role to play in moral development and moral education and by paying attention to moral exemplars we can learn about what morality requires of us. However, when we pay attention to what many moral exemplars say about their actions, it seems that our moral obligations are much more demanding than we typically think they are. Some philosophers have argued that this exemplar testimony gives us reason to accept a (...)
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  12. Supererogation and Optimisation.Christian Barry & Seth Lazar - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
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  13. The Relation between Moral Reasons and Moral Requirement.Brendan de Kenessey - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    What is the relation between moral reasons and moral requirement? Specifically: what relation does an action have to bear to one’s moral reasons in order to count as morally required? This paper defends the following answer to this question: an action is morally required just in case the moral reasons in favor of that action are enough on their own to outweigh all of the reasons, moral and nonmoral, to perform any alternative. I argue that this decisive moral reason view (...)
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  14. The Cautionary Account of Supererogation.Seyyed Mohsen Eslami & Alfred Archer - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    The problem of supererogation has attracted significant attention from contemporary moral philosophers. In this paper, we show that this problem was outlined in different terms in the work of the 11th century Persian philosopher Abū Alī Miskawayh. As well as identifying this problem, Miskawayh also developed a unique solution cashed out in terms of virtue ethics that has not yet been considered in the contemporary literature. We will argue that this solution, which is in its general form independent of virtue (...)
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  15. Must We Be Perfect?: A Case Against Supererogation.Megan Fritts & Calum Miller - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63.
    In this paper we offer an argument against supererogation and in favour of moral perfectionism. We argue three primary points: 1) That the putative moral category is not generated by any of the main normative ethical systems, and it is difficult to find space for it in these systems at all; 2) That the primary support for supererogation is based on intuitions, which can be undercut by various other pieces of evidence; and 3) That there are better reasons to favour (...)
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  16. Pacifists Are Admirable Only if They're Right.Blake Hereth - forthcoming - Public Affairs Quarterly.
    The recent explosion of philosophical papers on Confederate and Colonialist statues centers on a central question: When, if ever, is it permissible to admire a person? This paper contends it’s not just Confederates and slavers whose reputations are on the line, but also pacifists like Martin Luther King, Jr., and Daisy Bates whose commitments to pacifism meant they were unwilling to save others using defensive violence, including others they talked into endangering themselves for the sake of racial equality. Other things (...)
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  17. Partiality and Meaning.Benjamin Lange - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-28.
    Why do relationships of friendship and love support partiality, but not relationships of hatred or commitments of racism? Where does partiality end and why? I take the intuitive starting point that important cases of partiality are meaningful. I develop a view whereby meaning is understood in terms of transcending self-limitations in order to connect with things of external value. I then show how this view can be used to distinguish central cases of legitimate partiality from cases of illegitimate partiality and (...)
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  18. Partiality, Asymmetries, and Morality’s Harmonious Propensity.Benjamin Lange & Joshua Brandt - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-42.
    We argue for asymmetries between positive and negative partiality. Specifically, we defend four claims: i) there are forms of negative partiality that do not have positive counterparts; ii) the directionality of personal relationships has distinct effects on positive and negative partiality; iii) the extent of the interactions within a relationship affects positive and negative partiality differently; and iv) positive and negative partiality have different scope restrictions. We argue that these asymmetries point to a more fundamental moral principle, which we call (...)
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  19. The Enmity Relationship as Justified Negative Partiality.Benjamin Lange & Joshua Brandt - forthcoming - In Monika Betzler & Jörg Löschke (eds.), The Ethics of Relationships: Broadening the Scope. Oxford University Press.
    Existing discussions of partiality have primarily examined special personal relationships between family, friends, or co-nationals. The negative analogue of such relationships – for example, the relationship of enmity – has, by contrast, been largely neglected. This chapter explores this adverse relation in more detail and considers the special reasons generated by it. We suggest that enmity can involve justified negative partiality, allowing members to give less consideration to each other’s interests. We then consider whether the negative partiality of enmity can (...)
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  20. Permissiveness in morality and epistemology.Han Li & Bradford Saad - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Morality is intrapersonally permissive: cases abound in which an agent has more than one morally permitted option. In contrast, there is a dearth of cases in which an agent has more than one epistemically permitted response to her evidence. Given the structural parallels between morality and epistemology, why do sources of moral permissiveness fail to have parallel permissive effects in the epistemic domain? This asymmetry between morality and epistemology cries out for explanation. The paper's task is to offer an answer (...)
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  21. Impartiality, Eudaimonic Encroachment, and the Boundaries of Morality.Errol Lord - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
    Many hold that morality is essentially impartial. Many also hold that partiality is justified. Susan Wolf argues that these commitments push us towards downgrading morality's practical significance. Here I argue that there is a way of pushing morality's boundaries in a partialist direction in a way that respects Wolf's insights.
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  22. The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism, by Theron Pummer. [REVIEW]Daniel Muñoz - forthcoming - Mind:fzad043.
  23. Resuscitation during the pandemic: Optional obligation? or supererogation?Jonathan Perkins, Mark Hamilton, Charlotte Canniff, Craig Gannon, Marianne Illsley, Paul Murray, Kate Scribbins, Martin Stockwell, Justin Wilson & Ann Gallagher - forthcoming - Sage Publications: Clinical Ethics.
    Clinical Ethics, Ahead of Print. This paper is a response to a recent BMJ Blog: ‘The duty to treat: where do the limits lie?’ Members of the Surrey Heartlands Integrated Care Service Clinical Ethics Group reflected on arguments in the Blog in relation to resuscitation during the COVID-19 pandemic.Clinicians have had to contend with ever-changing and conflicting guidance from the Resuscitation Council UK and Public Health England regarding personal protective equipment requirements in resuscitation situations. St John Ambulance had different guidance (...)
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  24. Compensated Altruism and Moral Autonomy.Theron Pummer - forthcoming - Social Philosophy and Policy.
    It is sometimes morally permissible not to help others even when doing so is overall better for you. For example, you are not morally required to take a career in medicine over a career in music, even if the former is both better for others and better for you. I argue that the permissibility of not helping in a range of cases of “compensated altruism” is explained by the existence of autonomy-based considerations. I sketch a view according to which you (...)
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  25. Even More Supererogatory.Holly M. Smith - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Losing an arm to rescue a child from a burning building is supererogatory. But is losing an arm to save two children more supererogatory than losing two arms to save a single child? What factors make one act more supererogatory than another? I provide an innovative account of how to compare which of two acts is more supererogatory, and show the superiority of this account to its chief rival.
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  26. The Weight of Reasons: A Framework for Ethics.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The book develops, defends, and applies an account of weighing reasons to resolve various issues in ethics. It tells you everything you ever wanted to know about weighing reasons and probably a lot of stuff you didn't want to know too. The excerpt provided here is the Table of Contents, the Introduction, and Chapter 1.
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  27. Weighing Reasons Against.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    Ethicists increasingly reject the scale as a useful metaphor for weighing reasons. Yet they generally retain the metaphor of a reason’s weight. This combination is incoherent. The metaphor of weight entails a very specific scale-based model of weighing reasons, Dual Scale. Justin Snedegar worries that scale-based models of weighing reasons can’t properly weigh reasons against an option. I show that there are, in fact, two different reasons for/against distinctions, and I provide an account of the relationship between the various kinds (...)
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  28. Parity, Pluralism, and Permissible Partiality.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - In Eric Siverman & Chris Tweed (eds.), Virtuous and Vicious Partiality. Routledge.
    We can often permissibly choose a worse self-interested option over a better altruistic alternative. For example, it is permissible to eat out rather than donate the money to feed five hungry children for a single meal. If we eat out, we do something permissibly partial toward ourselves. If we donate, we go beyond the call of moral duty and do something supererogatory. Such phenomena aren’t easy to explain, and they rule out otherwise promising moral theories. Incommensurability and Ruth Chang’s notion (...)
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  29. The All or Nothing Ranking Reversal and the Unity of Morality.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
    Supererogatory acts are, in some sense, morally better their non-supererogatory alternatives. In this sense, what is it for one option A to be better than an alternative B? I argue for three main conclusions. First, relative rankings are a type of all-in action guidance. If A is better than B, then morality recommends that you A rather than B. Such all-in guidance is useful when acts have the same deontic status. Second, I argue that Right > Wrong: permissible acts are (...)
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  30. Review of Rebecca Stangl, Neither Heroes Nor Saints: Ordinary Virtue, Extraordinary Virtue, and Self-Cultivation[REVIEW]Jeremy Reid - 2024 - Mind 133 (529):258-267.
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  31. Beyond reasons and obligations: A dual-role approach to reasons and supererogation.Knoks Aleks & Streit David - 2023 - In Juliano Maranhão, Clayton Peterson, Christian Straßer & van der Torre Leendert (eds.), Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: 16th International Conference (DEON2023, Trois-Rivières). London: College Publications. pp. 119-137.
    Dual-role approaches to reasons say, roughly, that reasons can relate to actions in two fundamentally different ways: they can either require conformity, or justify an action without requiring that it be taken. This paper develops a formal dual-role approach, combining ideas from defeasible logic and practical philosophy. It then uses the approach to shed light on the phenomenon of supererogation and resolve a well-known puzzle about supererogation, namely, Horton’s All or Nothing Problem.
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  32. Heroic Supererogation.Alfred Archer - 2023 - Encyclopedia of Heroism Studies.
    In this entry I will introduce two such puzzles that relate to the heroic actions and testimony. I will first introduce the basic idea of supererogation and why some heroic actions give us reason to accept the existence of supererogatory actions. I will then introduce the problem that supererogation raises for moral theory and explain the main responses that have been offered to this problem. I will then explain two related problems that arise from the way that heroes describe their (...)
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  33. What’s the Use of Non-moral Supererogation?Alfred Archer - 2023 - In David Heyd (ed.), Handbook of Supererogation. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 237-253.
    While moral philosophers have paid significant attention to the concept of moral supererogation, far less attention has been paid to the possibility that supererogation may also exist in other areas of normativity. Recently, though, philosophers have begun to consider the possible existence of prudential, epistemic, aesthetic, and sporting supererogation. These discussions tend to focus on aspects of our practices in these areas of normativity that suggest an implicit acceptance of the existence of supererogation. In this chapter, I will offer a (...)
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  34. Supererogation and the Limits of Reasons.Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt & Daniel Munoz - 2023 - In David Heyd (ed.), Handbook of Supererogation. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 165-180.
    We argue that supererogation cannot be understood just in terms of reasons for action. In addition to reasons, a theory of supererogation must include prerogatives, which can make an action permissible without counting in favor of doing it.
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  35. The Evaluative Condition for Supererogation.Claire Benn - 2023 - In David Heyd (ed.), Handbook of Supererogation. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 181-198.
    Supererogatory actions must go beyond duty not only by being optional, but also by being good to do. Understanding the evaluative condition that supererogatory actions must meet is vital in order to understand the very concept of supererogation. I argue for two key features of the goodness of supererogatory actions: firstly, that they are comparative, and secondly, that they are relative. Specifically, I argue that an action meets the evaluative condition of supererogation if and only if it is (i) better (...)
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  36. Taking Responsibility and Heroism.Dominik Boll - 2023 - Encyclopedia of Heroism Studies.
    “Taking responsibility” has different senses, referring most prominently either to something which has already happened or to something to be done. Taking backward-looking responsibility is a manner of relating to earlier actions, for instance, properly seeing them as one’s own, accepting their consequences, or appropriately discharging duties arising from them. Taking forward-looking responsibility concerns the acquisition, distribution, and execution of responsibilities regarding something which should be done, for example, by adopting certain roles, taking initiative, or optional action such as volunteering.
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  37. Supererogation and Forgiveness.Christopher Cowley - 2023 - In David Heyd (ed.), Handbook of Supererogation. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 199-219.
    Forgiveness is widely considered a paradigm of supererogation: it seems to be morally permissible without being obligatory, and it seems to be almost always admirable and praiseworthy. I want to show that the phenomenon is a bit more complicated, and that many instances are hard to describe as supererogatory. First, I will distinguish forgiveness from some other responses to the transgression (ignoring, excusing, letting go). Second, I will examine the philosophical debate over the question of whether or not the victim (...)
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  38. Supererogation in Christianity.Dimitrios Dentsoras - 2023 - In David Heyd (ed.), Handbook of Supererogation. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 293-314.
    The philosophical origins of the concept of supererogation can be found in medieval discussions of actions that deserve extraordinary merit. These discussions focus primarily on the evangelical counsels of celibacy, poverty, and obedience, which Christian tradition has recognized as non-obligatory and especially efficacious ways of reaching perfection and salvation, ever since its early centuries. This chapter will provide a history of supererogation and the related counsels, primarily within the context of the Roman Catholic Church. It starts with the New Testament, (...)
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  39. The Staircase Scene: Supererogation and Moral Attunement.Dale Dorsey - 2023 - In David Heyd (ed.), Handbook of Supererogation. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 87-104.
    This paper considers a pair of mutually puzzling first-order intuitions: a case in which it seems both supererogatory for an agent to perform a specified act, and also seems as though were that act not performed, this would have been a failure of moral obligations. I argue that these intuitive reactions are difficult to dislodge and resist accommodation by standard accounts of supererogation. I then argue that this puzzle motivates a new form of supererogatory action: action that, though morally required, (...)
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  40. Springer Handbook of Supererogation.David Heyd (ed.) - 2023 - Springer.
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  41. Promise-Making and Supererogation.David Heyd - 2023 - In Handbook of Supererogation. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 221-236.
    Studies of the practice of promising have concentrated on the reasons for keeping promises. This article focuses on promise-making and argues that the making of promises is typically supererogatory. It then addresses the question whether we can promise to perform supererogatory acts. Although once given, the promisor is under an obligation to perform the promised act, there is no paradox in describing the act as supererogatory. The proposed analysis is based on the distinction between the content of the promised act (...)
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  42. Handbook of Supererogation.David Heyd (ed.) - 2023 - Springer Nature Singapore.
    Supererogation is the category of moral actions which go beyond the call of duty. This collection of articles is the first of its kind to cover the broad spectrum of issues related to supererogation. It provides an up-to-date status of the discussion on the main issues, alternative analyses, and controversies regarding central cases of supererogation. The work explores a broad range of philosophical problems and challenges our presuppositions about the basis of ethical theories. Beyond the challenges of supererogation to deontological (...)
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  43. Introduction.David Heyd - 2023 - In Handbook of Supererogation. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 1-15.
    Only few philosophers are fortunate enough to start single-handedly a new topic in philosophy. The Oxford philosopher J. O. Urmson is one of them. But at the time he wrote his seminal article, ‘Saints and Heroes’ (1958), he was certainly not aware of it.
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  44. Supererogation in Buddhism.Soraj Hongladarom - 2023 - In David Heyd (ed.), Handbook of Supererogation. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 361-372.
    Supererogation in Buddhist philosophy is a rather neglected topic. Among the questions to be investigated are: “Is there supererogation in Buddhism?” “Can one explicate the examples of apparently supererogatory acts performed by bodhisattvas and other enlightened beings in terms of supererogation?” “Is there room in Buddhist ethics for acts which are neither obligatory but still meritorious?” The answer that I aim to defend here is that there is a place for supererogation in Buddhism, as exemplified, among others, by the acts (...)
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  45. The Expected, the Contra-Expected, the Supererogatory, and the Suberogatory.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2023 - In David Heyd (ed.), Handbook of Supererogation. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 119-130.
    This chapter defends the claim that the space of human actions is really partitionable into five non-overlapping deontic categories: the three commonly recognized ones (the obligatory, the impermissible or wrong, and the optional), plus two additional ones labeled the expected and the contra-expected. These latter categories are typically not recognized in ethical theorizing but nonetheless they are part of everyday moral experience. The defense of these additional deontic categories appeals, via inference to the best explanation, partly to phenomenological considerations and (...)
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  46. Supererogation, Conditional Obligation, and the All or Nothing Problem.Joe Horton - 2023 - In David Heyd (ed.), Handbook of Supererogation. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 51-61.
    If doing good is often beyond the call of duty, instances of the All or Nothing Problem abound. I have argued elsewhere that we should solve this problem by accepting a principle that I call Optimific Altruism, which has interesting implications both for the correct account of supererogation and for our obligations to give to charity. However, Theron Pummer and Daniel Muñoz have argued that we should instead solve this problem by rejecting an inference rule that I call Conditional Obligation. (...)
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  47. Supererogation and Duty.F. M. Kamm - 2023 - In David Heyd (ed.), Handbook of Supererogation. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 29-49.
    This chapter considers the relation between supererogation and duties (also here referred to as obligations) from a nonconsequentialist point of view. It first considers whether supererogation may sometimes take precedence over positive and negative duties and how this relates to personal costs (including efforts) required to perform one’s duty. It then considers how acquiescence to having large costs imposed on one (even permissibly) can be supererogatory. Finally, it considers how what are usually duties can become supererogatory and how what is (...)
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  48. Does Judaism Recognize the Supererogatory?Samuel Lebens - 2023 - In David Heyd (ed.), Handbook of Supererogation. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 329-348.
    This chapter puts forward a prima facie argument for a Jewish form of anti-supererogation before finding that no such argument can do justice to the Jewish tradition. Instead, the question becomes: what form of supererogation can Jewish law recognize? Qualified forms of supererogation would allow the Jewish philosopher to preserve certain theological and philosophical desiderata, but an unqualified form of supererogation sits more easily with a central approach to the nature of Divine revelation. Accordingly, the shape of a Jewish supererogation (...)
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  49. Going Above and Beyond: Non-moral Analogues of Moral Supererogation.Brian McElwee - 2023 - In David Heyd (ed.), Handbook of Supererogation. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 255-270.
    Apparent analogues of moral supererogation can be found in other normative domains, such as the prudential domain and the epistemic domain. Vindicating moral supererogation requires a convincing response to the challenge of the ‘paradox of moral supererogation’: if some act would be morally best, why would it not be morally required? Vindicating putative non-moral types of supererogation requires responding to analogous challenges: if some act would be best by the lights of some normative domain, why would it not be required (...)
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  50. Supererogation and Its Conceptual Neighborhood Through a DWE Lens.Paul McNamara - 2023 - In David Heyd (ed.), Handbook of Supererogation. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 131-163.
    I first provide an accessible overview of the DWE (Doing Well Enough) logical and semantic framework for representing going beyond the call and its family of kindred concepts in a tightly intergraded way. Next, a module, for representing some basic agent-evaluative notions is developed (“AA” for “Aretaic Assessment”), and then it is integrated with the more act-evaluative notions of DWE, thereby allowing for a representation of suberogation and supererogation (as distinct from going beyond the call) and many other combined deontic (...)
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