As a philosophy instructor, I strive to get my students to think critically about the subject matter. However, over the years I have encountered many students who seem to deliberately want to avoid thinking critically. I am talking particularly about some students in my “Science and Religion” course, who subscribe to scientific creationism and endorse anti–scientific beliefs which seem to be irrational. In this essay, I will offer reflections of my experiences from these classes, and argue that individuals who subscribe (...) to creationism exhibit a combination of epistemic vices that makes them prone to holding incorrect views. Employing Quassim Cassam’s framework on the epistemic vices of conspiracy theorists in his “Vice Epistemology”, I argue that the creationists’ beliefs can best be understood as resulting from similar vices. Subsequently, I move to consider the reasons why these students subscribe to creationism, using Katherine Dormandy’s analysis in her “Does Epistemic Humility Threaten Religious Beliefs?” as a springboard. Following Dormandy, I explore how epistemic vices lead to someone holding false —even irrational— beliefs. Finally, I will consider strategies in dealing with vice–charging the epistemically vicious students in a way that avoids the practical difficulties noted by Ian James Kidd in his “Charging Others with Epistemic Vice”. (shrink)

As a philosophy instructor, I strive to get my students to think critically about the subject matter. However, over the years I have encountered many students who seem to deliberately want to avoid thinking critically. I am talking particularly about some students in my “Science and Religion” course, who subscribe to scientific creationism and endorse anti–scientific beliefs which seem to be irrational. In this essay, I will offer reflections of my experiences from these classes, and argue that individuals who subscribe (...) to creationism exhibit a combination of epistemic vices that makes them prone to holding incorrect views. Employing Quassim Cassam’s framework on the epistemic vices of conspiracy theorists in his “Vice Epistemology”, I argue that the creationists’ beliefs can best be understood as resulting from similar vices. Subsequently, I move to consider the reasons why these students subscribe to creationism, using Katherine Dormandy’s analysis in her “Does Epistemic Humility Threaten Religious Beliefs?” as a springboard. Following Dormandy, I explore how epistemic vices lead to someone holding false —even irrational— beliefs. Finally, I will consider strategies in dealing with vice–charging the epistemically vicious students in a way that avoids the practical difficulties noted by Ian James Kidd in his “Charging Others with Epistemic Vice”. (shrink)

The World War II Disney propaganda films – the propaganda and entertainment shorts – are included in the Walt Disney in the Front Lines boxed set, which was released as part of the third wave of the Walt Disney Treasures collection in 2004. This chapter considers a neutral definition of propaganda – one that does not foreclose on the question of its moral acceptability. Each of the Disney propaganda shorts comes with a specific message, though the common purpose was “intended (...) to help the war effort, whether by encouraging thrift and sacrifice, or demoralizing the enemy.” Whether it is the pareidolic depictions of Nazi submarines in The Spirit of '43, or the caricatures of the German leaders in Der Fuehrer's Face, or the portraits of the Japanese troops in Commando Duck: the point is that these all rouse the passions in a way that purely verbal descriptions of the Axis soldiers never could. (shrink)

Although fantastical thought-experiments about personal identity abound, these seemingly cannot bring home the conviction one way or the other, when it comes to the nature of diachronic (or synchronic) personhood. Per Kathleen Wilkes, these thought-experiments suffer from being divorced from the necessary background conditions. In this paper, I aim to rectify this by developing an empirically-informed thought experiment (that fill in these blanks) focusing on feral children, or children who have grown up in near-complete isolation from all human interaction. After (...) detailing the significance of these cases and discussing a present-day case, I move to construct the background for thought-experiments on these cases. As an upshot, I apply the experiment to a contemporary theory of personhood (namely, constitutionalism), analyze its shortcomings, and make recommendations for future improvements. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called ' appeal to personal incredulity'. The fallacy of appeal to personal incredulity is committed when the arguer presumes that whatever is true must be easy to understand or to imagine. The fallacy seems to be most frequent when the contrasting expert opinions differ from our deeply held beliefs. The fallacy is very commonly found in debates over science. In a variant of the fallacy, a person may to (...) appeal to her lack of understanding on a subject matter in a seemingly more self‐deprecating manner as a backhanded way of undermining expert authority. The steps to avoid committing the appeal to personal incredulity fallacy are rather straightforward. (shrink)

The base rate fallacy is a fallacy that occurs in probabilistic reasoning when available general information is omitted from the calculations and attention is given to specific information only. To illustrate this concept, this chapter discusses the scenario in Philip K. Dick's short story “Minority Report”, with some details augmented by the 2002 movie daptation by Steven Spielberg. The legislative approach seems to be based not just on the base rate fallacy but on assuming a base rate that is divorced (...) from reality, that the drug use rate among welfare applicants is significantly higher than the national rate. Once the accurate base rate is applied (be it the proportions between the races in the US population, or the percentage of drug users among the people receiving government welfare, etc.), one can clearly see that the original conclusion does not follow. (shrink)

What if the Merc with a Mouth was sent to a psychiatric institution with the intent of helping him, but what came out was something even more disturbing? This is the basic plotline of Deadpool Kills the Marvel Universe where Deadpool, well, kills all the characters who make up the Marvel Universe in order to save them from a fate worse than death. Under the gory surface of this story are substantive philosophical questions about the nature of reality, the place (...) we inhabit in it, and the meaning of our seemingly absurd existence. This chapter explores the nature of possibility and the arguments for cashing out the notion of alternate realities in terms of possible worlds. (shrink)

The fallacy of diminished responsibility (DR), a variant of the fallacy of accident, is common enough to warrant being treated on its own. The fallacy of DR occurs when a principle that could be applicable as a positive defense in common law trials is applied in cases that are typically excluded from the scope of the principle. Whether the fallacy of DR is committed or not depends on the context in which the claim for DR is made. If the factor (...) that is offered as diminishing one's (moral) responsibility is something that results from a voluntary choice, then the claim is fallacious. In terms of avoiding the fallacy, there are some instances where an individual's moral (or legal) responsibility can be diminished due to factors beyond the individual's control. However, in none of these instances is the causal responsibility diminished. (shrink)

This chapter considers epistemology to look at the four sorcerers who were once students of the Ancient One: Jonathan Pangborn, Kaecilius, Mordo, and Doctor Stephen Strange. In the 2016 film Doctor Strange, the Book of Cagliostro is a repository of forbidden knowledge of dark magic. The notion of “forbidden knowledge” is deeply ingrained in the collective consciousness. By contrast to the practicality of reliabilism, responsibilism emphasizes the ethical aspect of the acquisition of knowledge, demanding not only that it be acquired (...) well but virtuously. According to contemporary philosopher James Montmarquet, there are three character traits that are conducive to being epistemically virtuous in this sense: impartiality, courage, and the ability to unite these two in proper ways. Though none of the Ancient One's students display perfect intellectual virtue, Doctor Strange ultimately comes closest to the virtues of impartiality and intellectual courage in their proper balance. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called moving the goalposts (MG). This fallacy is typically committed when the three conditions are met: Person A requests Person B to meet a certain goal; Person B fulfills the goal; and instead of admitting that Person B has met the goals or has discharged the conditions of the contract, Person A stipulates even further goals. Focusing on the Archaeopteryx fossil, the goalposts are shifted when it comes to (...) the interpretations of it. Scientists who conclude that it is a genuine transitional fossil require that it shows features of dinosaurs and of birds, which the Archaeopteryx does. The most straightforward way in which this fallacy can be avoided only requires a few steps, but these are such that they need to be completed beforehand. The chapter also discusses all these steps. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'no true Scotsman (NTS)'. Though NTS may look similar to the fallacy of accident, it takes a more subjective form. NTS is frequently found in ideological debates where it is used in an attempt to make one's claim unfalsifiable. The NTS is a fallacy of presumption: the arguer committing the fallacy presumes to be the authority on determining what it takes to be a member of a certain group. (...) Determining whether one is a Scotsman or not is chiefly based on one's nationality or residence, and this does not necessitate having a strong moral character. A likely factor that contributes to the NTS fallacy is the arguer's own cognitive bias, specifically the in‐group ('us')/out‐group ('them') bias. To avoid the NTS fallacy, the arguer needs to be mindful of his own cognitive biases and allow for the fact that in‐group disagreements do happen. (shrink)

This paper describes a newly-developed course titled Philosophy of Censorship. Developed out of materials covered in an applied ethics course, this course seeks to improve the students’ understanding about the rights to free expression, and the ways in which these rights are—sometimes necessarily—curtailed in the contemporary society. In studying J. S. Mill’s prominent argument for freedom of thought and expression, the course analyzes the argument for its strength and applicability, when it comes to frequently challenged forms of expression, such as (...) pornography and hate speech. Moreover, the course looks into alternative arguments that aim to safeguard individuals’ right to free speech, including non-consequentialist arguments. The course also strives to keep current with contemporary discussions of freedom of expression and censorship. (shrink)

Although Ian Barbour’s model for outlining the science-religion relationship is probably the best known taxonomy, it also faces substantial criticism. I offer a qualified defence of the continuing usefulness of Barbour’s taxonomy as a starting point for exploring the science-religion relationship. To achieve this, I outline a method for illustrating Barbour’s taxonomy by using the recent Disney/Pixar film Inside Out in a reciprocal manner: as an upshot, the message of the movie can be employed for modifying some aspects of the (...) taxonomy. (shrink)