In this paper, I develop an argument against eternalism, which is similar to the widely discussed grounding problem for presentism. It has recently been argued by many that presentism should be rejected on grounds that its sparse ontology is not suited to underwrite the healthy dose of realism we all share about the past. My aim basically is to add a new twist to the debate, by showing that actually eternalists are no better off than their rivals. In particular, I (...) argue that the eternalist’s ontology does not have the appropriate shape to ground true propositions about the past. (shrink)

The basic divide in the metaphysics of time is between those who defend a dynamic view and those who defend a static view. Whereas the former hold that time does truly pass, the latter take the passage of time to be some sort of illusion. Recently, however, an alternative minority view developed, according to which passage is identical either with the succession of times in the four-dimensional manifold or with the temporally ordered sequence of events located at these. I want (...) to argue that something is wrong with the identity theory of passage. If passage and time qua part of the manifold are identical, then talk of passage should be translatable into talk about time qua part of the manifold (and vice versa). I show that this is not always possible. (shrink)