One of the most influential contemporary philosophers, Hilary Putnam's involvement in philosophy spans philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, ontology and epistemology and logic. This specially commissioned collection discusses his contribution to the realist and pragmatist debate. Hilary Putnam comments on the issues raised in each article, making it invaluable for any scholar of his work.

One of the most influential contemporary philosophers, Hilary Putnam's involvement in philosophy spans philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, ontology and epistemology and logic. This specially commissioned collection discusses his contribution to the realist and pragmatist debate. Hilary Putnam comments on the issues raised in each article, making it invaluable for any scholar of his work.

I investigate the relationship between traditional philosophical epistemology and cognitive science. I start my considerations with the following questions: does the development of cognitive science require any revision of epistemology, akin to the revision required in some areas analytic philosophy after the emergence of quantum physics? Does cognitive science continue philosophical epistemology or is the complete break with traditional philosophical approaches?

The paper sought to point at the epistemological aspect of understanding. It departs from the semiotic analysis of understanding, submitted with regard to words, statements, and texts. Some problems connected with the semiotic analysis are pinpointed here. They cannot be solved on the semiotic level. The considerations are crowned with some remarks on understanding as a property of the cognitive equipment of the knowing system. This property is examined not only in philosophical epistemology but in the epistemology developed in the (...) contemporary context of cognitive sciences. (shrink)

The paper is focused on the problem of identification in perception. I attempt to inquire on what ground the cognitive system is able to identify an object of perception (I restrict my analysis to visual perception). Although this is an empirical question for cognitive science, I consider it using a philosophical method of analysis. But my considerations in great part are heuristic, I ask questions and rather search for the answers than give a ready solution. The questions I ask arise (...) from a theoretical philosophical inquiry made in the context of cognitive science. The key question of my paper is whether perceptual identification has any cognitive basis, i.e. does it require any concepts or any prior knowledge. I especially pay attention to the problem of representation, asking if perceptual identification is representational or not. These questions are topical today and show that the traditional philosophical approaches to perception require revision and a new critical look at old problems and controversies. (shrink)

The main thesis of the paper is very simple, namely that the cognitive system is a representational system. The cognitive system will be defined as a system which is able to realize cognitive functions such as perception, symbolic thinking, understanding and reflection. Such a system is further characterized as: cognitively open and at the same time relatively isolated, representational, structurally complex and many-dimensional, dynamic and having functional plasticity (cognitively adaptive) and also having the capacity for self-determination. The analysis will be (...) focused on the characterization of representation (which will be defined as a certain kind of content) and on the types of representations in the cognitive system (i.e. perceptual and conceptual representations, the representation of the body and the representation of "self"). (shrink)

In this paper I defend the multi-dimensional conception of the mind according to which an account of one-dimension, for example biological or computational or cultural, is insufficient for an adequate theory of the mind. The systematic account of this conception was presented in my book Philosophy of mind. The debate with naturalistic conceptions of mind (in Polish, Marszałek 2003). Here I only focus on some problems which have been raised by Robert Poczobut in his review of my book (presented in (...) this volume). They are the following problems: the problem of unification of research in the paradigm of cognitive science (i.e., unification via information); the problem of reduction and emergence discussed on Searle's approach to the mind; the problem of causality and determinations of the mind (Does the mind have only causal, i.e. physical determination or not?, Does the determination of the mind have any influence on the causal complementation of the physical universe?, Is possible a system without any causal determination?); the problem of consciousness (Is consciousness possible in artificial intelligence? What is the conclusion from the known Searle's principle of connection saying about the connection between the intentional and conscious states?); and the problem of compatibility of descriptions given in the philosophy of mind at the psychological level, and in neuroscience at the neuronal level (I'd presented this compatibility on the analysis of the experience of pain). In the conclusion, entitled "Conclusion without dialectics," I reply to the objection of my reviewer that I admit the dialectics of naturalism with non-naturalism. I agree for such "dialectics" as a starting point from where I speak for certain continuity in research of the mind conducted by science and philosophy, but I also admit such dimensions of the mind which can be studied autonomically (in non-naturalistic philosophical approach). (shrink)

This special issue offers a multidimensional perspective on the recent inquiries into knowledge representation. Multidimensionality exposes the complexity of knowledge representation and helps distinguish between different approaches and research tools. On the one hand, the presented research focuses on the theoretical and empirical aspects of knowledge representation (taking into account cognitive processes and capacities, including linguistic skills needed to generate and express knowledge); on the other, the articles included in the issue discuss the practical discourse, analyzing actions from the point (...) of view of cognitively oriented semantics and the scientific practice broadly understood. The issue consists of five papers that show how certain ideas in the research area of knowledge representation inspired the authors to look for new approaches to modelling concepts and practical reasoning, constructing theory of signs using the tools of data science, and dealing with cognitive artifacts in scientific practice and its dynamics. What these approaches have in common is their attempt at capturing the multidimensionality of knowledge representation in such a way that integrates them. Our goal is to emphasize some innovative aspects of those approaches with respect to the dynamics of knowledge representation in both the cognitive system and scientific practice. (shrink)