The essays in this volume formulate what is considered to be the preconditions for an adequate theory of modern society. The volume starts with an examination of the modern European philosophical and scientific tradition notably the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.

William Rasch offers a reading of Carl Schmitt that avoids rehashing the controversies of the Weimar era in favour of examining a broader historical context. He examines Schmitt's notion of political theology, eschewing theocratic intention but taking seriously the 'secularization' of patterns of thought derived from Medieval theology.

Carl Schmitt's critique of liberal pluralism (of individuals and associations) was conducted in the name of a different pluralism, a truer pluralism, according to him, namely, the pluralism of equal and sovereign nation-states. His friend/enemy distinction dictates that conflict is the only legitimate model for politics, at least on the international level. By translating Schmitt's theory of politics as conflict into terms derived from the work of Lyotard and Luhmann, this article asks whether Schmitt's concept of the political has any (...) relevance for the contemporary world, especially considering that the liberal pluralism of associations (or social systems) seems to have carried the day. Such a transposition requires that the modern, horizontal structure of operationally closed (but internally bifurcated) social systems be thought of as sovereign states fiercely fighting to maintain their autonomy. Thus, the common battle fought by the anti-modernist, Schmitt, the ultra-modernist, Luhmann, and the post-modernist, Lyotard, is the one against de-differentiation and the expansion of a universalist morality and economy. (shrink)

If, as Max Weber famously argued, science in general (Wissenschaft)*that is, the focused, disciplined use of reason*cannot justify itself on its own terms, then each individual science*law is among his examples*remains without foundation. Law, Weber wrote, operates by distinguishing between legality and illegality. Whatever is brought before it by way of formally correct procedures demands and receives judgment. An action is either legal or illegal; a person either not-guilty or guilty. But law itself remains in legal limbo. Law as a (...) science cannot determine whether the science of law is legal.1 This conundrum, Niklas Luhmann would say, is the foundational paradox, the paradox of all foundations, and thus the foundation of all of Luhmann’s speculations. Modernity consists in the functioning of operationally closed social systems that reproduce themselves internally, autopoietically, by means of their own elements. Seen from the perspective of sociology, or at least Luhmann’s sociology, social systems - law included - find their legitimacy only through the continued success of their operations. Legitimation durch Verfahren [Legitimation through procedure],2 as Luhmann famously and controversially put it early in his career. (Published: 1 September 2010) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2010, pp. 239-254. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v3i3.5488. (shrink)