ABSTRACTThis paper argues that decolonial theory can offer a distinctive and valuable ethical lens. Decolonial perspectives give rise to an ethics that is fundamentally global but distinct from, and critical of, moral cosmopolitanism. Decolonial ethics shares with cosmopolitanism a refusal to circumscribe normative commitments on the basis of existing political and cultural boundaries. It differs from cosmopolitanism, though, by virtue of its rejection of the individualism and universalism of cosmopolitan thought. Where cosmopolitan approaches tend to articulate abstract principles developed from (...) within a particular Western tradition, decolonial approaches reject abstract global designs in favour of inter-cultural dialogue amongst multiple people, including peoples who deem collective and non-human entities to be of fundamental moral importance. In addition, decolonial global ethics rejects universality in favour of ‘pluriversality’. (shrink)

This book explores the concept of and cases of complicity in an interdisciplinary context. It in part covers cases of direct complicity, where an agent or set of agents facilitates an identifiable act of wrongdoing. The book also draws attention to the manner in which agents become complicit in the reproduction of wider practices of wrongdoing. It goes on to explore the notion of complicity through a series of cases emerging from a variety of academic disciplines and professional practice, including (...) the complicity of politicians, medical practitioners, and the wider public in forms of state violence, protest movements and secret‐keeping. (shrink)

Does Bevir's weak intentionalism clash irredeemably with the rejection of conceptions of subjectivity in the work of Deleuze and the later Foucault? The paper examines the notion of the subject required by Bevir's weak intentionalism, before turning to the "rejection" of the subject found in the work of Deleuze and the later Foucault, suggesting that this rejection only rejects the subject as something fully autonomous and given in advance, and does not constitute a global rejection of any subject capable of (...) intentional meaning. A subject who intends is perfectly permissible within the context of Deleuze and Foucault's philosophies, provided that they are regarded as emergent phenomena from multiple impressions, processes, forces and powers. This subject is in fact a strong candidate for weak intentionalism. However, the Deleuzean/Foucaultian conception of the subject does problematize Bevir's restriction of historical meaning to the meanings of individual subjects, and not to collectivities. Collectivities, much like individuals, can be conceived as emergent phenomena from multiple matters, relations, powers, individuals and so on, and therefore seem capable of generating meanings, much in the way that subjects can generate meanings. We must, therefore, ask what is so special about the individual subject such that only they are capable of meaning. (shrink)

This book explores the concept of and cases of complicity in an interdisciplinary context. It in part covers cases of direct complicity, where an agent or set of agents facilitates an identifiable act of wrongdoing. The book also draws attention to the manner in which agents become complicit in the reproduction of wider practices of wrongdoing. It goes on to explore the notion of complicity through a series of cases emerging from a variety of academic disciplines and professional practice, including (...) the complicity of politicians, medical practitioners, and the wider public in forms of state violence, protest movements and secret‐keeping. (shrink)