In September 2003, several prominent mutual fund companies came under investigation for illegal trading practices. Allegations suggested these funds allowed certain investors to profit from short-term trading schemes at the expense of other investors. Surprisingly, regulatory authorities have known for more than two decades of the potential for such abuses, yet have taken limited steps to correct the problem. We explore investor reaction to the scandal by measuring assets under management, stock returns, and performance. Mutual funds managed by investigated firms (...) show a substantial decline in post-announcement assets under management. These firms also experienced significantly negative announcement-period returns. Finally, we discuss several policy suggestions to prevent future trading abuses and provide direction for future research. (shrink)

Prior research shows that mutual fund investors are often aware of up-front charges like sales loads, but they are less mindful of annual operating expenses, even though both types of fees lower overall performance. This study documents the historical trend and recent abuse of annual mutual fund expenses. As the industry becomes more adept at segmenting customers by level of investment sophistication, we claim that load mutual fund companies take advantage of this ability and charge higher expenses to their target (...) customer: the less-knowledgeable investor. No-load fund companies, which tend to attract the more sophisticated investor, offer lower expenses. For example, over 2000–2004 the average annual expense ratio of load equity funds was 50 basis points higher than no-load equity funds. We show evidence of this widening cost disparity since the early 1990s among new and existing equity, bond, and index funds. We also document a growing abuse of sales distribution or 12b-1 fees among funds that are closed to new investors, almost all of which are load funds. Thus, load fund investors are more susceptible to paying higher expenses and receiving lower returns over time. (shrink)

Prior research shows that mutual fund investors are often aware of up-front charges like sales loads, but they are less mindful of annual operating expenses, even though both types of fees lower overall performance. This study documents the historical trend and recent abuse of annual mutual fund expenses. As the industry becomes more adept at segmenting customers by level of investment sophistication, we claim that load mutual fund companies take advantage of this ability and charge higher expenses to their target (...) customer: the less-knowledgeable investor. No-load fund companies, which tend to attract the more sophisticated investor, offer lower expenses. For example, over 2000-2004 the average annual expense ratio of load equity funds was 50 basis points higher than no-load equity funds. We show evidence of this widening cost disparity since the early 1990s among new and existing equity, bond, and index funds. We also document a growing abuse of sales distribution or 12b-1 fees among funds that are closed to new investors, almost all of which are load funds. Thus, load fund investors are more susceptible to paying higher expenses and receiving lower returns over time. (shrink)