One of the main problems of modern rationalistic theories of science is the non-eliminability of the subjective factor in the development of science. Temperate rationalism of Newton-Smith was an attempt to solve this problem. J. Życiński developed his own version of temperate rationalism in which the subjective factor played much more substantial role. In the article I am presenting his specific idea of the personal _commitment_ as a necessary condition for rationalism and science. In the first section I proceed to (...) reconstruct ˙ Życiński’s argument leading him to the conclusion of this epistemological necessity. Next in the section 2 I present his idea of the epistemological uncertainty principle as a consequence of the subjective _commitment_. In sections 3 and 4 I explore axiological and pragmatic aspects of the Życiński solution. Finally, in the section 5 I do compare his temperate rationalism with Newton-Smith’s proposal in the context of the Polanyi’s idea of personal knowledge showing differences in their respective approach to the role of the subjective factor in science and rationalism. (shrink)

Is there a place for the tragic vision in an orderly scheme of things? This is the question that Patrick Madigan asks in an interesting essay that explores not only the place of tragedy and comedy in human experience, but also the place of the opening that tragedy represents in the Aristotelian system. He argues that Aristotle's view of being, if rightly understood, can accept and even embrace the tragic vision, and moreover that the perspective on human experience laid open (...) by tragedy can lead to a more complete understanding of ourselves and the world we try to come to terms with. He argues that it is only in the dreadful character of tragic experience that we can be shocked out of a complacent "doxalogical slumber" into the genuinely self-critical examination required for the attainment of theoretical knowledge. (shrink)